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Abstrdct 
Post-war affluence for a time appeared to threaten Labour's 
future as a party of government in Britain. After the Party's 
third consecutive election defeat in 1959 commentators suggested 
that the twinned growth of affluence and consumerism had begun 
to erode Labour's traditional base of support. It was argued 
that workers aspired to middle class values and lifestyles as 
they became more prosperous and as a consequence abandoned the 
Labour Party. Wilson's victory in 1964 showed that predictions 
about the Party's long-term demise had been wide of the mark. 
But historians have continued to search for an explanation for 
Labour's apparent electoral weakness in the 1950s. 
This thesis will argue that the descriptions of weakness and 
failure which have been applied to the Labour Party in the 
affluent post-war years have been overstated. It will aim to 
show that the underlying strength and vitality of the Party in 
the 1950s and early 19609 have been too often overlooked. 
After the aims of the thesis have been explained in more 
detail in the introduction, chapter two examines the internal 
politics of the Labour Party between the elections of 1951 and 
1955. Policy-making during this period is also discussed. 
Chapter three focuses on Hugh Gaitskell's leadership of the 
Party between December 1955 and October 1959. Labour's three 
year review of policy is discussed in chapter four and it will 
be shown that this review provided the basis for the manifestos 
of 1959 and 1964. Chapter five will examine the Party's response 
to the 1959 election defeat. Chapter six is a discussion of 
policy-making between 1959 and 1964. Chapter seven assesses the 
internal opposition to the Labour leadership after 1955 and 
chapter eight is a discussion of local Labour politics during 
the thirteen years of opposition. 
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1. Introduction 
Within a decade of the Attlee Government's departure from office 
in 1951, commentators began to argue that post-war prosperity 
threatened Labour's future as a party of government in 
Britain. (1) After a third consecutive election defeat in 1959 it 
was suggested that the twinned growth of affluence and 
consumerism had begun to erode Labour's traditional base of 
support. The spread of home ownership, the growth of home- 
centred leisure activities, and increased consumer spending on 
luxury items and durables were all identified as factors which 
had altered the priorities of traditional Labour supporters. 
(2) 
Rather than identify with the interests of a social class or the 
trades unions, individuals seemed to be more concerned with 
their own particular needs and aspirations. As a result, many 
either lost interest in politics or alternatively supported 
Conservative Governments which delivered economic growth and 
which emphasised their positive attitude towards individual 
ambition. In short, it was argued that a significant proportion 
of traditional Labour voters abandoned the Party as their 
standard of living reached new heights in the 1950s. 
Initially, this analysis appeared to offer a credible 
explanation for Labour's sequence of election defeats in 1951, 
1955 and 1959 (see appendix). In a study of factory workers in 
1960, Ferdinand Zweig concluded that full employment, universal 
welfare provision and the increased availability of consumer 
durables had combined to produce a change in working-class 
attitudes: 'The whole working class finds itself on the move, 
moving towards new middle-class values and middle-class 
existence. 1(3) The process by which workers adopted this middle- 
class outlook was known as embourgeoisement. Zweig found that 
his sample of workers enjoyed security of employment, 
comfortable housing, and wages which gave them access to items 
such as televisions, record players, refrigerators, washing 
machines and motor cars. The result of this security and 
relative prosperity, he believed, was a decline in the 
collectivist values which lay at the heart of Labour's appeal; 
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'[The worker] wants little things instead of big things. He 
wants them for himself, rather than for society at large. He 
wants better and wider opportunities for getting along. Old 
calls, old slogans, old loyalties often leave him cold. The 
class struggle interests him less and less. The idea of the 
working class as an oppressed or an exploited class or the 
romanticized idea of the working class as foremost in the 
struggle for progress and social justice is fading from his 
mind, and is more and more replaced by the idea of the 
working class as a class well established and well-to-do in 
its own right. ' 
(4) 
Mark Abrams drew a similar conclusion from his survey of 
political attitudes in 50 parliamentary constituencies chosen at 
random in 1960. The Labour Party, he argued, could still hope to 
persuade voters of the merits of its policies for economic and 
social reform, but the task was likely to become increasingly 
difficult as post-war affluence continued into the 1960s; 
'A new epoch has been entered, in which the policies Labour 
has stood for are losing support. Its old appeal as the Party 
of the working class is waning; class allegiances are 
weakening in our modern more fluid society-The radical mood 
seems to be lacking today. People appear concerned chiefly 
with their own ambitions. They have no great interest in 
politics; they are satisfied with their jobs; they set high 
store on possessing a house of their own - and, once 
possessed, they shift noticeably into the Conservative 
camp. ' 
(5) 
This analysis appeared to signal disaster for a Party with a 
traditional reliance on working class support and a continued 
faith in collectivist policies. Fortunately for Labour, though, 
the analysis proved to be flawed. The depressing prognosis of 
the Party's political future was discredited by Labour's return 
to power in 1964 and by its comfortable election victory in 
1966. Subsequent research also exposed the inadequacy of the 
embourgeoisement thesis as an explanation for the decline in the 
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Labour vote between 1951 and 1959. 
(6) In the light of these 
developments, historians and political commentators have sought 
instead to explain the contrast between Labour's electoral 
success in the 1940s and 1960s and its failure in the 1950s. 
Writers have disagreed about the causes of this failure in the 
1950s, but there is at least a general agreement among 
historians and commentators that Labour had fundamental problems 
at this time which require explanation. The images of weakness, 
decline and failure are familiar features of the literature on 
the Party in the years of opposition between 1951 and 1964. 
Vernon Bogdanor described the thirteen years of opposition as 
'years of disaster' for the Party: 'The Labour Party was rent by 
dissension after 1951, because it had completed the classical 
programme of British Socialism and was compelled to search for 
another. 
(7) Samuel Beer has also portrayed the 1950s as a period 
of conflict and division for Labour. In his view, unity was 
restored temporarily only when a general election approached: 
'Looking at the Labour Party during this decade, little seems to 
change. With almost compulsive iteration, the same battles are 
fruitlessly fought out again and again through the same cycle of 
renewed confrontation, bitter strife, and temporary and 
1 (8) indecisive compromise. In tandem with this internal division, 
Beer believed that the Party's 'working-class image' and its 
association with public ownership made it increasingly. unpopular 
with the electorate - it was this unpopularity which in his view 
produced the 'routs' of 1955 and 1959. 
(9) 
James Hinton was equally critical of the Party in the period 
under discussion. He agreed with Beer that at the root of 
Labour's difficulties was internal division and conflict: 'In 
the 1950s the Labour Party's problem was ... that it seemed 
incapable of presenting a sufficiently coherent face to the 
electorate to recapture power at all. ' 
(10) Kenneth Morgan's 
assessment of Labour in the 1950s was essentially no different. 
He described the decade as 'a highly damaging and divisive time' 
for the Party: 'The unity, the structural coherence, the 
certainty of priorities of the 1945 period abruptly 
disappeared. ' (11) Kevin Jefferys also focused on the problem of 
internal division as an explanation for 'Labour's weakness in 
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the 1950s', although he is at least prepared to concede that 
economic growth helped the Conservatives to retain power in the 
elections of 1955 and 1959. 
(12) 
Ralph Miliband, from a left-wing perspective, complained that 
the Party betrayed its principles and alienated its natural 
supporters during the period by abandoning 'radical' socialist 
policies. The result, in his view, was a blurring of the 
distinction between the two main parties in Britain. MilLSAjD 
argued that the Party leadership in the 1950s contributed to a 
wider decline in the vitality of national politics by adopting a 
moderate programme which aimed to attract support from the 
'floating voter': 'If politics in the fif--fi6S have seemed a 
decreasingly meaningful activity, void of substance, heedless of 
principle, and rich in election auctioneering, the 
responsibility is not only that of the hidden or overt 
persuaders: it is also, and to a major degree, that of Labour's 
leaders. ' (13) 
The burden of this analysis was shared by David Howell. He 
argued that the Party lost its way after 1951, particularly in 
terms of the development of policy. The 1964 election victory, 
according to Howell, was tarnished by the preceding years of 
division within the Party and by Labour's failure to construct a 
radical programme: 'Compared with 1945, its [19641 programme was 
a flimsy blend of optimism, rhetoric and sparse proposals. The 
party evoked the image of "Thirteen Wasted Years" - it might 
have applied this a little nearer home. ' 
(14) Nick Tiratsoo has 
also criticised Labour's selection of policy in the 19509, but 
from a different perspective. In his view, one of the main 
causes of Labour's problems after 1951 was its failure to win 
support from groups which were at the centre of post-war social 
change - in particular, women and youths. Tiratsoo has argued 
that while the Conservatives welcomed social change and the 
spread of affluence, Labour was more ambiguous and often 
displayed a rather high-minded attitude towards the development 
of consumerism, advertising, mass entertainment and youth 
culture. 
(15) In other words, the Party misunderstood the needs 
and values of the electorate. 
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The debate about Labour politics in the affluent society 
between 1951 and 1964, therefore, has been concerned largely 
with the causes of the Party's relative political weakness. The 
aim of this thesis is to show that the premise of this debate is 
flawed. The following chapters will challenge the assumption 
that the period under discussion was a time of weakness and 
decline for Labour. It will be argued here that the underlying 
strength and vitality of the Party in the 19509 and early 19609 
have been too often overlooked by historians and commentators. 
Labour, it will be shown, staged a steady political recovery 
after the 1951 defeat and laid the basis for the 1964 election 
victory in the second half of the 1950s. It will also be shown 
that the Party's performance in elections was conditional upon 
domestic issues rather than foreign affairs. As a result, this 
thesis will not attempt to assess the foreign policy of the 
Labour Party in this period. 
The initial stages of Labour's political recovery after 1951 
will be covered in chapter two. This will examine the Party's 
search for a new programme after the return to opposition and it 
will be argued here that the familiar portrait of a party which 
had run out of ideas and energy is innacurate. It will show that 
the period between 1951 and 1955 saw the first attempts by 
Labour policy makers to adapt the Party's appeal to the changed 
conditions of post-war Britain. The nature of this adaptation 
provoked a fierce debate within the Party, but this did not 
prevent Labour from producing a manifesto in 1955 which 
attracted the fourth highest vote in the Party's history. 
Chapters three and four will examine Labour politics between 
1955 and 1959. The burden of the analysis here is that the Party 
was in a relatively strong position by 1959. The Parliamentary 
Labour Party rediscovered the benefits of unity under a new 
leader; organisation in the constituencies was improved; modern 
techniques of presentation in an election campaign were 
introduced; and the leadership carried some important revisions 
of domestic policy during a three year review of the Party's 
programme. The examination of this policy review in Chapter four 
offers a more detailed study of the project than has hitherto 
been available. The central proposition here is that the policy 
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makers in the 19509 provided most of the programme on which 
Labour returned to power in 1964. 
The resumption of conflict within the Party after the 1959 
defeat is covered in chapter five. The aim of this chapter is to 
show that sections of the Party were overtaken by a mood of 
defeatism for a time after the Conservatives' third consecutive 
election victory. Radical changes were proposed for Labour's 
constitution, organisation and image - the result was a 
fracturing of Party unity and a series of unnecessary 
controversies. It will also be argued, though, that the Party 
was able to recover by 1964 primarily because of developments 
which had taken place before 1960. Labour was able to rely on an 
organisational base, improvements in presentation and an agreed 
policy programme which had been worked out largely in the second 
half of the 1950s. The development of policy between 1959 and 
1964 will be examined separately in chapter six. As will be 
shown, Labour's policy makers decided not to embark on a further 
detailed review of the Party's programme after the 1959 
election. Only four main policy documents were produced and 
Labour's programme continued to consist of proposals which had 
been agreed between 1956 and 1958. Changes were made to the 
Party's economic policy, but it will be argued that the 
importance of these changes in electoral terms has been 
overstated by historians and political commentators. 
Opposition to the Party leadership between 1955 and 1964 
provides the focus for chapter seven. Although a vocal minority 
within the Labour movement consistently opposed the leadership 
over policy and strategy, it will be shown here that this 
minority was successfully marginalised for much of the period 
under discussion. The Left enjoyed a victory over the campaign 
to change Labour's constitution in 1960, and they were at least 
pleased to see a renewed emphasis on the language of planning in 
Party policy after 1959. But the leadership's control of the 
policy-making process remained secure and even the election of a 
new Party leader in 1963 with apparent roots in the Left failed 
to produce decisive changes in Labour's programme. The 
marginalisation of opposition within Labour's ranks was a 
significant victory for the leadership, particularly after 1955. 
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The final chapter examines one of the most important 
manifestations of Labour's underlying strength in the period: 
the commitment of the Party membership. No previous study has 
attempted to assess in any depth the effect of post-war 
affluence or the disappointment of consecutive election defeats 
on Labour's core supporters - the members and activists in the 
constituencies. Using records from wards, constituency parties 
and divisional parties, as well as interviews conducted with 
activists from the period, it will be shown that the Party 
retained an unprecedented degree of enthusiasm and support among 
the membership in the 19509 and early 19609. The significance of 
this commitment in the local parties is that it should be seen 
as part of a wider picture of Labour renewal and strength after 
1951. 
The main archival sources for this study have been provided by 
the Labour Party's own records. Briefing papers and minutes of 
the meetings of the National Executive Committee, the Home 
Policy Sub-Committee and the Organisation Sub-Committee have 
been examined in detail for the whole period. Where appropriate, 
minutes of the meetings of the National Council of Labour, the 
Financial and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, the Chairmen's 
Sub-Committee, the Publicity and Political Education 
Sub-Committee, and Home Policy study groups and working parties 
have also been used. A comparative study of manifestos, drafts 
and policy documents forms the basis of chapters four and six. 
The Labour Party Annual Conference Reports for the period were 
also a valuable source of information. The minutes of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and the Parliamentary Committee were 
consulted but were found to be of limited value in the context 
of this thesis. 
The most useful collections of private papers were those of 
Richard Crossman, Tony Crosland, Patrick Gordon Walker, Hugh 
Dalton, Philip Noel-Baker and George Brown. The General 
Secretary's papers at the Labour Party's archives are also a 
rich source for the period. The papers of Clement Attlee, 
Maurice Edel"4rJ , Michael Foot, Tony Greenwood and Herbert 
Morrison were consulted, but little of this material appears in 
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the following chapters. Unfortunately, the papers of Hugh 
Gaitskell remain closed to researchers. His diary has been 
published for the period between 1945 and 1956, but more 
comprehensive material is available in the diaries of Richard 
Crossman and Hugh Dalton. Tony Benn kindly agreed to lend the 
present writer a copy of his diary for the period between 1951 
and 1960 before it was published. The unpublished diary of 
Patrick Gordon Walker was of particular value for the period 
between 1951 and 1955 and for the post-1959 election 
controversies. 
The interviews with current and former Labour 
parliamentarians were of enormous value. Lord Jay, Lord Rodgers, 
Peter Shore MP and Dick Taverne offered a detailed insight into 
several important areas. Requests for interviews were made to 
eleven other current or former Labour parliamentarians, but 
unfortunately these requests were always declined. The 
interviews with constituency activists provided valuable 
background information, but clearly it was not possible to draw 
specific conclusions from such a small sample. These activists 
were contacted by writing to the secretaries of 120 Constituency 
Labour Parties (CLPs) in southern England. 
The documentary evidence for the chapter on local politics 
was largely provided by records from the following Constituency 
and Divisional Labour Parties: Abingdon, Bermondsey, Greenwich, 
Hornchurch, London, Newcastle West, Romford, Ruislip Northwood, 
Stockport Central, Sheffield Hallam, Southall and Hanwell, West 
Ham South, West Salford, Woolwich and York. The composition of 
this sample was governed by the availability of material in 
local archives and ease of access, both of which vary widely 
across the country. Local party records also concentrate 
frequently on organisation rather than policy; as a result, the 
records were often of limited value in the context of this 
thesis. There is a clear need for a history of the Constituency 
Labour Parties to be written, based on the records of a much 
larger sample of local material. However, this chapter was not 
an attempt to begin the task. 
A wide selection of newspapers and periodicals was consulted 
during the research and was used in the following chapters. A 
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list of these titles appears in the bibliography alongside a 
full list of the published works which were consulted for this 
thesis. The results of the general elections of 1951,1955,1959 
and 1964 are set out in tables in the appendix. 
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2. The return to opposition, 1951-1955 
The Labour Party lost the 1951 election, but the result can be 
presented as one of the least disappointing defeats in the 
Party's history. No British party had ever secured as many votes 
in an election, the Tory Government's majority of 17 appeared 
vulnerable to by-election defeats and back-bench revolts, and 
the size of Labour's individual membership was climbing to its 
peak total in 1952. 
(1) Labour politicians in 1951 could look back 
on the recent past with some satisfaction. They had served in 
government for 11 years, helped to steer the country through the 
Second World War, won their first ever majority at Westminster 
and honoured commitments that had been part of Labour's 
programme for decades. At worst, defeat was seen as a minor and 
temporary setback on the Party's route to electoral dominance; 
at best, defeat offered the Party an opportunity for calm 
reflection, a chance to decide how it should build on the 
reforms of the Attlee Governments. Hugh Dalton, who served in 
Cabinet for most of Attlee's premiership, believed that Labour 
had left office at exactly the right time and with acceptable 
losses. In his view, the result was 'wonderful'. 
(2) 
The circumstances of defeat may have provided some comfort 
for the Party, therefore, but they also disguised some profound 
difficulties. Returning to opposition in 1951 was a more 
complicated transition than it had been in 1924 or 1931. The 
first two minority Labour governments had been unable to 
transform their core commitments into legislation. As a result, 
these commitments were simply carried forward for inclusion in 
each new manifesto before 1945 - the list included public 
ownership of the coal industry and the railways, increased 
provision of public sector housing, improved social services and 
full employment. 
(3) By 1951, though, a Labour Government had 
achieved these objectives and most of the rest of its manifesto 
commitments. This success meant that the Party could no longer 
rely on a programme which in part had served Labour since the 
1900 election. 
(4) Policy had been exhausted and it was not clear 
immediately how Labour would respond. In opposition, its task 
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was to draw up a new programme which defined Labour's purpose in 
a society which offered universal welfare provision, low levels 
of unemployment and improved relations between trade unions and 
government. This was always likely to prove difficult, but the 
process of policy-making in opposition was complicated still 
further by disunity within the Party. As will be shown, conflict 
and division was a particular problem for Labour between 1951 
and 1955. 
This chapter will examine the Party's attempt to recover from 
the 1951 election defeat. It will be acknowledged in the 
following paragraphs that the return to opposition was a 
difficult time for Labour, but it will also be argued that in 
two important respects the Party was in a stronger position by 
1955 than it had been in 1951. First, unity was restored within 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) during the period. The 
leadership marginalised its critics in the PLP and helped to 
ensure that Labour was able to concentrate its attention on 
issues such as policy, presentation and organisation after 1955. 
Secondly, an initial attempt was made to construct a new policy 
programme after the exhaustion of traditional proposals by the 
Attlee Governments. The familiar description of Labour as a 
party which had run out of ideas in the early 1950s will be 
challenged in this chapter. 
(5) Instead, it will be argued that 
the 1951 election was followed by Labour's first attempts to 
respond to economic and social change in post-war Britain. It 
was of particular importance here that the policy makers 
rejected attempts to position increased public ownership at the 
centre of Labour's new mission. Although most of the new 
thinking on Labour policy occurred after 1955, the policy makers 
in the early 1950s produced a useful first draft of the Party's 
new programme. The result was a manifesto in 1955 which 
attracted the fourth highest vote in Labour's history before 
1993 - both in terms of the aggregate vote and the percentage of 
votes cast. 
(6) It will be argued throughout this thesis that the 
political recovery of the Labour Party after 1951 occurred in 
the main in the second half of the 1950s, but this chapter will 
show that recovery was helped by developments which took place 
between 1951 and 1955. In order to begin this task, an 
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assessment must first be made of the condition of the Party in 
1951. 
The defeat of the Labour Government in the general election of 
1951 was not unexpected. Attlee's administration had lost more 
than 95 per cent of its majority in the 1950 election, 
(7) 
and the 
Conservatives' clear lead in the opinion polls throughout 1951 
showed that they were likely to achieve the small swing that 
they required to form a government. 
(8) Political problems had 
continued to weaken the position of the Labour Government during 
1951. The resignations of Bevan, Wilson and Freeman in April 
over the twin issues of health service charges and the defence 
budget graphically illustrated the disunity within the Party; 
(9) 
the devaluation of sterling in September 1949 continued to push 
up the price of imports and the cost of living; Gaitskell's 
pre-election budget increased overall levels of taxation, 
(10) 
and 
in September 1951 further cuts were made in the rations of basic 
foodstuffs. These difficulties were compounded by the success of 
the Conservative Party's efforts to revive its political 
fortunes after its defeat in 1945: the organisation of the Party 
was revitalised and policy was modified to take account of 
changes which had been made by the Attlee Government - public 
ownership of the Bank of England, the coal mines and the 
railways was accepted, and similar acceptance was made of the 
principle of increased public spending to finance the welfare 
state. The Tories also had a simple message for the electorate: 
Conservative government would end the austerity and shortages 
caused by socialist bureaucracy and inefficiency. 
(11) 
Apart from attempts by the opposition parties to portray 
Aneurin Bevan as an extremist who would become Prime Minister if 
Labour won, and a row over the Government's handling of the 
Iranian oil crisis, the 1951 campaign proper was relatively 
restrained. 
(12) Labour's appeal was built around a defence of its 
achievements since 1945 and the prediction that a Conservative 
government would return large areas of Britain to the poverty 
and mass unemployment of the 1930s. 
(13) The manifesto led the way 
in this 'safety first' approach. At best, its descriptions of 
policies were cautious; at worst, they were ambiguous. The 
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document contained very few positive or new proposals to fire 
the imagination of the electorate, but it also presented 
opponents with little opportunity to attack either the cost or 
the content of the Party's programme. 
The most positive aspects of the manifesto included a 
commitment to build at least 200,000 houses each year, a pledge 
to reduce taxation on 'moderate' incomes at the first 
opportunity, a policy of statutory dividend limitation, and a 
commitment to establish equal pay between men and women in the 
public services. The policy makers, though, were less specific 
about industrial democracy, public ownership and education. On 
industrial democracy the manifesto outlined the Party's 
intention 'to associate the workers more closely with the 
administration of public industries and services'; but the 
precise role that workers would play in the management of these 
industries and the mechanisms that would enable them to 
participate in administration were left unclear. The section on 
public ownership said that a future Labour government would 
'take over concerns which fail the nation and start new public 
enterprises wherever this will serve the national interest'. But 
the criteria by which an industry would be condemned as having 
failed the nation were left unstated, and it was equally unclear 
whether the 'national interest' would be defined primarily. in 
terms of profits, export orders, a commitment to research and 
development or full employment. Finally, on education there was 
a simple commitment to 'extend our policy of giving all young 
people equal opportunities in education'. But no specific 
reference was made to the comprehensive principle, the role of 
the local authorities or the position of the private sector. 
(14) 
Despite its internal problems and its lack of substantive 
policy proposals, Labour achieved its highest ever vote in 1951. 
This owed much to the reduced number of candidates fielded by 
the Liberal Party. But it also confirmed the popularity of the 
Attlee Governments' reforms and the strength of the Party's core 
support. In Wales, the North East of England, the Potteries and 
East London Labour polled more than 60 per cent of the votes 
cast. In the North East Midlands, the West Riding, Coventry, the 
Black Country? South London and parts of Forth it polled more 
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than 55 per cent of the vote. 
(15) The Party's strength in these 
areas, though, was overshadowed by its failure in Southern 
England. Labour won in only 24 southern constituencies outside 
(16) 
of London, leaving the remaining 120 seats to the Tories. In 
Kent, Sussex, Surrey and the South West the electorate voted 
overwhelmingly for the Conservative promise of less bureaucracy 
and more prosperity. In terms of seats, the Tories' hold on the 
South far outweighed Labour's advantage in Wales, the North and 
the Midlands. As will be shown, the Party's weakness in the 
south was a recurring problem in contests against the Tories. 
The first analysis of the 1951 election for the NEC was provided 
by Morgan Phillips, the Party's General Secretary. The closest 
he came to an explanation of the defeat was a vague statement 
about 'irrationally fostered fears of the consequences of a 
Labour-victory'. Overall, the report was marked by a sense of 
optimism: Attlee's personal success was highlighted as 'one of 
the outstanding features of the campaign' and the Party was said 
to be in 'good fettle', with its support increasing throughout 
the country. There was no indication in the report that the 
Party faced any specific political problems or that its return 
to office might be delayed past the next election. Instead, the 
immediate tasks outlined for the Party were a recrui-r. ment drive 
to increase the individual membership, the improvement"of 
Labour's financial position and the appointment of more 
full-time agents. 
(17) 
Tribune, a left-wing publication whose editorial board and 
contributors included Labour MPs, shared the optimism of 
Phillips in 1951 and claimed that the Party's period in office 
had been merely 'interrupted'. 
(18) To a large extent, this 
optimism was based on the belief that Labour would be returned 
to power to restore full employment and adequate welfare 
provision after a brief period of Tory rule during which many of 
the social and economic reforms made after 1945 were expected to 
be reversed. An NEC discussion paper acknowledged that in policy 
terms Labour was 'temporarily sterile' and uncertain about the 
future. (19) But this was not considered to be a problem so long 
as the belief remained that the Tories would destroy their own 
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electoral fortunes with cuts in public expenditure and the 
return of high unemployment. 
This sense of optimism was to prove unfounded and it also 
took no account of the extent of Labour's internal problems in 
1951. For a time after the election defeat the Party was torn by 
a division between the leadership and a group which was known as 
the Bevanites. The origins of this division were in foreign 
affairs. The Bevanites developed from the Keep Left group which 
had criticised Ernest Bevin's foreign policy in November 1946, 
and they were formed officially after Gaitskell introduced a 
budget in 1951 which aimed to finance a massive rearmament 
programme. 
(20) Their first public show of defiance came when they 
led a revolt by 57 Labour MP9 over an official amendment to the 
defence estimates in March 1952. 
(21) But the split within the 
Party was also concerned with much wider issues than defence. 
The Bevanites should be seen as part of a radical tradition in 
British socialism which includes the ILP in the nineteenth 
century, Victory For Socialism in the late 1950s and the 
Campaign for Labour Party Democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
Bevanites presented themselves in the first half of the 19509 as 
the guardians of the socialist soul of the Labour movement. They 
were effective self-publicists who liked to contrast their 
dynamism and irreverence with the apparent caution and dullness 
of the Party hierarchy. As Ben Pimlott has argued; 
'The essence of Bevanism was outrage: the Bevanites were 
determined to shock. They were the enemies of blimps, snobs 
and stuffed shirts of whatever political persuasion. They 
enjoyed the anger of right-wing union barons as much as the 
bluster of Morrisonian MPs or, for that matter, the 
indignation of Tory colonels. They were anti-upper class, 
anti-public school, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist and 
anti-American. ' 
(22) 
The group took its name from the most prominent critic of the 
leadership within the Party, Aneurin Bevan. By 1951, Bevan had 
become established as the senior left-wing member of the PLP: in 
domestic policy terms this meant that he believed in an enlarged 
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public sector within the mixed economy, increased state planning 
and greater industrial democracy. 
(23) But Bevan was much more 
than a rebel and a critic; he was recognised also as a potential 
leader of the Party and this was the root of the difficulty with 
the Labour hierarchy. The Party at the time lacked experienced 
former ministers who were younger than sixty and who could be 
expected to lead the Party through the 19509 and into the 1960s. 
Attlee was sixty-eight in 1951 and his retirement was expected 
within the next few years. His Cabinet had been an old Cabinet, 
so the number of possible successors was limited. Morrison was 
one option, but he was already sixty-three in 1951. Gaitskell 
was a rising star, but he had only been an MP since 1945 and was 
more likely to be seen as Labour's next leader but one. Bevan, 
though, had been in Parliament since 1929, he had made his 
reputation as Minister of Health and Housing between 1945 and 
1950 and he was only fifty-four in 1951. Securing the leadership 
for Bevan was seen by some in the Party as the prime motivation 
of the Bevanites. 
(24) 
Ironically, Bevan was an infrequent attender of Bevanite 
meetings. Instead, the most prominent members of the group were 
Barbara Castle, Richard Crossman, Michael Foot, Jennie Lee, Ian 
Mikardo, Tom Driberg and Harold Wilson. 
(25) The group was based 
in the PLP and its aggregate membership was 49 - at its peak in 
1952 it was likely to attract about 30 members to its weekly 
meetings. 
(26) The Bevanites have featured prominently in the 
historiography of the Party in the 1950s because the 
significance of the divisions within Labour's ranks at this time 
has been emphasised. 
(27) The important point about the Bevanites 
in the context of this thesis, though, is that they were 
marginalised by the Party leadership between 1951 and 1955. 
Divisions in the Party had not healed necessarily by the middle 
of the decade, but at least action had been taken to ensure that 
Labour could concentrate on its political and electoral recovery 
after 1955, rather than focus again on internal conflict and 
renewed challenges from the Left. Arguably, one of the main 
achievements of the Labour leadership after 1951 was that it won 
the civil war in the Party and thereby established a relative 
peace in the movement for most of the remainder of the decade. 
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To understand the success of the leadership in neutralising the 
Bevanite challenge, an assessment must be made of the scale of 
this challenge. 
Close colleagues of Attlee were in no doubt that the 
Bevanites represented a considerable threat to his leadership. 
During the spring and summer of 1952 senior members of the PLP 
held a series of meetings to discuss the divisions in the Party 
and the position of the Labour leader. Those present at these 
meetings included: Herbert Morrison, the deputy leader; Hugh 
Gaitskell; Patrick Gordon Walker, the former Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations; Alf Robens, the former Minister of 
Labour; Sir Hartley Shawcross, the former Attorney-General; Sir 
Frank Soskice, the former Solicitor-General; Richard Stokes, the 
former Lord Privy Seal; and William Whiteley, the Party's Chief 
Whip. (28) Members of this group first invited Attlee and Jim 
Griffiths, the former Colonial Secretary and Minister of 
National Insurance, to discuss the problems presented by Bevan 
and his followers in the Spring of 1952. They offered to help 
Attlee in any way possible, but found that he was 'rather 
casual' about the threat from Bevan, which he believed would 
'fade out'. 
(29) Paradoxically, Attlee also told the meeting that 
he was too old to be a Prime Minister again and that he would 
have made up his mind to resign earlier if it had not been for 
the divisions within the Party. 
(30) Whiteley later told the group 
that Attlee had already spoken of resignation before the 1951 
election. 
(31) Convinced that the retirement of Attlee was 
imminent, members of the group met throughout the summer of 1952 
to consider the possible consequences of his departure. At these 
meetings it was agreed that Morrison was the natural successor 
to Attlee. Although Morrison was old and his political 
reputation had suffered during his time as Foreign Secretary in 
1951, the alternatives were limited. The only other candidate 
who was discussed as a serious contender was Griffiths, but his 
position was weakened by the knowledge that Morrison would 
refuse to serve under him as deputy leader. 
(32) This meant that 
if Griffiths was successful he would be left isolated against a 
potential challenge by Bevan - and a Bevan succession had to be 
avoided at all costs. The group, however, disagreed about the 
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best way to ensure the election of Morrison. Some felt strongly 
that Attlee should resign at once - the Chief Whip was convinced 
that in a contest at that time the PLP would have chosen 
Morrison. 
(33) Others, notably Griffiths and Gaitskell, felt that 
Attlee should remain as leader until after the next election and 
then retire. They put this suggestion to Attlee and received 'a 
non-commital but not altogether unfavourable reply. He would 
think it over'. 
(34) 
Gaitskell and Griffiths appear to have been successful 
because in July 1952 Attlee announced that he would lead the 
Party into the next election. 
(35) Gordon Walker and his 
colleagues at least welcomed this new commitment and urged 
Attlee to take the lead in the fight against Bevan and his 
supporters. Attlee, however, rejected this request because 'he 
had been advised by "people close to the rank and file" not to 
attack. Bevan would hang himself in time'. 
(36) Gaitskell was 
particularly depressed by the Labour leader's caution. He 
believed that support for Bevan had increased in the PLP and 
that his following might have been as high as seventy. 
(37) 
These discussions about the future of the leadership are 
significant because they provide an insight into the thinking of 
the Party hierarchy at the time. In particular, they confirm 
that the Bevanites were perceived as a serious threat to the 
leadership and that Gaitskell was much more concerned about this 
threat than Attlee. But was this perception of the Bevanite 
threat accurate? It is difficult to quantify the precise 
strength of the Bevanites in the period, but it is certainly 
true that Bevan and his followers were popular among 
constituency party activists in the period. This was important 
because the local parties controlled seven of the twenty-seven 
places on the National Executive Committee - the governing body 
and policy-making forum of the Party. 
(38) Critics of the 
Bevanites accused them of organising support among the CLP9 and 
of creating in effect a 'party within the Party'. 
(39) Bevan 
himself had invited this charge when he spoke in November 1951 
of the need to 'capture the constituency parties and so put a 
squeeze on the Parliamentary Party'. 
(40) 
The mobilisation of Bevanite support in the constituencies 
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was usually attributed to Ian Mikardo, who at the time was the 
MP for Reading. Mikardo, however, denied that the Bevanites 
organised support among the local parties. He stated in his 
autobiography that he had never had a Bevanite agent, organiser 
or contact in any CLP: 'The very idea was so impractical - 
fanciful, that only a paranoiac could have entertained it'. 
(41) 
Instead, a more straighforward explanation can be offered for 
the group's popularity in the constituencies. The Bevanites' 
presented themselves as fearless, imaginative and committed 
socialists. Rather than organise directly in the constituencies, 
members of the group used their talent for self-promotion to 
reinforce this image through high profile rows with the Party 
hierarchy, articles in Tribune, and appearences on the 'Brain 8 
Trusts' - where a panel of Bevanites answered questions from an 
audience of constituency activists. Members of the local parties 
confirmed that the image of Bevanite vigour and irreverance was 
the group's main strength. An activists from Brentwood CLP 
recalled: 
'To us it was imperative that we had a strong Bevanite 
commitment on the National Executive representing the 
constituency parties. That's what fired us and kept us going. 
I thought that the Bevanites were prepared to challenge old 
Labour beliefs and old Labour positions ... they were offering 
revitalisation of the Party generally and speaking the 
language of the 1950s rather than that of the 20s and 
30s. ' (42) 
Similarly, activists from Surbiton CLP supported the Bevanites 
because of a shared belief in public ownership, a shared 
hostility to the trade union block vote and a shared image of 
themselves as 'radicals'. 
(43) 
Perhaps the best demonstration of local party support for the 
Bevanites occurred during the noisy and often bad-tempered Party 
Conference at Morecambe in 1952. Douglas Jay remembered this 
Conference for the 'groups of screaming fanatics in the 
gallery'. 
(44) Hugh Dalton described it to a colleague as a 
'bloody bore' 
(45) 
and shortly after the Conference wrote in his 
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diary: 'I am very gloomy about the Party. We haven't had so 
strong hatreds since 1931'. 
(46) Morecambe provided another forum 
in which the Bevanites and the leadership could play out their 
differences and this was reflected in the atmosphere of the 
Conference. Dalton himself was a victim of the escalating battle 
in the Party. Despite reaffirming his socialist credentials at a 
Labour rally before the Morecambe Conference - when he spoke 
about the need to take action against large estates, 
accumulations of capital and the City of London - Dalton was 
removed from the constituency section of the NEC after more than 
25 years of service on the Executive. 
(47) Herbert Morrison joined 
him in defeat. They were replaced by Crossman and Wilson, which 
left Griffiths as the only representative of the constituencies 
who was not a member of the Bevanite clique. 
(48) 
The elections for the constituency section of the Executive 
at Morecambe appeared to represent a victory for the Left 
against the caution of the Party leadership. Hugh Gaitskell, 
however, was determined that this victory would be reversed and 
his counter-attack began at Stalybridge on the weekend after 
Conference. Gaitskell alleged that some of the constituency 
party delegates at Conference had been Communists or Communist- 
inspired. And in a thinly disguised attack on the Bevanite 
hierarchy, many of whom wrote for Tribune, the New Statesman & 
Nation, Reynolds' News. and other publications, he declared that 
the time had come to 'end the attempt at mob rule by a group of 
frustrated journalists and restore the authority and leadership 
of the solid, sound, sensible majority of the Movement'. 
(49) 
Gaitskell's outburst at Stalybridge was an unfair attack on 
his opponents in the Party. Allegations of Communist 
infiltration in the constituency parties caused unnecessary 
offence in the movement and risked damaging Labour's image in 
the country. The charge should not have been made because there 
was nothing to support it beyond the hearsay evidence of some 
'well-informed correspondents'. 
(50) All of the activists 
interviewed for this project who were present in the Party in 
1952 deny any knowledge of a Communist presence in their local 
ward or constituency. Douglas Jay, who first suggested to 
Gaitskell that Morecambe was an example of 'mob rule' in 
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practice, believed that the attack at Stalybridge had been too 
violent. 
(51) The NEC made it clear that they did not wish to 
pursue the issue of infiltration when they rejected Wilson's 
proposal to investigate the allegations. 
(52) In other respects, 
though, the speech was a necessary and timely assault, both for 
the Party as a whole and for Gaitskell personally. The split 
within the Party could not be allowed to continue indefinitely - 
Labour needed to have a clear identity, and if the leadership 
did not want Bevanite ideas and policies to be part of that 
identity they had to make this apparent as soon as possible. 
Gaitskell disagreed with the Bevanite approach to domestic and 
foreign politics and he believed that his views were shared by 
the majority of the Party. Attlee and Morrison had failed to 
take a stand against the Bevanites, so Gaitskell seized the 
initiative at Stalybridge and in the process alerted many of his 
colleagues to his own leadership credentials. He even found 
support for his attack among the local parties. London News, the 
monthly publication of the London Labour Party, used similar 
language to Gaitskell in its criticism of the NEC election 
results at Morecambe; 
'It looks as if some constituency parties have lost their 
sense of proportion in the face of the oratorical gifts of Mr 
Bevan and the industrious labours of his associates. Others 
appear to have given Mr Bevan their enthusiastic support for 
reasons which, to do him justice, he would never approve. 
Among these are the near-Communists, the pacifists, the 
temperamental anarchists, the "clear-out-of-everywhere" 
school. ' 
(53) 
The Party leadership took up the attack within weeks of 
Gaitskell's offensive at Stalybridge. Attlee made his move 
against the Bevanites at the start of the new session at 
Westminster. A resolution was drawn up by Labour's Parliamentary 
Committee - the Shadow Cabinet - which called for the 'immediate 
abandonment of all Group organisations within the Party'. 
(54) 
Attlee agreed to submit this to a meeting of the PLP and to 
resist any attempts to amend the wording of the resolution. When 
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the PLP accepted Attlee's resolution on 23 October by 188 votes 
to 51, the Bevanite group in Parliament was forced to 
discontinue its regular meetings. This action against the group 
weakened its standing at Westminster still further. In November, 
Bevan challenged Morrison for the deputy leadership and was 
defeated by 194 votes to 82. 
(55) In the annual elections of the 
PLP in the same month, Bevan was returned to the Shadow Cabinet 
in twelfth and final place, but no other Bevanite was 
successful. In contrast, Gaitskell repeated his performance from 
the previous year when he was elected to the Shadow Cabinet in 
third place. The Times noted the strength of Gaitskell's 
position within the Party after he had 'risked his political 
life' at Stalybridge. 
(56) 
After the drama of Morecambe and Stalybridge and the 
disciplinary measures of October 1952, an 'armed truce' was 
maintained between the Bevanites and the Party leadership until 
April 1954. (57) Once again, when this truce was breached the 
immediate cause of the renewed conflict was a defence issue. 
Bevan interrupted Attlee in the Commons and challenged the 
Labour leader's cautious support for a united front against 
Communist aggression in South East Asia. When Attlee criticised 
his conduct at a PLP meeting the following day, Bevan repeated 
his performance of April 1951 and resigned from the 
Parliamentary Committee 'in a sulk', according to one 
observer. 
(58) This episode further weakened the Bevanite group 
within the Party. Despite the clear disapproval of most his 
colleagues in the group, Wilson stepped into Bevan's place in 
the Shadow Cabinet and thereby confirmed his removal from the 
Bevanites. More importantly, Bevan's conduct - his regular 
tantrums at Party meetings, his criticisms of the leadership and 
his second resignation - finally seemed to confirm that he was 
not suitable to become Party leader. When Bevan contested the 
post of Party treasurer against Gaitskell at the Scarborough 
Conference in 1954, his defeat by 4.3 million votes to 2 million 
votes showed that Gaitskell was the favoured candidate of the 
trade unions and of almost half of the constituency parties. 
(59) 
The result meant that Bevan no longer had a base in either the 
Shadow Cabinet or the National Executive. Gaitskell, who had 
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previously been co-opted to work for the NEC, now had a secure 
position on both. The leadership prospects of Bevan receded 
still further in 1955 when he narrowly escaped expulsion from 
the Party. In April he challenged Attlee in the Commons during a 
debate on the hydrogen bomb and led 62 Labour members in an 
abstention on the opposition amendment. The PLP voted to 
withdraw the whip from Bevan, but he survived the vote on 
expulsion in the NEC by 14 votes to 13. 
(60) 
In contrast to Bevan's declining fortunes, Gaitskell had 
emerged as the young standard bearer of the Right less than ten 
years after he had entered parliament*for South Leeds in 1945. 
He had risen quickly to become Chancellor by 1950 and in the 
opposition years he showed a willingness and an ability to 
challenge the Left - he led the counter attack at Stalybridge in 
1952 and he beat Bevan for the treasurership at Scarborough in 
1954. By the time of the 1955 election the battle against the 
Bevanites had been won and Gaitskell had firmly established 
himself as a potential leader of the Party. As will be shown in 
the followi ng chapter, the result of these developments was the 
election of Gaitskell to succeed Attlee in December 1955. It 
will be argued throughout this thesis that Gaitskell led 
Labour's recovery after 1955 and laid the basis for the Party's 
return to power in 1964. In particular, he controlled a 
long-term review of policy which eventually fed into the 
manifestos of 1959 and 1964. The significance of the 
marginalisation of the Bevanites in the early 19509 in this 
context is that it helped to make Labour's long-term recovery 
possible. Before discussing these issues further, though, the 
Party's initial attempt to rewrite policy after the 1951 defeat 
will be assessed. 
Work on domestic policy was the responsibility of the Policy 
and Publicity Sub-Committee of the NEC -a group that was known 
more simply as the Home Policy Committee. Initially in 1951 this 
set up four sub-committees to examine policy on nationalised 
industries, private industry, the social services and 
agriculture and rural life. 
(61) 
In May 1952 a Financial and 
Economic Policy Sub-Committee was formed to consider the broad 
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economic implications of domestic policy proposals. It is worth 
noting, though, that detailed costings of policies were not 
always made at this time. 
(62) Arrangements were made to consult 
the trade unions during the formation of policy, but the links 
were to be kept 'flexible and informal'. 
(63) It was also agreed 
at the outset that constituency members should participate in 
the work of policy-making, despite the fact that Herbert 
Morrison, the Chairman of the Home Policy Committee, had accused 
them of 'clumsy thinking or no thinking' and of ignoring the 
facts of life when they submitted motions to Conference. 
(64) it 
was suggested that consultation could take two forms: members of 
the Home Policy Committee could visit constituency parties and 
listen to their views direct, or local parties could discuss 
pamphlets produced by the Committee and send their views to the 
Executive at Transport House. 
(65) With the machinery in place, 
the initial aim was to produce an interim policy statement for 
the 1952 Conference at Morecambe. 
Facing the Facts, the interim statement, left the NEC maximum 
room for manoeuvre at Conference because its authors carefully 
avoided the inclusion of detailed commitments. As the title of 
the document implied, the NEC preferred to outline their 
assessment of the main problems and challenges which faced the 
country in the early 1950s, rather than offer a detailed set of 
policies for discussion. The problems which the statement 
diagnosed were instantly familiar. Facing the Facts identified 
the need to improve Britain's balance of payments as the most 
important challenge for the nation. 
(66) This was no surprise, 
because the post-war Labour Governments had consistently battled 
to improve Britain's export performance - particularly when 
Cripps was Chancellor. 
(67) The document recalled the spirit of 
the Cripps austerity programme when it outlined the need to 
divert resources to industry at the expense of other goods and 
services. The aim was to increase output and productivity, but 
the methods by which this would be pursued were not set out in 
detail. The expansion of the coal and steel industries was 
identified as a priority, but there was no firm commitment to 
renationalise steel if the Tories acted on their promise to 
return it to the private sector. Instead, the 'public interest' 
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formula from the 1951 manifesto was re-employed. Despite 
insisting that the Party believed in public ownership as a means 
of planning for full employmenty the document committed the NEC 
to nothing more than a defence of those industries which ha d 
been nationalised after 1945, minus steel and road haulage. This 
set the tone of the statement. In some respects, Facing the 
Facts said as much about Labour's past as it did about its 
future. Food rationintd- and food subsidies were envisaged as 
components of a future Labour programme. The restoration of a 
free health service was also identified as an important 
objective, despite the fact that a Labour government had 
introduced the principle of charges in 1951. 
Facing the Facts was a cautious document which probably 
inspired few within the Party and even fewer outside. An 
editorial in The Times claimed that it said 'almost nothing at 
all'. 
(68) But to use the content of this document to support the 
claim that the Party was devoid of ideas would be a mistake. The 
important point about the statement for the 1952 Conference is 
that it reflected very little of the detailed work which had 
been carried out by the four sub-comittees on home policy. The 
ideas and proposals which these groups produced in a short 
period of time can be contrasted with the cautious approach of 
Facing the Facts. The sub-committees showed that the Party was 
more than capable of producing constructive domestic policies in 
this period. 
The sub-committee on socially owned industries offered the 
Party a way out of the debate about more or less state ownership 
of whole industries by outlining some new forms of public 
ownership: for example, the extension of the Co-operative 
movement, state building of factories which could be let to 
private firms, and the establishment of state firms within an 
industry to compete with the private sector. 
(69) The 
sub-committee on private industry agreed with this final 
proposal and added some ideas of its own. These included the 
abolition of resale price maintenance and the use of statutory 
powers to impose price controls. 
(70) The group on agriculture 
suggested increased Public ownership of farming land, while the 
sub-committee on social services offered the creation of a 
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Ministry of Social Security and a feasibility study of a 
national superannuation scheme to replace flat-rate 
pensions. 
(71) 
It is possible to suggest a number of explanations for the 
absence of these policy ideas from Facing the Facts. Some of the 
ideas were at an early stage of development and might not have 
stood up to a full Conference debate and public scrutiny in the 
press. The 1952 Conference was perhaps a little too soon after 
an election defeat for the presentation of new policies - 
possibly the NEC wished to test the mood of the Party at 
Conference before pressing ahead with the detailed work of 
constructing a programme. Labour's gains in the local elections 
of May 1952 also appeared to confirm that there was no need for 
the Party to offer anything new in order to win power - voters, 
it seemed, had already begun to reject the Tories. Finally, the 
Bevanite controversy was likely to make the Party leadership 
over-cautious about policy: the less that was said about policy, 
the less opportunity there was for an argument. If the intention 
was to avoid controversy, however, the leadership was soon 
disappointed. 
The bad-tempered Morecambe Conference provided the first 
opportunity for the Party to discuss collectively its future 
after the 1951 election. On the second day of the Conference, 
Attlee opened the debate on Labour's new programme by - 
summarising the main points contained in Facing the Facts. The 
delegates showed their disappointment with this document by 
supporting a composite resolution moved by Islington North CLP 
which called on the Executive to produce a much more clearly 
defined set of policies for a future Labour government. Arguably 
the most significant part of the composite instructed the NEC to 
draw up a list of industries which would be taken into public 
ownership during the lifetime of the next Labour administration. 
This was a commitment which the leadership had been reluctant to 
make since at least 1950. The resolution also called for a 
'speedy' redistribution of wealth in favour of workers, greater 
democracy in the workplace, 'radical' educational reforms to 
ensure full opportunities for all, and proposals which would 
restore, co-ordinate and extend the value and scope of the 
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social services. 
(72) Morrison accepted this resolution on behalf 
of the NEC, but he reaffirmed his opposition to the idea of a 
target list of industries for public ownership. 
(73) He also 
suggested that amendments to the resolution should be remitted 
to the Executive for further consideration: these included a 
proposal for the nationalisation of land, a call for a 'vast 
expansion of the school-building programme' and a demand for the 
abolition of the House of Lords. 
(74) 
Morecambe, therefore, left the NEC with a set of instructions 
for policy-making. Crossman believed that the Conference had 
opened the way for 'a more militant Socialist policy'. 
(75) When 
the Executive met for a weekend in December to consider a 'broad 
framework' for a policy statement for the 1953 Conference, 
Crossman's judgement appeared to be confirmed. 
(76) The dominant 
issue at the meetings was public ownership and the need to draw 
up a list of industries which would be taken over in the 
lifetime of the next Labour administration. The Bevanite members 
of the Committee took the initiative in this area, particularly 
Bevan and Mikardo who suggested a number of possible candidates. 
Attlee was cautious throughout the meetings and told the 
Executive that he wished to hear a detailed, prima facie case 
made before any industry became a candidate for public 
ownership. 
(77) During the meetings it was agreed that an 
appropriate case had been made for the nationalisation of the 
chemical industry, home minerals, water, air-frame assembly and 
aero-engines. It was also agreed that further consideration 
should be given to ship-building, ship-repairing, marine 
engineering, textile machinery and boot-making machinery. 
Although it was stressed that the meeting had reached only 
'tentative conclusions', Labour's industrial policy by the end 
of 1952 appeared to be much more clearly defined than it had 
been during the 1951 election. If Labour's manifesto for the 
1955 election had been based closely on the resolutions passed 
at Morecambe and the preliminary conclusions of the NEC in 
December 1952, it would have promised a substantial 
restructuring of the British economy and a clear growth in the 
size of the public sector. However., as passions cooled after 
Morecambe, as the Conference faded in the memory and as the Home 
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Policy Committee began its detailed work, the retreat on public 
ownership began. The Committee kept in place the existing 
sub-committees on agriculture, social services and economic 
policy and set up four working parties on possible candidates 
for public ownership: engineering and aircraft, textile 
machinery, chemicals and shipbuilding. The TUC leadership viewed 
this enquiry into candidates for state ownership with hostility. 
At a joint meeting of the TUC General Council and the NEC in 
January 1953 the trade union leaders refused to co-operate 
formally with the working parties: they did not want to become 
involved directly in policy-making, they claimed that they did 
not have the time to attend the meetings, and Lincoln Evans of 
the Steelworkers expressed serious doubts about the value of 
nationalisation. 
(78) Rather than have a formal input into policy 
formation, the TUC agreed to place its appropriate committees at 
the disposal of the NEC for whatever consultation or advice was 
thought necessary. 
(79) 
The discussions of the working parties about public ownership 
appear to have been conducted in practical rather than in 
ideological terms; efficiency and productivity were the key 
considerations rather than principle. It soon became clear that 
while it was comparatively easy to draft resolutions which 
demanded new measures of nationalisation, it was much more 
difficult to produce workable proposals which could be justified 
on economic grounds. The result was that the working parties 
rejected full scale nationalisation for all the industries which 
they examined. Although it was chaired by Ian Mikardo, the 
working party on engineering and aircraft rejected the outright 
nationalisation of the aircraft industry. 
(80) It also rejected 
the idea of taking over whole firms within the industry. 
Instead, it proposed that Labour would acquire an interest in 
certain firms in an effort to stimulate competition in the 
sector. Only in 'very special circumstances' and if a firm was 
acting contrary to 'national interests' would it be acquired 
fully by the state. 
(81) 
The working party on shipbuilding was equally unenthusiastic 
about public ownership. The discussions here were based on a 
document which the Research Department had prepared in 1948 and 
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the conclusion was soon reached that the contraction of the 
industry could not be reversed or managed significantly better 
under state ownership. It was suggested that some form of 
Development Council which included representatives of government 
and all sides of the industry would be more appropriate than 
nationalisation. 
(82) The working party on chemicals agreed that 
they would base their deliberations on two considerations: the 
efficiency of the industry and the adequacy of its investment 
programme. 
(83) It was eventually proposed that the state should 
acquire a controlling interest in some of the major chemical 
manufacturing companies, but a firm decision was postponed until 
the TUC and the Home Policy Committee had been able to examine 
the full implications of a form of public control in this 
industry. (84) The working party on textile machinery failed to 
submit any proposals at all to the 1953 Conference. Its members 
decided that they needed to investigate the prospects of the 
whole textile industry before they could make any sensible 
decisions about the future of textile machinery - but it was not 
possible to conduct this investigation within the constraints of 
the original timetable. 
(85) 
Although these four sub-committees had produced nothing to 
satisfy the spirit of the Morecambe resolution on public 
ownership, the Home Policy Committee clearly felt no pressure to 
offer other candidates for nationalisation instead. In effect, 
the Islington North composite was ignored. On the mining of home 
minerals, the Committee agreed that a Labour government would 
reserve powers to take over rights or workings 'in the light of 
the overall national interest' - it was also made clear that the 
'national interest' would be defined in terms of economic 
efficiency. 
(86) The enquiry into mining machinery was guided by 
similarly practical considerations. It was proposed that the 
state should acquire a 'controlling interest' in a few key firms 
in order to stimulate investment in research and development. 
The report also stressed that a policy statement in this area 
should make specific reference to the way in which improvements 
in mining machinery would improve coal output in Britain. 
(87) A 
broadly similar policy was applied to the machine tool industry. 
It was suggested that the state should acquire a 'controlling 
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interest' in a small number of the larger machine tool 
manufacturers in an effort to promote rationalisation and 
efficiency. 
(88) Finally, public ownership of the boot and shoe 
machinery industry was rejected outright. 
(89) 
The rejection of full public ownership for the eight 
industries discussed so far created little controversy within 
the Home Policy Committee. The Executive could at least argue 
that it had investigated the main potential candidates for 
nationalisation and found them to be unsuitable. Public 
ownership of agricultural land, however, was a more contentious 
issue for the Committee. During its deliberations in the spring 
of 1953, Bevan, Mikardo and Wilson all advocated state ownership 
of rented agricultural land. 
(90) Others dismissed the idea as 
administratively unworkable and electorally damaging. Morgan 
Phillips and Peggy Herbison, the MP for North Lanarkshire, 
argued that the scheme would encounter widespread opposition 
among the farming community. 
(91) George Brown, the MP for Belper 
and a future deputy leader of the Party, agreed with this view 
and argued that a change of ownership would be a huge 
administrative task and would do nothing to increase 
productivity in the short-term. 
(92) Brown suggested that existing 
powers for supervision and the dispossession of inefficient 
farmers remained the most effective instruments of control. In 
March, the Home Policy Committee accepted this proposal by eight 
votes to none; the Bevanite proposal was rejected by eight votes 
to three. 
(93) 
The Bevanites' failure in the debate on agricultural land 
confirmed the extent to which they were marginalised within the 
policy-making forum of the NEC. At a meeting of the full 
Executive in April 1953 they failed once again to secure a 
commitment to the public ownership of either farm land or rented 
farm land. (94) When a draft version of Challenge to Britain, 
Labour's first general statement of policy since 1951, was 
discussed by the NEC in May 1953, Bevan, Crossman, Castle and 
Mikardo put forward ten amendments in an attempt to bring the 
document more in to line with Bevanite thinking. Nine of the 
amendments were defeated comfortably and one was ruled out of 
order. 
(95) As a result, Challenge to Britain was in most respects 
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a cautious and moderate document. After Morecambe, the Executive 
chose to ignore the call for increased nationalisation in both 
industry and agriculture because they judged that it would be 
impractical and unpopular with voters. In its place they offered 
limited state intervention - for example, the use of state funds 
to compete with the private sector as a way of improving 
investment, efficiency and productivity. This was an idea which 
had the strong support of Hugh Gaitskell, who warned that Labour 
should avoid becoming identified as a party which supported 
public ownership as an end in itself. Shortly before the 
publication of Challenge to Britain he wrote; 
'Politically one of our dangers at the moment is that we tend 
to be regarded as a party opposed to the energetic 
enterprising small man who wants to get on'. 
(96) 
Gaitskell believed that Labour had to deflect the charge that 
it would stifle individual initiative with bureaucratic 
restrictions and a large extension of the public sector of the 
economy. To be sure, surveys conducted in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s confirmed the extent to which public ownership was 
unpopular with the electorate. 
(97) Increasingly, Gaitskell and 
his colleagues within the Party became convinced that economic 
growth and efficiency, full employment and social equality could 
be achieved largely within the existing balance of the mixed 
economy. The lesson of the 1940s appeared to be that Keynesian 
budgetary techniques and the management of the welfare state 
could be used to secure many of the social and economic 
objectives of the Labour Party. Futher progress was required on 
the redistribution of income and wealth, but it was believed 
that this could be achieved without the reform of existing 
institutions in Britain and without fu(k1H. -9A measures of 
large-scale public ownership. In short, the transformation of 
the economy through an extension of the state sector was no 
longer seen by some in the Party as a finite socialist goal. 
This analysis of the economy gained wider credence in 1952 with 
the publication of New Fabian Essays. 
(98) As will be shown, 
however, the most complete elaboration of the analysis arrived 
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in 1956 when Anthony Crosland published The Future of 
Socialism. (99) 
The economic priorities identified in Challenge to Britain 
were drawn from the papers which Gaitskell and Crosland had 
produced for the Financial and Economic Policy 
Sub-Committee. (100) In their view, Britain had to increase its 
foreign currency reserves if it was to survive without aid from 
other nations. The need to increase the dollar reserves was of 
particular significance because the United States was the 
world's leading supplier of raw materials - Dalton, Cripps and 
Gaitskell had all struggled with this problem as Chancellors in 
Attlee's post-war administration. It was now suggested that a 
Labour government could defend the reserves by combining direct 
controls with a planned distribution of resources. Imports would 
be regulated, currency exchange would be controlled, capital 
investment would be chanelled into the production of food and 
raw materials both at home and in the Commonwealth, and 
productivity increases would be targeted in industries which had 
'big export prospects'. Challenge to Britain identified those 
industries which relied on sophisticated research and high 
levels of manufacturing skill as the ones which had the best 
export prospects: oil refining, chemicals, industrial plastics, 
aeronautical engineering and electronics. As we have seen, 
though, the extent to which a future Labour government-would 
intervene in these industries to increase productivity was not 
clear. Full public ownership of these industries had been ruled 
out by the Executive, but there was a strong suggestion that 
individual firms in these sectors would be taken over. The only 
candidates offered for full nationalisation in the document were 
road haulage and steel. 
The theme of state planning ran consistently through 
Challenge to Britain. Management of interest rates, regulation 
of investment, control of capital movement abroad, allocation of 
raw materials, control over the location of industry, dividend 
limitation and price controls were offered as measures which 
would secure full employment and growth without inflation. 
Labour also offered to 'review the detailed working of the tax 
system in order to ensure that it is efficient and just'. This 
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proposal was open to wide interpretation, but anything more 
detailed was probably inappropriate when a general election was 
not expected for almost two years. 
More specific policies for the pursuit of social equality 
were contained in the document. There was a call for an 
immediate increase in the level of social security benefits and 
a pledge to conduct an annual review which would link benefits 
with inflation. Labour repeated its pledge from the 1951 
manifesto to abolish health charges and it promised to improve 
health care for all by building more hospitals and by recruiting 
extra staff in the service. The Party's belief in the principle 
of equal pay between the sexes was reaffirmed - there was a 
commitment that a Labour government would introduce this 
principle immediately into the public sector. On housing it was 
promised that a Labour government would instruct local 
authorities to submit schemes for the take-over and 
modernisation of rent-controlled private properties - the aim 
was to transfer almost all rented property eventually to the 
local authorities. Although Labour was concerned primarily with 
public sector housing, there was also a pledge to reduce 
interest rates to help those who wished to buy their homes. The 
Party reaffirmed its commitment to comprehensive secondary 
education, although the rate at which the transition towards 
this system would take place was not mentioned. There was also a 
pledge to raise the statutory school-leaving age to sixteen as 
soon as it was 'practicable'. A commitment was made to ensure 
that students who were accepted for higher education would be 
entitled to a state scholarship. Finally, it was recognised that 
there was a need to promote science and technology in education 
- the document promised that funds would be made available for 
this and that Labour would establish a College of 
Technology- (101) 
By 1953, therefore, the Party had a full domestic policy 
programme which combined measures for economic planning and 
efficency with proposals for social reform. As with most 
documents of its kind, Challenge to Britain received a mixed 
response. Tribune's verdict on the policy statement was 'Good! 
But it can be a whole lot better'. 
(102) Predictably, the paper 
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called on the NEC to accept the Bevanite amendments to the 
document which had been rejected in May. The national press as a 
whole was equally unsure about its verdict. The Daily Mail 
described it as a victory for the 'right-wing'. The Daily 
Express offered an alternative view and declared it a 'victory 
for Mr Aneurin Bevan. At point after point his desires have 
prevailed'. The Financial Times believed that the 
nationalisation proposals and the philosophy of central control 
in the statement represented a 'strategic victory for the 
left-wing of the Labour Party'. 
(103) The Times meanwhile 
criticised the Executive for producing a statement which they 
felt was 'extremely bare of specific proposals or ideas'. 
(104) 
John Freeman, one of the three Ministers who resigned from the 
Labour Government in 1951, described the document in the New 
Statesman & Nation as 'so unsatisfactory and yet so nearly 
good'. 
(105) 
Despite these reactions, Challenge to Britain was accepted at 
the Margate Conference of 1953 with few amendments. A delegate 
from Coventry North complained that the NEC had ignored the 
resolution on public ownership from the previous year and called 
for nationalised industry to be made more accountable to 
Parliament. Sir William Lawther, President of the National Union 
of Mineworkers, told him that he should 'go back to Coventry', 
the NEC oppposed the resolution and the amendment was 
defeated. (106) Five other attempts were made by delegates from 
Hendon, Sheffield, Solihull, West Renfrewshire and the 
Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers to commit the Party to 
further public ownership, but these were also rejected. 
(107) The 
difference between the Conferences of 1952 and 1953 in this 
respect was that the NEC could support their rejection of full 
nationalisation for industries in 1953 with the detailed 
evidence of the sub-committees. Most delegates accepted this 
point and supported the platform's policy on public ownership at 
Margate. It may also have been true that the Party wished to 
present a public display of unity at the 1953 Conference after 
the rancour of Morecambe. This could partly explain why further 
amendments on industrial democracy in the nationalised 
industries, public ownership of land and the abolition of 
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fee-paying schools were also defeated. 
(108)The Economist offered 
this interpretation of Margate; 
'The counter attack by the party's right wing has succeeded; 
the policy on domestic affairs that last year seemed to be 
veering far to the left has been pushed a good way back to 
moderation. ' 
(109) 
Labour's policy after the 1953 Conference was essentially the 
policy on which it fought the 1955 election. The NEC decided 
after Margate that work was required on some of the details, but 
the main components of the programme remained unchanged. 
(110) 
Although the Party was broadly united behind the programme, the 
Left was unhappy about the cautious proposals on nationalisatign 
and the absence of a specific pledge to introduce a capital 
gains tax. 
(111) From a different perspective, Noel-Baker 
expressed reservations about the policy of comprehensive 
secondary education. 
(112) Gordon Walker shared this view and 
argued that the Party should aim to provide a 'Grammar school 
education for all'. He was also concerned about a housing policy 
which emphasised the need to provide rented accommodation. He 
argued that local authorities should aim to provide houses for 
sale because the country did not want 'a population of council 
tenants'. 
(113) 
Hugh Gaitskell expressed a different concern about Challenge 
to Britain. In July 1954 he presented a paper to the NEC which 
argued that Labour would be unable to finance the commitments 
which it had made in its programme, despite press criticism that 
Challenge to Britain was cautious and that it lacked specific 
proposals. 
(114) Even on the 'most favourable' assumption that a 
Labour government could deliver an annual growth rate of 3 per 
cent, Gaitskell believed that the programme was 'still too 
ambitious'. In order to fund the promised increased investment 
in industry and to finance the commitments on education, state 
benefits, health care, housing and equal pay without risking 
inflation, Labour would have to impose 'major increases in 
taxation'. As the paper concluded; 
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'The political consequences as well as the economic 
difficulties must be realised ... A re-examination of the 
commitments entered into in Challenge to Britain is desirable 
if a future Labour Government is not to face an impossible 
situation'. 
(115) 
As election year approached, however, it seemed increasingly 
unlikely that Labour would be asked to implement its programme 
in government - in that respect the cost of its programme was 
irrelevant. A series of articles published in the Manchester 
Guardian between December 1954 and January 1955 contained an 
important truism about electoral politics during the period: 
'The need for a change has never been less obvious'. 
(116) Despite 
Labour's slim lead in the opinion polls for most of the period 
from 1952 to 1954, there were simply no compelling reason for 
the country to vote for a change of government when an election 
was called for May 1955. Labour's dire predictions in 1951 about 
the consequences of a Tory victory had been disproved by events. 
The Conservative Government was certainly helped by external 
economic factors - particularly an improvement in the terms of 
trade - but its record overall was marked by a number of 
significant achievements. By 1955 unemployment was barely 1 per 
cent; cordial relations were maintained with the trade unions; 
pensions and national assistance benefits were raised; income 
tax was reduced in 1953 and 1955; the housing programme, which 
aimed to build 300,000 houses a year, was achieved in 1953; food 
rationing was stopped in 1954 and sales of consumer durables 
rose rapidly, especially after 1952. The Conservatives showed 
that they were committed to the maintenance of the welfare 
state, they held all their seats at by-elections after 1951 and 
the Chancellor offered the prospect in 1954 of living standards 
which would double in twenty-five years. 
By 1955 Labour's policy makers recognised the difficulties 
they faced in the forthcoming election. A paper for the Home 
Policy Committee in February admitted that the economy was 
'running fairly smoothly' and acknowledged that the references 
in Challenge to Britain to the restoration of full employment 
were out of date'. 
(117) It argued that the best economic issue 
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on which Labour could attack the Tories was the looming balance 
of payments problem. This was a valid argument, but its impact 
on the electorate was likely to be minimal. Another paper in 
March, entitled 'Plans for an Election Manifesto', reinforced 
the scale of the difficulties which Labour faced. It conceded 
that the economic situation would favour the Government during 
the campaign, but it suggested optimistically that Labour could 
claim the credit for prosperity as they had laid the foundation 
for recovery after 1945. It was further suggested that Labour 
should attack the Tories for their failure to achieve a higher 
rate of growth, for their failure to distribute wealth fairly 
and for their failure to guard against inflation. The paper also 
put forward the argument that in an age of technological change, 
only a government committed to economic planning could prevent 
the return of heavy unemployment. 
(118) 
These were valid arguments for Labour to use, but their 
potential impact against a Government which had presided over 
economic growth and prosperity was always likely to be limited. 
When Anthony Eden succeeded Winston Churchill as Prime Minister 
in April 1955 and announced a general election for the following 
month, Labour's prospects appeared to be bleak - despite the 
progress that it had made since 1951. The civil war was largely 
over by the time of the election, but the ending of hostilities 
came too late for the Party to convince voters that it was a 
unified force. The image of division and in-fighting which the 
Party had often presented to the public during its time in 
opposition was also summoned up again by the attempt to expel 
Bevan in March 1955. Valuable work was completed on policy after 
1951, but constructive policies were of limited electoral value 
while the Government remained popular. The Conservatives entered 
the campaign with a lead of 4 per cent in the opinion 
polls. 
(119) And according to the Nuffield study of the 1955 
election the 'general expectation' of a Tory victory was present 
from the outset. 
(120) 
The belief that the Government would be returned to office 
made for a dull campaign. Election stories rarely made the 
headlines in the national press in 1955, the average audience 
for election broadcasts was one-third of the size of the average 
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audience in 1951, and neither of the main parties made 
particularly effective use of television. 
(121)Labour 
focused its 
attack on rising prices under the Conservatives, but it failed 
to overcome the apathy of the electorate. This was reflected in 
the fall in the turn-out of voters from the previous election: 
whereas 82.5 per cent of the electorate had voted in 1951,76.7 
per cent of the electorate voted in 1955. As a result, both of 
the main parties suffered a reduction in their aggregate vote 
from 1951: the Conservative vote fell by approximately 430,000 
and Labour's vote fell by more than 1,500,000. In terms of 
parliamentary seats this meant that the Government increased its 
effective majority from 17 to 59. However, Labour could at least 
take some comfort from the defeat. In difficult circumstances 
they had won 46.4 per cent of the popular vote, while the 
average swing towards the Government had been just 1.8 per 
cent. 
(122) Tony Benn, who held his seat for Labour in Bristol, 
explained in his diary that the national defeat could be 
attributed to the Government's good economic fortune rather than 
any serious and irreversible decline in Labour's support: 
'Now we are defeated again. The right will blame Bevan. The 
Bevanites will interpret it as the price paid for the 
right-wing policies and leaders. But since 1951 the Tories 
have had good luck with the economic climate, people are 
generally better off and the end of most shortages has 
enabled rationing to be ended on everything but coal. There 
has been no unemployment. A family in a council house with a 
TV set and a car or motorcycle-combination on hire purchase 
had few reasons for a change of government. ' 
(123) 
The Party was more united than at any time since 1951 in the 
aftermath of the 1955 defeat. The task for the leadership as the 
Party entered another period in opposition was to ensure that 
this unity was consolidated. This would enable the attention of 
the PLP to be focused on the fight against the Government. A 
start had been made on the search for a new policy programme 
before 1955, but more work was needed to refine and to modernise 
policy as the next Labour administration was unlikely to take 
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power during the remainder of the 1950s. Labour could look to 
the future with some confidence in 1955, but it was also aware 
that a further period of economic prosperity could again damage 
its electoral fortunes. The following chapter will show how 
Labour responded to its second successive electoral failure. 
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3. Labour in the affluent society, 1955-1959 
Labour's record in elections to Parliament between May 1955 and 
October 1959 appears to be that of a party in decline. At 
Westminster, the Conservatives increased their majority from 59 
seats to 100 seats. Labour's share of the poll fell from 46.4 
per cent to 43.8 per cent and its aggregate vote dropped by 
almost 200,000. 
(1) By-elections provided the Party with some 
welcome victories, but its record overall in these contests was 
one of only modest success. Labour increased its share of the 
vote in 31 of the 49 by-elections during the period, but all 
four of its gains were the result of small swings in marginal 
constituencies. Lewisham North, Rochdale and Glasgow Kelvingrove 
were taken from the Tories, while Carmarthen was won from the 
Liberals; in none of these four contests, though, did Labour 
increase its share of the vote by more than 5 per cent. 
(2) 
The 1959 election was the fourth successive national contest 
in which Labour lost seats overall. At the time, commentators 
believed that this record of failure raised questions about the 
Party's ability to form another government. 
(3) Historians, aware 
of course that these questions were answered in 1964, have 
focused instead on the contrast between Labour's apparent 
weakness in the 1950s and its strength in elections in the 1940s 
and 1960s. Various arguments have been used to explain this 
contrast, but there is at least agreement among historians that 
Labour was a Party with serious problems in the 1950s, 
particularly in the second half of the decade when it lost two 
elections. 
(4) These problems have been attributed to factors such 
as poor leadership, failures in policy-making and failure to 
respond to social changes in an increasingly affluent 
society. 
(5) 
This chapter will offer a different interpretation of 
Labour's performance between 1955 and 1959. Here it will be 
argued that Labour was in a relatively strong position at the 
end of this period. The PLP rediscovered the benefits of unity, 
individual membership of the Party remained stable at about 
850,000 (6) and the leadership carried some important revisions of 
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policy which enabled the Party to offer a workable programme in 
the 1959 election. To be sure, mistakes were made at the time 
which undermined the Party's strategy for recovery after the 
1955 defeat. But in an era of economic growth and rising living 
standards, the remarkable feature of Labour's support in the 
late 1950s is not its decline, but its consistency. 
Labour's first task after the 1955 election was to analyse the 
reasons for its failure. Morgan Phillips' report on the contest 
for the NEC offered a number of explanations for the Party's 
defeat. The most important factor he identified was continued 
prosperity in the country. Phillips conceded that many workers 
were 'haDDv about the Dresent Dosition and had no inclination to 
secure a change of Government at this time I- 
(7) The superior 
organisation of the Tories, based largely on their employment of 
more professional staff than their rivals, was another advantage 
identified by Phillips. The redrawing of constituency borders by 
the Boundary Commission helped to make the contest even more 
favourable for the Conservatives; the report calculated that the 
Boundary Commission's changes had produced a net gain of 23 
seats for the Tories and a net loss of 17 seats for Labour. 
Phillips also acknowledged, though, that in some respects at 
least the Party's electoral failure was self-inflicted. 
Divisions within the Party were blamed both for a loss of votes 
and for a loss of morale among Party workers. The report also 
argued that policy differences between the parties in some areas 
were 'of a technical nature rather than clear cut'. As a result, 
many Labour candidates had conducted negative campaigns in which 
they attacked the Government's record, but failed to offer 
clear, positive alternatives to the voters. 
(8) 
In the aftermath of the Party's second successive defeat, the 
NEC highlighted two areas for urgent attention; organisation and 
policy. In June, the NEC set up a sub-committee on Party 
organisation with the aim of improving Labour's electoral 
machinery. 
(9) In July, the Policy Committee agreed to begin a 
(10) 
long-term review of domestic policy. Most Labour supporters 
and activists, though, were more concerned with the issue of the 
Party leadership. The Tories did not have to request d 
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dissolution before 1960, by which time Attlee, who had led the 
Party since 1935, would be seventy-seven. As we have seen, 
Attlee had apparently considered retirement before the 1951 
election, and he had told his colleagues in 1952 that a Prime 
Minister should be younger than seventy. After his Party had 
lost seats at three consecutive contests, it was obvious that 
Attlee was not the man to lead Labour into the next election. 
Within days of the Conservative's victory, the Daily Mirror led 
the call for a leadership change. Under the headline 'Attlee 
Must Go! ' it described the Labour leader as the 'chief architect 
of defeat. 
(11) The paper believed that Attlee and his senior 
colleagues were too old, too tired and too weak to lead the 
Party; its message to the old men in the Shadow Cabinet was 
simple - 'Move over, Dad. Make room for Youth'. 
(12) 
This view of the Party leadership was not confined to the 
press. In a private account of his election campaign, Crossman 
blamed 'the obvious disarray of the Labour leadership' for the 
'indifference and apathy' which he had encountered around the 
country. He looked forward to the prospect of the Party 'getting 
rid of an ageing leadership, which, in the course of the 
campaign gave no lead whatsoever and left each candidate with a 
feeling that he was fighting an isolated battle in his own 
constituency'. 
(13) According to Arthur Moyle, Attlee's 
parliamentary private secretary, the Labour leader had 
anticipated this type of criticism and wanted to retire 
immediately after the 1955 defeat. 
(14) At the time, however, 
there was no obvious successor. The main candidate on the right 
of the Party was Morrison; but at sixty-seven he was already 
probably too old to take charge. Bevan was the clear left-wing 
favourite; but his resignation from the Shadow Cabinet in 1954 
and his narrow escape from expulsion in 1955 perhaps confirmed 
that he was too much of a rebel to be a team captain. An early 
contest between the two also offered the prospect of an 
immediate return to the civil war which had scarred the Party 
between 1951 and 1955. Therefore, although a change of leader 
was necessary, there was no compelling reason for Labour to rush 
into a decision. Instead, it made sense for the Party to enjoy a 
period of quiet reflection after its electoral setback. As a 
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result, when Attlee suggested that he should step down as leader 
at the first PLP meeting of the new session, his colleagues made 
it clear that they wanted him to stay. Douglas Jay, a member of 
the PLP who worked closely with Attlee, believes that the Labour 
leader fully expected to be asked to delay his retirement at 
this meeting. 
(15) 
Attlee's decision to stay in his post has been portrayed as a 
deliberate attempt to deprive Morrison of the leadership. 
Exponents of this view argue that Attlee refused to stand down 
until he was satisfied that Morrison would not be chosen as his 
successor. 
(16) 
However, Attlee already knew that Morrison's 
chances of leading the Party had probably disappeared before the 
PLP meeting in June. Morrison would have been favourite to win a 
leadership contest before the 1955 election, but he was unlikely 
to be chosen to lead the Party after this because of his age. He 
was from the same generation as Attlee; a generation which had 
rescued the Party in the 1930s and dominated British politics in 
the 1940s, but whose work was now complete. In 1955, Labour had 
to find a leader from a younger generation to guide the Party 
into a new decade. Until a credible candidate emerged, Attlee 
knew that the Party was not ready for a leadership contest. This 
judgement, rather than antipathy towards Morrison, best explains 
why Attlee stayed on as leader until December 1955. 
Attlee's decision to delay his resignation was arguably the 
greatest service he performed for the Party after 1951. It 
allowed Hugh Gaitskell to convince both himself and his 
colleagues that he should become the next Labour leader. As a 
result, the contest to find Attlee's successor in 1955 settled 
the leadership issue for the forseeable future and enabled the 
Party to declare a truce in its civil war. As shown, Gaitskell's 
record after ten years in Parliament had marked him out as a 
future leader of the Party: he had been promoted rapidly in the 
1945-1951 administrations; he had been elected to one of the top 
three places in the Shadow Cabinet throughout the 1951 
Parliament; and his successful bid for the treasurership in 1954 
showed that he had the support of the major trade unions. 
Throughout most of 1955, though, Gaitskell believed that he 
would become leader only after Morrison had served a short term 
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as Attlee's successor. In October, at a meeting with Patrick 
Gordon Walker, he agreed that he could best serve the Party as 
Morrison's deputy 'for a few years'. 
(17) But he also made it 
clear that he would enter the leadership contest if he believed 
that Bevan was likely to beat Morrison. 
At the Margate Conference in October, Gordon Walker - who had 
been canvassing hard for Morrison - noted a 'strong trend' among 
the PLP in favour of a Gaitskell succession. 
(18) There were two 
main reasons for this. First, Gaitskell offered the prospect of 
a long period of settled leadership. Second, by outlining his 
thoughts about the future of the Party in post-war society, 
Gaitskell had begun to prove that he could match his 
administrative talent with political vision, imagination and 
passion. In his debut speech from the platform at Conference he 
emphasised that his socialism was rooted in a hatred of social 
injustice, poverty and squalor. 
(19) But he also recognised that 
these issues had lost much of their resonance with the 
electorate since 1945 as affluence increased in Britain. In an 
article published shortly after the 1955 election, he outlined 
the way in which the values of voters had become more 
individualistic: 
'I fancy that in the last year or two more and more people 
are beginning to turn to their own personal affairs and to 
concentrate more on their own material advancement. No doubt 
it has been stimulated by the end of post-war austerity, TV, 
new gadgets like refrigerators and washing machines, the 
glossy magazines with their special appeal to women, and even 
the flood of new cars on the home market. Call it if you like 
a growing Americanisation of outlook. I believe it's there, 
and it's no good moaning about it. ' 
(20) 
Gaitskell saw that rising living standards and the changing 
attitudes of voters presented a challenge to Labour. The Party 
had to adapt its appeal to win votes in these new circumstances; 
the traditional pledges to tackle poverty and unemployment were 
no longer adequate in an era of full employment and universal 
welfare benefits. This analysis signalled to the PLP that 
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Gaitskell was willing to engage in the new thinking that was 
required after successive election defeats. His leadership 
prospects were improved still further by his combative 
performance in the debate on Butler's supplementary budget in 
October 1955. This performance contrasted sharply with 
Morrison's laboured efforts in the House which eventually led 
Gordon Walker to comment: 
'Morrison is undoubtedly failing both mentally and 
physically. He still has deep knowledge of the movement which 
Gaitskell still lacks. But he cannot think afresh - nor can 
he any longer speak in Parliament. His performances of late 
have been horrible. ' (21) 
When Attlee retired in December 1955 Bevan, Gaitskell and 
Morrison entered a 
it is difficult to 
Bevan was a rebel; 
decline; Gaitskell 
landslide: 157 Lab 
contest for the succession. 
(22) In retrospect, 
believe that the result was ever in doubt. 
Gaitskell was a loyalist. Morrison was in 
had yet to reach his peak. The outcome was a 
our MPs voted for Gaitskell, 70 for Bevan, 40 
for Morrison and 8 abstained. 
(23) Almost 60 per cent of the PLP 
voted for the new Labour leader - at the time it was the most 
convincing victory in the Party's history and it made Gaitskell 
the youngest leader of any main British party since RosebeKj 
had led the Liberals at the end of the LAý-V Century. With a 
simple change of leadership, the Party had drawn a line under 
the years of Jarrow, Dunkirk and post-war austerity. Labour 
could now face the future with a leader who was young, competent 
and self-assured. The Dailv Mirror caught the mood of optimism 
which followed the PLP's decisive vote when it declared: 'Last 
night the Labour Party was reborn. It demonstrated that it is no 
longer satisfied with the cautious advice of old men, or with 
the ideas of the last half-century. ' 
(24) 
Despite Gaitskell's past battles with the Bevanites, his 
election by the PLP was a new beginning which gave the Party an 
opportunity to repair the damaging splits within its own ranks. 
Bevan simplified the process by signalling that he was at least 
prepared to work with his old rival. The day after his defeat in 
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the leadership contest, Bevan made it clear that he would stand 
for the position of Gaitskell's deputy after Morrison 
retired. 
(25) 
This represented a further step towards peace in the 
Party, but it would be a mistake to assume that former Bevanites 
completely buried their differences with Gaitskell at this time. 
At an NEC meeting in January, Mikardo argued that Gaitskell 
should not be permitted to retain the treasurership after he had 
become Party leader. (26)This move was an attempt to secure the 
treasurership for Bevan as the second placed candidate in the 
contest for the post at the 1955 Conference. Gaitskell's 
majority on the NEC enabled him to defeat Mikardo's proposal, 
but the episode was an early warning that the Left had no 
intention of supporting the new leader on every issue. 
The priority for Gaitskell was to set Labour on a route back 
to power. He outlined the three main components of his strategy 
for electoral recovery at a meeting of the National Council of 
Labour at the start of 1956. The Party had to improve its 
organisation to ensure that it mobilised maximum support in the 
constituencies; the PLP had to show that it was an 'alternative 
Government' by conducting vigorous opposition in Parliament in a 
'responsible manner'; and the three year policy review had to 
produce an 'up-to-date version of Labour's Socialist faith'. 
(27) 
This programme made obvious sense as a broad strategy for the 
Party, but the objectives it set were only met in part between 
1955 and 1959. As will be shown, the Party made substantial 
progress in only one of the three areas highlighted by 
Gaitskell. The important point, however, is that this progress 
was made in the most significant area of all: the rewriting of 
policy. Party organisation improved only marginally before the 
1959 election, the PLP enjoyed mixed fortunes opposing the 
Tories at Westminster, but the policy review was a clear 
success. It will be argued here that weaknesses in organisation 
and occasional failures by the PLP at Westminster were 
understandable and were not decisive factors in Labour's defeat 
in 1959. Although progress in these two areas would have been 
welcomed by the Party, the important feature of Labour politics 
after 1955 was the direction in which Gaitskell led the Party 
over policy. It was this new direction and a rediscovered sense 
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of purpose under Gaitskell which laid the foundations of 
Labour's election victory in 1964. 
When Gaitskell became leader, an internal study of the Party's 
organisation was already in progress. A sub-committee had been 
set up to examine the subject following the General Secretary's 
report on the 1955 election. Wilson chaired this sub-committee 
and turned its investigation into the most extensive and 
methodical study of organisation in the Party's history. Between 
July and September 1955 the sub-committee visited each regional 
centre of the Party and a small number of marginal 
constituencies; they received oral and written evidence from the 
National Union of Labour Organisers and the Co-operative Party; 
they asked every Election Agent in the country to answer a 
questionnaire and received 527 completed forms; they took 
evidence from 140 Labour MPs and 164 unsuccessful Labour 
candidates; and they interviewed officers from Transport 
House. (28) When Wilson sifted through this mass of evidence and 
wrote the sub-committee's report, his conclusions were highly 
critical of the existing standard of organisation in the Party. 
Although the report acknowledged that poor organisation was 
not the sole cause of Labour's defeat in 1955, Wilson emphasised 
that it was an important factor which operated in favour of the 
Tories. The sub-committee was 'deeply shocked' by the evidence 
they had found during their study: 
'After what we have seen of Party organisation throughout the 
country our surprise is not that the General Election was 
lost, but that we won as many seats as we did. ' 
(29) 
The sub-committee claimed that the Party's army of voluntary 
workers was smaller and less enthusiastic than at any previous 
time. According to Len Williams, Labour's National Agent, 35 
marginal seats across Britain were lost to the Tories 'primarily 
through poor organisation'. An example was given of a large city 
- which the report did not identify - with three marginal 
divisions where no house was canvassed during the campaign. This 
example of neglect highlighted the importance of the 
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constituency parties. Wilson stressed that the primary function 
of CLP9 during elections was to identify Labour supporters and 
to ensure that they cast their votes, particularly in marginal 
constituencies. Time should not be wasted on attempts to make 
converts. In order to create a machine that would mobilise fully 
the potential Labour vote, the report argued that the Party's 
voluntary workers had to be supported with 'staff, finance, 
inspiration and advice'. It would have made sense for the Party 
to follow the Conservatives' practice of employing professional 
party workers in the constituencies, but the sub-committee 
believed that Labour should retain its traditional reliance on 
voluntary workers. 
(30) 
Wilson's report covered 80 pages and made 41 recommendations. 
Many of these dealt with detailed aspects of finance and 
organisation within constituencies, but several important 
recommendations threw into sharp relief the Party's failure to 
adopt even the most obvious methods of effective organisation in 
the country before 1955. It was suggested, for example, that a 
standing committee should be established to supervise the 
organisational work of the Party - the eventual creation of the 
Organisation Sub-committee of the NEC was arguably the most 
important achievement of the report. One of the priorities 
envisaged for this new sub-committee was to prepare a scheme to 
recruit, train and deploy agents who would be used solely for 
organisational work in the constituencies. Alongside the 
recruitment of more agents, the report urged the Party to ensure 
that resources were transferred from safe seats to marginals 
during an election campaign. In fact, one of the main aims of 
Wilson's report was to focus the efforts of the Party on 
marginal constituencies. It was suggested that prospective 
Parliamentary candidates should be appointed in every marginal 
seat at the earliest possible date; this would enable candidates 
to build a base of support in their constituency by working 
alongside local councillors. Wilson also argued that the NEC 
should assume responsibility for providing adequate financial 
assistance to local parties in marginals. In the 1955 election, 
37 seats had been won on minority votes and 42 seats were held 
with majorities of less than 1000. 
(31) The report called for a 
61 
full canvass in every marginal division as part of an effort to 
capture as many of these seats as possible at the next election. 
Success in this area, however, eluded the Party; in the 1959 
election, Labour gained only 5 seats overall and sustained 28 
losses. (32) 
Although Wilson's report offered solutions to Labour's 
organisational problems, its critique was too powerful ever to 
be accepted in full at Transport House. Morgan Phillips and Len 
Williams, the two members of staff in charge of Party 
organisation, resented the criticism of their working methods 
implied in the document and launched a counter-attack against 
its conclusions. Each complained that the report contained a 
number of inQcý--uracies at a meeting of the NEC. 
(33) This 
rearguard action was rewarded when the Executive decided against 
adopting the report officially; instead, the document was to be 
given 'detailed consideration' after Conference had discussed a 
revised version of the material. 
(34) A favourable reception from 
delegates at Margate, though, failed to persuade the NEC or 
Transport House to accept the logic of the sub-committee's 
findings. The Party's methods of organisation required thorough 
reform, but the only significant change that occurred before 
1959 was increased financial assistance for marginals. 
(35) 
Crossman, a member of the NEC, pointed to the lack of progress 
in this area when he complained shortly before the 1959 
election; 'Transport House is a machine which is gummed up and 
the whole structure of constituency parties is barely 
alive'. 
(36) Overall, mainly because of resistance from Party 
officials and a shortage of funds, Wilson's report continued to 
be a critique rather than a programme of action. 
In contrast, the PLP at Westminster was relatively well 
organised. This at least gave the Party an opportunity to tackle 
the second requirement of Gaitskell's strategy for recovery - 
effective opposition in parliament. When the new Parliamentary 
Committee met for the first time after the 1955 election, 
Gaitskell suggested that front bench members should be allocated 
clear areas of responsibility in the Commons; the appointments 
would be made by Party officers. 
(37) The idea that Labour 
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spokesmen should 'shadow' Ministers made obvious sense and was a 
clear improvement on previous arrangements. Members of the PLP 
front bench would be able to develop expertise in specific 
areas; it would help to ensure that a senior PLP member was 
ready to attack the government on each area of policy; and it 
would help the PLP in opposition to present itself as an 
alternative government. Attlee led the Party when this practice 
was adopted. As a former Prime Minister, he understood the 
advantages of allocating specific responsibilities to 
individuals, but he emphasised that the procedure should not be 
allowed to interfere with his authority over strategy in the 
House, nor with the right of the Chairman or Deputy-Chairman of 
the PLP to intervene at any time when particular issues were 
raised. 
(38) 
Appointments to shadow posts were regularly changed, but the 
first allocation of major roles contained few surprises. With 
the PLP determined to present itself as a government in waiting, 
the obvious arrangement was for former Ministers to shadow their 
old departments. So, for example, Gaitskell was appointed to 
cover the Treasury, Bevan shadowed Labour and National Service, 
(39) 
and Wilson shadowed the Board of Trade. It was later agreed 
that front bench members of the PLP would not be permitted to 
speak from the back benches on issues which were not their 
direct responsibility; instead, they would concentrate on their 
(40) 
front bench duties. In theory, by deciding upon a clear 
division of responsibility at Westminster, the PLP had 
established a structure which enabled them to act as a more 
effective opposition than ever before. In practice of course, 
the quality of Labour's opposition was governed by two 
variables: the performance of PLP members and the performance of 
the Conservative Government. 
One of the main problems which faced the NEC after May 1955 
was a potential loss of morale caused by the disappointment of 
defeat. It is difficult to assess the morale of the Party in the 
Commons at this time with any degree of accuracy, but there is 
evidence which suggests that some members of the PLP did not 
relish the battle with the Tories at Westminster. Herbert 
Bowden, the Chief Whip, often drew attention to the problem of 
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poor attendance in the House, poor attendance at Party meetings 
and the fact that the front bench was often left unattended. 
(41) 
Gaitskell was asked to impress upon his senior colleagues the 
'desirability' of attending debates on the front bench, even if 
the issue under discussion was not an area of direct 
responsibility. 
(42) 
Crossman implied that the greatest threat to the morale of 
the PLP was the poor quality of Labour's senior 
parliamentarians. He was optimistic about the performance of 
Gaitskell and Bevan towards the end of 1957, but he described 
the rest of Labour's front bench team as 'small and 
unimpressive'. 
(43) 
Crossman criticised his colleagues in highly 
personal terms and argued that the real opposition in the 
country was anti-political and could be found outside Parliament 
among writers like John Osborne, John Wain and Colin Wilson - 
this trio and others attacked what they saw as the apathy and 
complacency of the post-war affluent society and earned 
themselves the generic title of 'angry young menT. 
(44) Crossman 
echoed some of their concerns when he complained that Labour was 
too cautious, paid too much attention to opinion polls and was 
too anxious to avoid debates on contentious issues in case 
commitments were made which might cost the Party votes at the 
next election. 
(45) Whether these criticisms were fully deserved 
is debatable. Crossman constantly complained in his diaries, 
correspondence and articles about colleagues he considered to be 
less able and less intelligent than himself; occasionally he 
would bestow praise, but criticism was more frequent. His 
description of Labour's 'unimpressive' front bench team and 
their cautious approach to politics should be seen in this 
context. In place of Crossman's verdict, it is more reasonable 
to argue that the Parliamentary Committee struggled to make an 
impression against the Government in the second half of the 
19509. The Conservatives at the time had a talented 
parliamentary team which included Harold Macmillan, R. A. Butler, 
Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell. 
(46) These were often more than a 
match for their Labour opponents in the House. Perhaps more 
importantly, the Government was able to take advantage of 
largely favourable economic circumstances; average annual total 
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output grew at almost 3 per cent, unemployment remained low at 
around 2 per cent and real wages continued to rise. 
(47) Provided 
that this prosperity in the country continued, Labour's front 
bench had few opportunities to challenge the Tories' ascendancy 
in Parliament. This dilemma was recognised by the Party 
hierarchy. A 'propoganda directive' for the NEC in 1956 
identified full employment, full shops and high wages as 
particularly strong factors which worked in favour of the Tories 
at that time. 
(48) 
This tranquility helped to produce the unfavourable political 
climate in which the new Labour leader had to operate before the 
1959 election. Gaitskell had the misfortune to face a Government 
which presided over a growing economy - any assessment of his 
performance in opposition at Westminster should begin with an 
acknowledgement of this fact. As Party leader, though, it was 
his duty to make the beat of adverse conditions. Gaitskell had 
called for effective opposition at Westminster; he, above all, 
had to rise to this challenge. Although much of his time as 
leader was spent on internal Party business, Gaitskell realised 
the importance of presenting himself as an alternative Prime 
Minister to Anthony Eden and later Harold Macmillan. 
(49) In fact, 
by 1958 Gaitskell was complaining that his Party had failed to 
pay enough attention to this task: 
'We've got to win the next Election. And one thing, surely, 
for purely technical reasons, the Party should be ready to 
build me up in the way that Macmillan is built up by his 
people. After all, I am their Leader, at least till after the 
next Election. ' 
(50) 
This is a revealing statement which outlines one of 
Gaitskell's main concerns in his early years as opposition 
leader. In part, it was an admission that he had failed to 
establish himself sufficiently in the public mind as a suitable 
alternative to Tory Prime Ministers. To be sure, Gaitskell had a 
mixed record against Eden, but he failed completely to disturb 
Macmillan's carefully crafted presentation of calm authority. 
For some time, Gaitskell found it difficult to adjust to his new 
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role in Parliament; the transition from Labour's chief economic 
spokesman to leader of the opposition was a difficult journey. 
Gaitskell's main strength in parliamentary debate was his 
mastery of economic and financial affairs. As shown, his 
training and his authority on economic issues had led to rapid 
promotion after 1945, and an impressive reply to Butler's 
supplementary budget in October 1955 helped to establish him as 
a favourite to succeed Attlee. As leader, though, Gaitskell 
enjoyed fewer opportunities to attack the Tories on his favoured 
ground. The responsibility for leading the Party's critique of 
Government economic management passed to Wilson, the new Shadow 
Chancellor. While Wilson was able to concentrate on this 
specific area and enhance his reputation in Parliament with some 
impressive performances, the Labour leader's brief at 
Westminster was largely governed by events. He could attempt to 
influence the political agenda by focussing his Party's attacks 
on specific aspects of Government policy, but his main task was 
to exploit Tory mistakes and difficulties as they occurred. 
Unfortunately for Gaitskell, opportunities to embarrass the 
Government were rare before 1959. To make matters worse, he 
failed to exploit Tory difficulties fully when they arose. 
The first main test of Gaitskell's potential as a national 
rather than a party leader came during the Suez crisis. Although 
the details of the Suez episode fall outside the boundaries of 
this study, it is useful to examine the Labour leader's handling 
of the affair and the effect which the crisis had on his 
standing as an alternative Prime Minister. According to the 
opinion polls he handled the crisis badly: in the aftermath of 
Suez, Eden's popularity rating climbed by 12 per cent; 
Gaitskell's fell by 9 per cent. 
(51) Eden reaped the short-term 
benefit that could be expected by a Prime Minister when the 
country's forces were engaged in military action; in contrast, 
Gaitskell left himself open to the charge that he had trimmed 
his opinions on an issue of national importance for party 
political reasons. Gaitskell was accused of initially supporting 
military action to protect Britain's interests in the Suez 
Canal, but then changing his mind when the troops were sent in 
because of pressure from his backbenchers and the condemnation 
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of the action by the United Nations. 
In fact, Gaitskell clearly informed Eden that Labour would 
not support Britain's use of force in the Canal Zone unless it 
was in self-defence. But in a Commons debate on 2 August 1956, 
he had compared the tactics of the Egyptian President Nasser to 
those used by Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s; in retrospect, 
this was an unwise and emotive comparison because it conveyed 
the impression that Gaitskell was prepared to sanction the use 
of force against Nasser unless the Egyptian President backed 
down in the face of international pressure. When Gaitskell 
protested against Britain's military intervention in Egypt in 
October 1956, he was accused by some of inconsistency. More 
importantly, he was accused of disloyalty at a time when British 
troops were preparing to go into action. Also, in a televised 
broadcast to the nation, Gaitskell followed a reasoned 
denunciation of the Government's breach of international law 
with a call for the Prime Minister's resignation. 
(52) As a 
result, the Labour leader was accused of exploiting an 
international crisis for party political purposes and some 
Tories took a long time to forget this charge. Gaitskell's 
biographer concedes that the Suez crisis damaged his subject's 
reputation in the country: surveys found that the number of 
voters who considered Gaitakell a bad leader nearly doubled and 
Gaitskell himself wondered whether his effectiveness as an 
opposition leader had been permanently undermined. 
(53) 
Despite provoking passionate debate in Parliament, in the 
press and to a lesser extent in the country, the influence of 
the Suez crisis on the electorate was limited. At the Lewisham 
by-election of February 1957, Crossman noted a tendency to deny 
that the episode had ever occurred. 
(54) Suez also had very little 
impact on voters during the 1959 election. 
(55) Politically, the 
most important immediate consequence of the affair was the 
resignation of Eden whose health had been ruined by the crisis. 
Unfortunately for Gaitakell, the new Prime Minister was 
Macmillan, a polished parliamentary performer who soon 
established an ascendancy in the Commons. Gaitakell's confidence 
at Westminster had been undermined by the criticism he had 
endured after Suez, and in the period before the 1959 election 
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he struggled to match the success and authority of the new Tory 
leader. Macmillan was certainly determined to stamp his 
authority on Parliament as a prelude to electoral success. 
Looking back on this period in 1971, he explained; 
'I didn't even mind losing a by-election or bother too much 
with the outside world, if you can once impress upon the 
House of Commons that the Government is in control ... then 
gradually ... it begins to go out into the country as the 
Members go back to their constituencies. ' 
(56) 
Macmillan was confident that he could dominate the Commons as 
long as Gaitskell led the opposition. His contempt for his rival 
was established long before the two became party leaders. When 
Gaitskell delivered his first and only Budget in April 1951, 
Macmillan noted in his diary the 'pedantic style, tedious 
expositions of the obvious, weak gestures, and irritating style' 
employed by the Labour Chancellor. 
(57) He saw Gaitskell as 
high-minded, but self-righteous; worthy, but stuffy and weak. In 
a telling entry in his diary he once ridiculed Gaitskell's style 
of correspondence as 'governessy'. 
(58) Gaitskell, he believed, 
regularly displayed acute political incompetence; he failed to 
take full advantage of Eden's difficult position over Suez, and 
he never learned how to an exploit an opportunity to embarrass 
the Prime Minister in the Commons. 
(59) 
Macmillan's view of Gaitskell was formed by something deeper 
than the natural rivalry which can be expected between political 
opponents. His contempt was genuine. Other observers were less 
dismissive of the Labour leader, but many agreed that Macmillan 
was a clear victor in his contest against Gaitskell. For 
example, six months before the Government announced the date of 
the 1959 election, Crossman's initial optimism about the Labour 
leader had given way to depression; 
'I don't think there has been a single occasion on which 
Gaitskell has got the better of Macmillan and it has been 
depressing to to watch how in debate after debate, our Front 
Bench has been out-manoeuvred or alternatively has blundered 
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into defeat. ' (60) 
The Sunday Express claimed in 1958 that Macmillan 'outshines Mr 
Gaitskell as a lighthouse does a glow-worm'. 
(61) Gaitskell's 
biographer was more generous, but he acknowledged the weakness 
of his subject's position during this period by choosing the 
title 'Macmillan Ascendant' for his chapter on the years from 
1957 to 1959. 
(62) Anthony Sampson, one of Macmillan's earliest 
biographers, wrote that the contrast between the two main party 
leaders was the main factor behind the Tories' lead in the 
opinion polls in the middle of 1958; 
'The opposition was certainly weak, and Hugh Gaitskell could 
not present a united front or a bold personal image. But most 
Conservatives thought that the chief factor was the prime 
minister himself. ' 
(63) 
Overall, Gaitskell and his party were unable to provide the 
'effective opposition' which had been envisaged as one of the 
three components of the 1956 strategy for recovery. When this 
failure is set alongside the limited progress made in improving 
the Party's organisation, it would appear that Labour's attempt 
to revive its fortunes after the 1955 defeat was largely 
unsuccessful. However, although Gaitskell had chosen to identify 
improved organisation and a strong performance by the PLP at 
Westminster as priorities, the importance of these two 
objectives and the implications of the Party's failure to 
succeed in these areas should not be overdrawn. 
The first point to make in mitigation concerns the 
difficulties which the Party had to overcome to achieve its 
objectives. Improving Labour's organisational efficiency across 
the country was a complex and expensive task. Even if the 
hierarchy at Transport House had pursued the drive for 
efficiency with enthusiasm, the Party did not have the large 
reserve of money required to make real progress in this area - 
despite increased financial assistance from the trade unions 
after 1955. Without the financial drain of large-scale spending 
on organisation, Labour still did not match even a quarter of 
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the Tories' expenditure on political advertising at the 1959 
election. 
(64) 
Alongside the substantial financial requirement, 
improving Labour's machinery in the constituencies also relied 
heavily on the efforts of an army of voluntary Party workers 
whose enthusiasm and competence varied across regions and over 
time. 
Equally plausible excuses can be offered to explain the PLP's 
lack of success in Parliament. Labour was always unlikely to 
make headway against a government which presided over economic 
growth; the Party's energies between 1955 and 1959 were largely 
devoted to the internal policy review; Eden's resignation and 
Macmillan's succession enabled the Tories to draw a line under 
the difficult Suez episode; and the Tories under Macmillan 
allowed the opposition parties few opportunities to exploit 
government mistakes. 
The second important point to make about these two objectives 
concerns their political significance. It is difficult to make a 
definitive assessment here, but it is reasonable to argue that 
Labour was unlikely to win the 1959 election, regardless of the 
Party's performance at Westminster or the quality of its 
organisation. As prosperity in the country grew after 1955, 
there was simply no compelling reason for the electorate to 
replace the Conservative Government with a Labour alternative. 
While it is true that Labour is by no means guaranteed to win 
elections during times of economic depression, it is equally 
true that the Party has never replaced the Tories in government 
at the top of the economic cycle. To describe the Conservatives 
as the natural party of government would be an overstatement; 
nevertheless, the fact remains that they have won two-thirds of 
the general elections fought in Britain since the reform of the 
franchise in 1918. In 1955, their position appeared to be even 
more secure; the Conservative and Unionist Party had emerged as 
the largest group in the Commons in 8 of the 11 general 
elections contested between 1918 and 1955: their average share 
of the vote in all 11 contests was 43.1 per cent; Labour's 
average share of the vote was 37.1 per cent, excluding those 
members of the Party who followed MacDonald into the National 
Government in 1931 and 1935. The average Conservative lead over 
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the Labour Party in these general elections was 6 per cent. 
(65) 
Taking into account this record of Conservative dominance and 
the relatively healthy condition of the British economy, there 
was very little that Labour could do after the 1955 defeat to 
secure a victory at the following election. More organisational 
improvements would have been an advantage in 1959, but clearly 
this would not have enabled Labour to deprive the Conservatives 
of the whole of their 100 seat majority. A more combative 
performance by the PLP would have been welcomed by Labour 
supporters, but ultimately the electorate was probably more 
concerned about job security, prosperity and taxation than it 
was with the contest between the parties in the Commons. In any 
case, even if. the PLP had performed consistently well, the 
public's perception of the contest at Westminster at this time 
was largely determined by press comment; and as Douglas Jay 
pointed out, approximately 80 per cent of national newspapers in 
the 19509 supported the Tories. 
(66) 
Labour in the second half of the 1950s, therefore, should not 
be judged primarily on its electoral record against the 
Conservatives. Instead, it should be recoghised that the Party 
made changes during the period which helped to prepare the way 
for a return to power in 1964. After the experience of 1951 and 
1955, the Party learned to abandon its attachment to 
factionalism in the period before an election; it learned to 
improve the presentation of its message; it designed new 
policies for a society with universal welfare provision and a 
mixed economy; and it modernised the way it conducted election 
campaigns. Although the Party was little more than fifty years 
old at this time, Gaitskell began a necessary process of 
modernisation which enabled Labour to face the future with 
growing confidence. 
Gaitskell's first success as leader was to reimpose unity on the 
PLP. This was a significant achievement, particularly as 
Gaitskell had been arguably the Left's main enemy within the 
Party since 1951. Gaitskell's early years as leader were largely 
free of the Bevanite controversies, disciplinary hearings, 
withdrawals of the whip and threatened expulsions which had 
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preoccupied the Party on so many occasions after 1951. As will 
be shown in another chapter, Gaitskell's style of leadership and 
policy preferences continued to draw criticism from the Left, 
but at least there was less talk about a 'party within the 
party'. The old divisions in the Party resurfaced for a time 
after the 1959 election, but there were no sustained and 
damaging splits in Labour's ranks until the 19709 and 1980s. 
This reimposition of unity on the PLP was helped by several 
factors. The scale of Gaitskell's victory in the leadership 
contest confirmed to the Left that Bevan was unlikely to lead 
the Party in the forseeable future; no Amount of meetings, 
alternative policy documents or rebellions could resurrect 
Bevan's leadership prospects or force such a secure leader as 
Gaitskell to cede ground to the Left. Indeed, Bevan was among 
the first to recognise the logic of the PLP vote. In February 
1956 he signalled his acceptance of the new leader when he stood 
for the post of Gaitskell's deputy and was narrowly defeated by 
Jim Griffiths. (67) Gaitskell in turn signalled his cautious 
acceptance of the rapprochement with his former rival by 
offering Bevan the job of colonial affairs spokesman. 
(68) Full 
co-operation between the two, though, was not achieved 
immediately. Significantly, the new leader remained suspicious 
of Bevan's attempt to become treasurer, a position which carried 
a place on the NEC and powerful responsibility within the 
movement. In April 1956, Gaitskell had a 'very private dinner' 
with 'almost all the key people in the TUC' at which they 
planned to support George Brown for the treasurership against 
Bevan. (69) This attempt to block the election of Bevan as 
treasurer was unsuccessful - which illustrates the difficulty 
the Party leader could face in controlling the trade unions' 
votes at Conference - but it provides a useful illustration of 
the lingering doubts which Gaitskell harboured about Bevan. 
By the end of 1956, though, these doubts had gradually given 
way to an appreciation of Bevan's abilities and an understanding 
of the advantages which a senior appointment for the spokesman 
of the Left would bring to the Labour leadership. After a series 
of impressive performances during the Suez crisis, Bevan was 
appointed Shadow Foreign Secretary at the end of 1956. This 
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appointment helped to sustain the Party's renewed unity in two 
ways. First, it showed that Gaitskell was prepared to balance 
the allocation of senior front bench responsibilities between 
former supporters and adversaries. Second, it helped to appease 
the Left's leading spokesman while detaching him from his 
rebellious acolytes: Bevan in 1956 had almost no prospect of 
becoming Party leader; in order to secure a senior position in a 
future Labour government, he had to perform as a loyal member of 
the front bench team as Gaitskell's Shadow Foreign Secretary. At 
the Brighton Conference in October 1957, Bevan finally confirmed 
that he was willing to fulfil this role. By speaking against a 
unilateralist motion in the defence debate, Bevan helped to take 
the developing alliance with his old rival a stage further. His 
breach with the Left helped to ensure that there were no major 
divisions within the Party hierarchy in the period before the 
1959 election. As will be shown, this at least helped the Party 
to fight an effective and united campaign in 1959. 
This renewed sense of unity in the Party was maintained in 
potentially difficult circumstances. Labour spent much of its 
time after 1955 in an introspective mood; the three year policy 
review forced the Party to answer some fundamental questions 
about its future direction. The balance of the mixed economy, 
the relationship between the state and the individual, the 
future of education in Britain and the nationalisation of land 
were the most sensitive issues which the policy review had to 
address, offering the prospect of renewed disagreements and 
divisions within the Party. A detailed examination of the policy 
review will be made in a separate chapter, but a brief 
assessment will be made here of the broad implications of 
Labour's domestic policy programme between 1955 and 1959. The 
purpose of this brief assessment is to acknowledge that 
significant and beneficial policy changes were made at this time 
which had long-term implications for the Party. 
Labour's policy makers responded to post-war affluence and 
successive election defeats by formulating what became known as 
a 'revisionist' programme. The term 'revisionism' can be traced 
back to the work of Eduard Bernstein, a German Social Democrat 
who helped to persuade his party to reject Marxism and its 
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revolutionary implications in the late-nineteenth century. 
Labour's revisionists did not need to rewrite Marxist policies, 
instead they aimed to show that the corporate socialism of the 
Attlee generation should be superseded by a programme whose 
central goal was the achievement of greater social equality. 
Arguably, therefore, although the term will be used throughout 
this study as an accepted definition of the Party's new 
programme, the use of the term 'revistepriist' to describe Labour 
policy at this time is in some respects misleading. There was no 
rejection or revision of the policies of the post-war 
Governments, instead there was an acknowledgement that the 
Attlee generation had completed its mission and that the Party 
had to build on this achievement in a new era. In simple terms, 
the policy makers had two main objectives; to define the second 
stage of British socialism after the reforms of the post-war 
Labour Governments and to abandon policies which were 
electora*lly unpopular. 
Public ownership was the unpopular policy which the 
revisionists had in their sights. They were largely satisfied 
with the balance of the mixed economy and they saw no 
justification for any major expansion of the public sector. The 
argument that a future Labour government should-place the 
pursuit of greater social equality above the expansion of public 
ownership was rehearsed in a number of publications after 1951; 
for example, the Fabian Society's New Fabian Essays in 1952, 
Bill Rodgers' About Equality in 1954, and John Strachey's 
Contemporary Capitalism in 1956. By far the most important 
revisionist work, though, was Anthony Crosland's The Future of 
Socialism, published in 1956. 
Crosland's analysis was produced at the perfect time. It came 
shortly after the election of a new Labour leader, it coincided 
with the policy review and it provided the new ideas required by 
the Party as it sought to define its mission in the second half 
of the 19509. Perhaps more importantly, Crosland provided a 
comprehensive rationale for the abandonment of the Morrisonian 
brand of corporate nationalisation. The central premiss of The 
Future of Socialism was that no correlation existed between 
state ownership and the achievement of socialist objectives; 
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full employment, economic growth and social equality could all 
be achieved within a mixed economy with a predominant private 
sector. This was the point at which Crosland departed from 
traditional socialist theory with its assumptions about the 
evils of capitalism. According to Crosland's thesis, Keynesian 
demand management, the welfare state and a progressive taxation 
system had changed the nature of capitalism in Britain. A Labour 
government could achieve its objectives with a mixture of 
economic management, taxation policy and spending on public 
services; in other words, the ownership of capital was largely 
irrelevant because the state had so much power over the 
direction of the economy. Instead of expending time and 
resources on a programme of nationlisation, Crosland believed 
that a Labour administration should concentrate on providing a 
redistribution of wealth, improved public services, 
comprehensive education, and a liberalisation of legislation on 
abortion, divorce, homosexuality and censorship. Redistribution 
was at the heart of Crosland's socialism, and economic growth 
would enable a Labour government to win public consent for this 
transferral of resources. Redistribution within a growing 
economy would allow rising living standards for all to continue; 
redistribution within a stagnant economy implied a return for 
some to the joyless austerity of the Cripps era. For Crosland, 
the ultimate aim was to produce a liberal society in which there 
was economic growth, social justice and social mobility. 
(70) 
Crosland based his vision of socialism on the mistaken 
assumption that governments could deliver the economic growth 
required to make redistribution acceptable. However, in the boom 
conditions of the 19509 the flaw in this assumption was not so 
apparent. The Future of Socialism appeared to provide Labour 
with a blueprint for policy in an affluent society, and its 
influence was clear in the documents produced during the policy 
review. Of the nine major policy statements published by the NEC 
between 1956 and 1958, seven owed a large debt to Crosland's 
thesis. 
(71) For example, the policy makers emphasised the need to 
achieve greater social equality through taxation reforms and a 
comprehensive education system. 
(72) They outlined a 
redistributive national pensions scheme which was linked both to 
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contributions and inflation. 
(73)Full 
scale nationalisation was 
downgraded in favour of the state acquisition of shares and new 
forms of competitive public enterprise. 
(74) The review recognised 
the need to safeguard individual liberties as the power of the 
state increased. 
(75) Finally, the policy review argued that a 
Labour government could achieve the economic growth needed to 
pay for its programme without creating inflation or a balance of 
payments deficit. 
(76) 
Although Crosland provided the theoretical framework for 
Labour's policy makers after 1955, the policy review itself was 
dominated by Gaitskell. The Labour leader's authority at 
Westminster may not have been established fully before 1959, but 
his hold on the Party was secure. He supervised closely the 
production of the home policy statements which eventually formed 
Labour's programme for the 1959 election. Gaitskell was an 
ex-officio member of the NEC, he served on the Home Policy 
Committee, he chaired the study group which produced the 
document on equality, he served on the study group which covered 
public ownership and he rewrote sections of the statement on 
housing. After the document on public ownership was endorsed by 
the Brighton Conference in 1957, the Sunday Times acknowledged 
the control which Gaitskell had maintained on policy formation. 
It said that he had; 
'transformed Labour's policy in all essentials to 
Gaitskellism, a great personal achievement ... Brighton has 
left him with his personal authority at its peak. ' 
(77) 
Gaitakell was fortunate to become Labour leader when the 
Party was committed to a long term policy review. It offered him 
an ideal opportunity to re-shape Labour's programme after the 
1955 defeat; he was able to examine all aspects of the Party's 
domestic programme, relatively unencumbered by previous policy 
statements or Conference decisions. Labour's manifesto in 1959, 
therefore, largely represented Gaitskell's personal vision of a 
socialist programme for the 1960s; indeed, he made a number of 
amendments to the final draft of the document, particularly in 
the section on economic and industrial policy. 
(78) The result was 
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a manifesto which combined revisionist faith in the existing 
balance of the mixed economy with Labour's traditional 
commitment to social reform. 
Britain Belongs to You emphasised the social policies which 
had been formulated during the three year review. It 
concentrated on traditional Labour themes such as tackling 
poverty, narrowing the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have 
nots' and criticising the Tories for their refusal to use 
economic controls. The document began with a discussion of 
Labour's plans to help pensioners. Perhaps this sense of 
priority was unlikely to capture the imagination of those voters 
who were more concerned with their own rising living standards, 
but at least it demonstrated the Party's belief that economic 
growth should be used to create a more humane society. This 
belief was reinforced by pledges to abolish health service 
charges, to spend at least E50 million each year on hospital 
development and to raise unemployment pay and other welfare 
benefits. Labour's housing policy was similarly motivated but 
more bold. Its main objectives were the repeal of the 1957 Rent 
Act - which had decontrolled rents in the private sector - and 
the eventual municipalisation of most rented property. 
Redistribution through improved public services and benefits 
would also be helped by the implementation of a 'fair' taxation 
system. The details of Labour's taxation plans were drawn only 
faintly, but specific references were made to the abuse of 
business expense accounts, the avoidance of death duties and the 
need to tax capital gains more heavily. 
As will be shown in the next chapter, Labour formulated 
specific economic policies during the three year review. But 
election manifestos in this period were relatively brief 
documents which rarely discussed policies in depth. As a result, 
the Party concentrated on identifying its main economic 
objectives in Britain Belongs to You. Expansion of output, full 
employment, stable prices, high investment, rising productivity, 
a favourable balance of payments and a strong pound were all 
cited as targets. Perhaps not surprisingly there was little 
attempt to establish priorities in this part of the document, 
and the policies that would be used to pursue the targets 
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mentioned were described with a minimal degree of precision. The 
mainfesto implied that tax concessions would be used to 
encourage investment in private industry; it stated that 
industrial 'giants' would be made to plan their operations in 
line with the Party's national objectives; and it predicted 
confidently that the 'full co-operation' of the trade unions 
would be secured by a Labour government. On the final point, 
although there was no mention of an agreed incomes policy, it 
was apparent that Labour aimed to win the co-operation of the 
unions by improved welfare policies and the implementation of a 
Workers' Charter which guaranteed employees' rights. 
Other parts of the manifesto helped to reinforce Labour's 
commitment to planning. The section on transport argued that 
planning was required to bring about necessary improvements in 
the nation's infrastructure. In particular, it promoted the idea 
of an integrated transport policy which included a national plan 
for road building. On public ownership, specific pledges were 
made about the re-nationalisation of steel and commercial 
long-distance road haulage, both of which had been promised in 
the 1955 manifesto. The rest of the section on public ownership, 
though, reflected revisionist concerns about the irrelevance and 
unpopularity of full-scale nationalisation. The formula which 
had been used since 1951 was employed once more -a Labour 
administration would nationalise all or part of an industry only 
if it was convinced that such action would benefit the national 
interest. Finally, using a phrase which foreshadowed one of the 
main themes of Labour's 1964 election campaign, the manifesto 
outlined the need for the 'application of science in all phases 
of our economic life'. 
Although the programme contained in Britain Belongs to You 
was the product of more than three years hard work and a 
mountain of drafts and papers, the national press was 
unenthusiastic about Labour's 1959 manifesto. The Times was 
sceptical about the Party's promise to increase public spending 
without raising basic rate taxes. It was not convinced that 
Labour could achieve the increased output and economic expansion 
it promised to finance its spending commitments: 
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'What assurance have we that Labour could bring about this 
happy state of affairs without running into trade deficits, 
depletion of gold reserves and domestic inflation? ... The 
general impression the manifesto gives is of a party with 
serious misgivings about the few doctrinAiRe experiments to 
which it is committed and with a coherent programme of minor 
social reform well grounded on Labour's traditional 
preoccupation with equality'. 
(79) 
The Guardian., which supported Labour in the 1959 campaign, also 
had reservations about the manifesto. Its leader writer was 
impressed by the section on foreign affairs, but was less 
enthusiastic about the commitments on domestic policy. 
'The image of an up-to-date Labour Party fails to come over. 
The truth is that the majority even of working class voters 
are more prosperous and better cared for today than ever 
before... But the general impression that remains is of a 
Labour Party still unwilling to come to grips with our post 
austerity revolution'. 
(80) 
Similarly, Tribune gave only qualified support to the manifesto, 
partly because of genuine disagreements with Gaitskell over 
policy, partly because of the legacy of the Left's battles with 
the Labour leader which had not been forgotten. 
'Britain Belongs to You advances many of the ideas which the 
Labour Party has agreed upon after debate. There are many 
points which will still be the subject of hot argument after 
the election. But it has done a masterful job of exposing the 
sham policies of the Conservatives'. 
(81) 
The faint praise and criticism which the Party's programme 
drew from the press was largely undeserved. Certainly it would 
be a mistake to hold the manifesto responsible for Labour's 
defeat in 1959. In terms of policy proposals, there was very 
little difference between Britain Belongs to You and the 
programme on which Labour eventually came to power under Wilson 
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in 1964. The three year policy review provided the basis for 
Labour's manifestos in 1959 and 1964. The only major commitments 
from the 1959 programme which did not reappear in 1964 were the 
nationalisation of road haulage, the large-scale 
municipalisation of rented housing and a 'plan for cotton'. As 
will be shown, the only significant new policy proposals which 
appeared in the 1964 programme were on the integration of the 
public schools into the state system and the details of welfare 
provision - the other innovations under Wilson largely concerned 
the machinery of government. In other words, almost all of the 
policies which took Labour into government in 1964 were in place 
before 1959. It was Wilson's good fortune in 1964 to fight 
against a Government that was discredited and unpopular; it was 
Gaitskell's misfortune in 1959 to fight against a Government 
that was successful, confident and popular. 
Labour was always unlikely to win the 1959 election, despite 
the find'ings of fluctuating opinion polls which occasionally 
gave the Party a lead during the campaign. Labour had to 
convince the electorate that a change of government was 
necessary in 1959, even though the economy had grown steadily 
and living standards had risen since 1955. The scale of this 
task should not be underestimated. Although the'two main 
arguments which the Party used to support its case were the best 
available in the circumstances, both were vulnerable to an easy 
counter-attack. The first part of Labour's strategy focused on 
the idea that social reform was required to redistribute the 
product of economic growth more equitably. The Conservatives 
countered this with the claim that reforms would be expensive 
and would lead to tax increases. They also argued that the 
Party's concern with social reform and the fight against poverty 
was increasingly inappropriate in the post-war affluent society. 
The second and twin part of Labour's strategy involved the 
promise that it could achieve a higher rate of economic growth 
than the Tories. The Conservatives simply responded to this by 
welcoming Labour's recognition of the fact that the Government 
had presided over growth and prosperity - whenever Labour 
focused on the economy, the electorate was reminded of the 
affluence that was associated with the Tories in the 1950s. In 
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short, Labour was in no position to win in 1959; it was a party 
of change and social reform in a country that was largely 
satisfied with the status quo. Its programme could be portrayed 
as fiscally irresponsible, and its promise of economic growth 
was merely words on paper against a Government whose record of 
achievement in this area could be seen in homes, shops and 
workplaces around the country. 
In these circumstances, the fact that Labour managed to 
conduct a relatively successful election campaign was a 
considerable achievement. Particular credit for this was earned 
by the team which produced the Party's televised broadcasts. 
Previously, the Conservatives had been more effective than their 
rivals at using televison for political purposes, but in 1959 it 
was widely accepted that Labour had won the battle on the small 
screen. According to the authors of the Nuffield study of the 
1959 campaign, the televised broadcasts provided Labour with 
'one of its most unexpected tactical successes during the 
election'. 
(82) By this time, of course, television had become an 
increasingly important medium of politicallcommunication - more 
than 70 per cent of the electorate had access to a set, while 
opinion polls found that television had become the prime source 
of information on news and politics for the public. 
(83) Labour's 
advantage over the Tories in the use of television during the 
campaign owed much to forward planning. As early as November 
1956, Tony Benn, who led the committee which was in charge of 
Labour's televised output, met colleagues to discuss the Party's 
election broadcasts. 
(84) Although the urgency was caused by 
predictions that the Suez crisis would be followed by a general 
election, discussions about Labour's broadcasing strategy 
continued even after it was clear that a dissolution would not 
take place. In December 1956 the Party's Senior Broadcasting 
Committee met in full to discuss election plans for the first 
time, and in the same month Benn supervised the production of a 
televised film on Labour's housing policy. 
(85) Although he was 
not satisfied fully with the film, the project at least gave 
Benn and his broadcasting team the opportunity to perfect their 
technique well in advance of a national contest. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the 
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Independent Television Authority (ITA) offered to help the main 
parties with their broadcasts and Labour was happy to accept 
their advice. Members of the Broadcasting Committee met a 
producer from Associated Rediffusion early in 1957 to discuss 
new approaches to political broadcasts. 
(86) This was followed in 
December 1958 by detailed talks with producers from the BBC who 
offered to help Labour with its televised election 
programmes. 
(87) 
Although the Party retained full control over the 
content of its broadcasts, BBC personnel worked on the structure 
of Labour's programmes and eventually helped with production. 
BBC staff also helped to train the Labour team that was involved 
in filming -a task that was preceded by the Broadcasting 
Committee's own efforts which had begun in February 1958 in a 
rehearsal studio at Transport House. 
(88) 
The result of these preparations was five effective televised 
broadcasts during the campaign - four of 20 minutes and one of 
15 minutes. Because convention at the time decreed that neither 
Macmillan nor Gaitskell was interviewed on television during the 
election, the party broadcasts were particularly important in 
1959. Benn and his team used a magazine format for Labour's 
programmes. Each broadcast covered a range of issues and used 
interviews, speeches, short pieces of film, music and cartoons 
for variety and pace. The films were presented by Benn from an 
'operations room' in order to convey an impression of purpose, 
efficiency and hard-edged professionalism. The content was 
planned carefully and parts of the films were prepared months in 
advance. 
(89) The Nuffield study described this as a 'brilliantly 
flexible formula' and it was far superior to the straight talks 
to camera which the Party had used in 1955. 
(90) 
The magazine format was also more effective than the 
recordings of staged 'discussions' between Ministers which the 
Conservatives favoured. Their first broadcast featured the 
Cabinet discussing the Government's various achievements; it had 
been filmed weeks in advance, but Edward Heath, the Government 
Chief Whip, described the broadcast as 'absolutely catastrophic 
- awful ... And the next programme was 
just as bad. ' 
(91) The 
penultimate Conservative broadcast, which had also been recorded 
in advance, was withdrawn and hurriedly replaced by an 
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alternative because it looked so bad in the preview. 
(92) In 
contrast, Labour maintained confidence in their programmes and 
concentrated on building up Gaitskell's image as a Prime 
Minister who was waiting to take office. The Labour leader had 
his own special set for the broadcasts in order to underline his 
authority and standing. In July 1958 Benn had written a briefing 
paper on communications in which he insisted that the image of 
the leader had to be amplified for the electorate. 
'The Party must realise that the projection of its Leadership 
is quite as important as the projection of its policy ... We 
must face the fact that by tradition, the Labour Party is 
inhibited against the idea of building up its own Leader. 
These inhibitions must now be overcome as a matter of 
deliberate policy. ' 
(93) 
The Party and Gaitskell responded to the challenge. His 
performances on television were described as 'formidable' in The 
Times and for a while at least they added to his reputation in 
the Party. 
(94) The value of Gaitskell's success was recognised by 
Harold Wilson, who copied and extended the strategy of 
dominating Labour's campaign on television when he was Party 
leader in 1964. 
Other aspects of Labour's campaign were less effective than 
the televised broadcasts but no less professional. Crossman led 
the Party's Campaign Committee and directed the Transport House 
staff in the organisation of public meetings and daily press 
conferences. In the early part of the election these press 
conferences helped to ensure that the contest was dominated by 
issues of Labour's own choosing - primarily, the charge that the 
Government had failed to achieve a sufficiently high rate of 
economic growth. On the penultimate Monday of the campaign The 
Times acknowledged that Labour had so far fought more 
effectively than either of its main rivals. 
(95) Tony Benn at the 
same time wrote in his diary, 'We have definitely got the Tories 
on the run I. 
(96) But this Monday has also been seen as a turning 
point in the election for two reasons. First, the Government 
announced that unemployment had fallen by 22,000 in August to 
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stand at 1.9 per cent. Secondly, Gaitakell pledged that a Labour 
Government would not increase income tax rates in order to 
finance its spending commitments. The Conservatives seized on 
this pledge and accused Labour of attempting to bribe the 
electorate by promising extra public spending without any rise 
in taxation, a charge that was summarised by the headline in the 
Daily Sketch: 'This is spiv stuff. What Next - Free Fags? ' 
(97) 
Butler, the Home Secretary, made the same charge using different 
language in a speech at Newcastle; 
'Never have we seen before a party leader so cynically 
prejudge the conditions with which he will be faced, and at 
once promise vast extra expenditure and deny that he is going 
to raise extra taxation to pay for it'. 
(98) 
To make matters worse, Morgan Phillips followed Gaitskell's 
pledge by confirming that Labour would abolish purchase tax on 
certain essentials. Peter Shore, from Labour's Research 
Department, believed that the statements on taxation were 
significant; 
'you can never be certain about what wins or loses 
elections, but you do know in the course of a campaign some 
particular event that changes the feel of the campaign, or 
puts a check on your impetus and gives a boost to the other 
side. And it was undoubtedly that pledge that we wouldn't 
raise income tax that really hit the Labour Party very hard, 
hit its credibility. ' 
(99) 
Tony Benn in his diary reached a similar conclusion. The 
confidence which he had felt just days before had begun to give 
way to anxiety. 'The income tax pledge that Hugh gave in his 
speech, coupled with the purchase tax pledge released by Morgan, 
has upset us all. We feel that the Tories have now got us on the 
defensive. ' (100) 
Although the Conservatives undoubtedly welcomed the chance to 
accuse Labour of conducting an auction for votes, it would be a 
mistake to attach too much significance to the controversy over 
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taxation. As already stated, the economic situation made a 
Labour victory unlikely in 1959? regardless of specific episodes 
during the campaign. The Conservatives were able to take 
advantage of the fact that the economy had grown steadily under 
their stewardship. On the advice of a public relations firm, the 
Tories emphasised that most people in the country were enjoying 
a higher standard of living than ever before. The slogan which 
captured the essence of their appeal was simple but effective; 
'Life's Better with the Conservatives. Don't Let Labour Ruin 
It! '. This message had been forced home by an expensive and 
unprecedented national advertising campaign which had begun two 
years before the election. It was reinforced by the release of 
two sets of statistics which complemented the announcement of a 
fall in unemployment. On 30 September it was announced that 
production was rising and that output in August was 8 per cent 
higher than it had been in the same month in 1958. This was 
followed on 2 October by the news that gold and dollar reserves 
had risen by E13 million in September to stand at their highest 
level since 1951. 
(101) 
Despite the advantage which prosperity gave the Tories, 
Gaitskell refused to concede that his party was on the way to 
another defeat - he even wrote out his proposed Cabinet list on 
the final Sunday of the campaign. His view of Labour's prospects 
was based on opinion polls which showed the two main parties 
neck and neck as they entered the final week of the election, 
but his confidence was both misplaced and eventually damaging. 
The expectation of a Labour victory, or at the very least a 
close result, increased the sense of shock and disappointment 
which accompanied the Conservatives' clear victory. This in turn 
affected the way in which the Labour leadership interpreted the 
1959 result. As will be shown in the next chapter, Gaitskell and 
his colleagues failed to appreciate that the Party had performed 
relatively well in difficult circumstances in 1959; instead, 
they saw defeat as the product of a long-term decline which had 
to be halted by drastic action. The consequence of their 
proposals for such action was renewed conflict in the Party. 
However, a more considered analysis of the polling figures would 
have revealed that Labour was in a strong political position at 
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the end of the 1950s and was well placed to win an election 
which was fought in less favourable circumstances for the 
Conservatives. 
Despite the problems which they faced in the 1959 campaign, 
Labour still received 43.8 per cent of the votes cast, compared 
with 49.4 per cent for the Conservatives and 5.9 per cent for 
the Liberals. Labour's aggregate vote fell by almost 200,000, 
but many of these votes were lost because the Liberals doubled 
the number of candidates they fielded from 1955. Although the 
Tories increased their majority at Westminster to 100 seats, the 
scale of this increase was partly the product of a bias in the 
electoral system which allowed the Tories to win a given number 
of seats with 400,000 fewer votes than Labour - in order for the 
parties to have won an equal number of seats in 1959, Labour 
would have required 47.3 per cent and the Conservatives 45.9 per 
cent of the votes cast. 
(102) In other words, the size of the 
Government's majority at Westminster exaggerated the true level 
of support for the Conservatives in the country. Labour could 
also take heart from the fact that they had at least slowed down 
the swing towards the Conservatives, despite the comfortable 
prosperity of the late 19509; in 1959 the swing towards the 
Government was 1.1 per cent, in 1955 it had been. 1.8 per cent. 
Although prosperity was the key to Conservative success, it 
was apparent too that the Government probably stood to lose 
votes heavily if confidence in the economy faltered. 
Conservative support was strongest both in regions which had 
prospered most in the 1950s and among social groups which had 
benefitted most from post war affluence. The largest swings to 
the Conservatives had taken place in the West Midlands, which 
provided 10 of their 28 gains, and the London area, which 
provided an additional nine. As prosperous industrial towns such 
as Luton and Leicester voted Conservative, it appeared that 
skilled, affluent manual workers had abandoned the Labour Party. 
According to opinion polls, support for the Conservatives also 
increased among voters aged between 21 and 29 who were too young 
to remember the depression of the 19309 or the post war reforms 
of the Attlee Government. In contrast, Labour's support had 
remained firm in areas where unemployment and poverty were high 
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- particularly Clydeside and South-East Lancashire. Pensioners 
formed perhaps the main social group which failed to benefit 
appreciably in the affluent society', so it was no surprise 
that a majority of over-65s voted for Labour - in fact, the 
Party had a lead of about 7 per cent over the Tories among 
pensioners. One final interesting aspect of the voting figures 
which should be mentioned is that Labour increased its share of 
the vote among women for the first time since 1945. Although 
much of this support was lost in 1964, it seems that many women 
voters transferred their allegiance to the Liberals. It appears, 
therefore, that the 1959 election marked the beginning of a 
drift of female support away from the Conservatives. 
(103) 
Labour politicians should not have been too depressed by the 
1959 result. Advanced economies had always been marked by 
periods of boom and slump and it was idle to expect that 
Britain's economy would always work in favour of a Conservative 
election campaign. Instead, the Party should have recognised the 
gains it made between 1955 and 1959. The leadership issue had 
been settled, divisions in the PLP had been healed, organisation 
had improved and the Party had learned how to conduct a modern 
and effective election campaign. As a result of these 
achievements, Labour managed to retain almost 44 per cent of the 
vote in difficult circumstances in 1959. More importantly, 
though, the Party launched a policy review after 1955 which 
provided the basis of Labour's programme in 1959 and again in 
1964. Arguably, more than any other factor, this policy review 
illustrates the way in which the groundwork for the Party's 
victory in 1964 was completed in the 1950s. 
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4. Policy-making, 1955-1959 
Defeat in a general election invariably acts as a force for 
change within political parties. The most important change which 
Labour made after the 1955 contest was the election of Gaitskell 
as leader; the second most important change was the reshaping of 
the Party's domestic programme. To an extent these two events 
were related. As we have seen, Gaitskell's ideas about future 
policy helped to establish him as a credible candidate for the 
leadership in 1955; after he took charge of the Party, Gaitskell 
used his authority in the NEC to dominate the long-term review 
of policy which Labour initiated after its second successive 
defeat. Gaitskell's victory against Bevan in the contest to 
succeed Attlee ensured that there would be no shift to the left 
in policy in the second half of the 1950s. This had been made 
clear during an exchange between the two rivals for the 
leadership in the columns of Tribune shortly after polling day. 
In reply to Bevan's claim that Labour had failed in 1955 because 
its policies were insufficiently distinguishable from those of 
the Conservatives, Gaitskell had asked: 'Do we really believe 
that the marginal voters who failed to go to the polls were 
skulking at home because the Labour Party is not revolutionary 
enough? ' 
(1) This rejection of Bevan's analysis of the election 
defeat signalled that Gaitskell as leader would attempt to 
reshape Labour's programme in a way that would appeal to 
marginal voters in the centre ground of politics. He was 
fortunate in this respect that the Party was already committed 
to a thorough review of policy by the time he became leader. 
This chapter will examine in detail the three year review of 
policy which was initiated in 1955. It will explore the 
policy-making process within the Party at this time and it will 
show how the leadership controlled this process to ensure that a 
programme was produced which reflected the revisionist ideas of 
Crosland, Gaitskell and others. The main aim of the following 
paragraphs, though, is to show that the review of policy formed 
the basis of Labour's manifestos of 1959 and 1964. 
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Work on policy began within weeks of the election defeat. In 
July 1955 the Home policy Committee, which included Gaitskell, 
Morrison, Wilson and Mikardo, met to discuss a Research 
Department paper which advised the Party to initiate a research 
programme on selected topics: the suggested themes were 
equality, the state and industry, security and old age, 
education, housing, agriculture, bureaucracy and liberty, and 
the atomic and automative age. 
(2) The 'Report on Future Policy' 
called on the Policy Committee to formulate statements which 
'while drawing on the Party's wealth of past experience, will be 
designed to take account of changes and developments in our way 
of life I. 
(3) These were to form the basis of a new party 
programme for 1960 when the next election was expected to take 
place. The research paper emphasised the need for Labour to 
modernise its policies in a way which recognised changed social 
conditions in Britain. It argued that the 1953 policy document, 
Challenge to Britain., had relied too heavily on the expectation 
of economic difficulties as a vehicle which would bring Labour 
back into power. The paper conceded that five years of 
Conservative rule had to be expected - years which economic 
growth was likely to make more straightforward for the 
Government than its previous term. As the Research Department 
predicted correctly in 1955, 'the real incomes of all sections 
of the community are likely to increase ... and some improvements 
are to be expected in the social services. ' 
(4) A revised version 
of the Department's paper in September argued that the task of 
preparing a policy statement for an election in 1959 or 1960 was 
potentially more difficult than ever before, because the 
Government was likely to be able to preserve full employment and 
would 'probably move into calmer economic waters well before the 
next election'. 
(5) 
The mechanics of policy-making outlined in the papers for the 
Home Policy Committee were relatively straightforward. A 
particular field of study was allocated to a member of the 
Party's Research Department who would then compile a report. The 
research team at this time usually comprised about twelve 
staff. 
(6) Small study groups made up of members of the Policy 
Committee were established for each policy theme to supervise 
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the work of the research staff. The study groups for the 
respective statements met initially to discuss the aims of the 
research and would meet again only after a draft statement had 
been prepared by the research worker. Outside experts were not 
co-opted on a formal basis, instead the research team was 
instructed to maintain close contacts with 'reliable and 
sympathetic experts' in the appropriate fields. 
(7)Policy-making 
was, therefore, highly centralised. In practice, only three or 
four members of the Policy Committee and one member of the 
Research Department were involved in the drafting of each 
statement. After a statement had been discussed, amended if 
necessary and approved by the Home Policy Committee it was 
submitted to a full meeting of the National Executive. After it 
was approved in an agreed form by the NEC the statement was 
published and presented to Conference. The nine major documents 
which were produced during the review were submitted to 
Conference at the rate of three each year between 1956 and 1958. 
As will be shown, all nine were endorsed by delegates with 
comfortable majorities. 
The first three policy statements produced by the review in 
1956 were Towards Equality, Personal Freedom and Homes of the 
Future. The influence of Croslandite revisionism was apparent 
from the outset; the first two of these documents were concerned 
with key themes covered in The Future of Socialism - social 
equality and the relationship between state authority and 
individual liberty. 
(8) Of course, greater social equality was a 
traditional Labour objective - the Labour Representation 
Committee's manifesto for the 1900 election had placed 'the 
Establishment of Social and Economic Equality between the Sexes' 
at the heart of the new Party's mission - but in 1956 
revisionists argued that the means by which equality had been 
pursued in the past were no longer appropriate. 
(9) Gaitskell 
himself chaired the study group on equality and presented the 
draft of Towards Equality to the Policy Committee in 
June. (10) After minor amendments the document was passed to a 
full meeting of the National Executive where it was approved for 
publication with little apparent controversy. 
(11) 
The greater part of Towards Equality consisted of an analysis 
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of the main causes of social and economic inequality in Britain. 
It was essentially a philosophical statement which set out the 
values and principles which underpinned the Party's programme. 
As seen, the belief in social justice and equality was a key 
component of Labour's 1959 election campaign. But only a brief 
section at the end of the document on this theme outlined the 
policies which Labour would employ in pursuit of equality. The 
introduction set out the scale of the problem which inequality 
presented and acknowledged that post-war welfare reform had 
failed to narrow the gap between rich and poor in Britain. There 
was at least a clear indication, though, that a Labour 
administration would use the power of the state to create a more 
equal society: 
'we must admit that opportunities are far from equal; 
privilege in many forms remains strongly entrenched; the 
division of the nation's wealth is still arbitrary and 
unjust; and in its essentials ours is - and is felt to be -a 
class society ... there exists in a capitalist system a strong, 
persistent trend towards economic and social inequality which 
can only be contained by deliberate and continuous State 
intervention. ' 
(12) 
The document identified the educational system as the most 
significant cause of inequality in the country. Post-war reform 
in secondary education, it argued, had failed to produce parity 
of esteem within the tripartite structure of state schools: 
secondary modern, technical and grammar. Division within 
education was even more pronounced between state schools and the 
fee-paying sector and the effect of this was to heighten social 
barriers and to stimulate class consciousness. In short, the 
school system both reflected and helped to perpetuate the class 
structure. It fostered social division among children and it 
influenced an individual's prospects of entering higher 
education, the professions and other forms of skilled, 
managerial or technical employment. The explanation of the 
policies which Labour would use to reduce inequality in this 
area, though, was reserved for the separate statement on 
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education which was due in 1958. 
(13) 
Towards Equality argued that some progress had been made 
towards a more equitable distribution of income and wealth since 
1945. Full employment, extensions in the social services, 
progressive taxation and equal pay between the sexes in certain 
areas of employment had achieved a 'considerable redistribution' 
of income through the community. However, serious problems still 
remained. The most affluent one per cent of Britons owned 
approximately half the nation's private wealth. Meanwhile, over 
2 million Britons were supported by payments from the National 
Assistance Board which had been established in 1948 as a safety 
net against abject poverty. In order to close the gap between 
these two extremes the Party committed itself in the document to 
a reform of Britain's taxation system. No major changes were 
envisaged to the existing rates of taxation - Gaitskell's income 
tax pledge during the 1959 election campaign, therefore, had 
been Party policy for three years - instead reform would focus 
on the superstructure of the taxation system. If gaps in the 
system could be closed, it was argued, the taxation system could 
become 'a very powerful instrument for redistributing income'. 
The main aim was to concentrate on hitherto untaxed or 
inadequately taxed sources of income. The abuse of business 
expenses and the payment of tax free capital to top executives 
on retirement were identified as common tax avoidance 
techniques. Death duties also had to be collected more 
rigorously - although Towards Equality made it clear that Labour 
did not wish to discourage workers from making reasonable 
provision for their families. Finally, capital gains made on the 
Stock Exchange were cited as a 'powerful and virtually unchecked 
force working for inequality'. Labour's commitment to address 
these faults in the taxation system was apparent in the 1959 
manifesto. The principles were clear even if the details still 
required some further explanation; 
'We shall deal with the business man's expense account racket 
and the tax-free compensation paid to directors on loss of 
office; We shall tax the huge capital gains made on the Stock 
Exchange and elsewhere; We shall block other loopholes in the 
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tax law including those which lead to the avoidance of death 
duties and surtax. ' 
(14) 
The 1964 manifesto adopted a similar line on taxation policy but 
the detail was even less clear; 
'Taxation must be fair and must be seen to be fair. The 
present situation where the largest gains are made, not 
through hard work but through the untaxed rewards of passive 
ownership of Stock Exchange speculation, must be ended. In 
particular we shall tax capital gains; and block up the 
notorious avoidance and evasion devices that have made a 
mockery of so much of our tax system'. 
(15) 
Towards Equality was accepted with an overwhelming majority 
and without amendment at the 1956 Blackpool Conference. 
Gaitskell reinforced his commitment to the values contained in 
the document by speaking on behalf of the NEC during the debate 
on the statement. 
(16) The Labour leader was also closely involved 
in the production of Homes of the Future, the 1956 policy 
statement on housing. Although improved housing had been 
promised in every Labour manifesto since 1900, the new policy 
statement attempted to explain in detail how the Party would 
provide decent, affordable housing as a nationwide public 
service. The draft of Homes of the Future was presented to the 
Policy Committee in May. (17) The main principle contained in the 
document was simple and familiar. The Party believed in the 
municipalisation of rented property - the principle that most 
accommodation in the rented sector should be owned and 
controlled by local authorities. The first appearance of this 
policy in a Labour manifesto came in 1955. The manifesto had 
said that a Labour government would request local authorities to 
submit schemes for gradually taking over and modernising 
rent-controlled private property. 
(18) By 1956, however, the 
commitment to the policy had been strengthened. Instead of 
making requests to local authorities the document stated flatly 
that 'houses and flats that were rent controlled on the 1st 
January 1956 and remain tenant occupied should be taken into 
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public ownership'. In the 1959 manifesto the commitment was 
stronger still: with allowance made for reasonable exceptions, a 
pledge was made that local authorities shall take over houses 
which were rent-controlled before 1 January 1956'. 
(19) 
The replacement of 'should' with 'shall' in the wording of 
the policy had far-reaching implications. Labour had committed 
itself to a policy which would have affected almost half the 
families in Britain if it had been implemented. (20) In view of 
the scale of the operation envisaged, it was no surprise that 
the issue of municipalisation caused some disagreement within 
the study group on housing. Whereas certain members of the group 
favoured a commitment to an early vesting day on which property 
would be acquired, others believed that the transfer of 
ownership to local authorities should be linked more 
specifically to the need to repair and to improve 
properties. 
(21) Two drafts of the chapter which dealt with the 
issue were therefore submitted to the Research Department with a 
request that they be merged in such d way as to leave a future 
Labour Minister of Housing a degree of flexibility over the 
issue. The final version of the document stated that local 
authorities would plan and operate the transfer of ownership, 
but it was also made clear that the Minister concerned would 
have the power to make alternative arrangements to speed up the 
process if a local authority was seen to be 'falling down on the 
job'. Gaitskell offered his own suggestions on the redraft of 
this section, arguing that the document had to be more precise 
about its justification for the municipal ownership of tenanted 
property and not just concentrate on the details of Labour's 
plans. 
(22) A revised draft of the statement was discussed during 
two meetings of the NEC in June where it generated 'considerable 
discussion'. (23) After a number of amendments were suggested and 
approved the statement was accepted for submission to 
Conference. 
Although Homes of the Future was concerned primarily with the 
issue of municipalisation, other aspects of Labour's housing 
programme were also addressed in the document. Despite the fact 
that improved housing had been a national priority in 1945, 
serious deficiencies in the housing stock continued to exist a 
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decade later. Post-war affluence had not solved the country's 
housing problems. The Ministry of Housing and Local Government's 
own figures at the time showed that almost 1 million houses in 
Britain were unfit for human habitation. The 1951 Census 
revealed that from a total of 14.5 million households, almost 7 
million had no fixed bath, over 3 million either shared or were 
without a water closet and over 1 million either shared or were 
without a cooking stove. 
(24) Homes of the Future offered a list 
of policies which would attack these problems. Increased slum 
clearance, lower interest rates for housing purposes, the right 
of leaseholders to purchase the freehold on the expiration of 
the lease, the provision of 100 per cent mortgages by local 
authorities and the establishment of a National Housing 
Association to help with a building programme were all mentioned 
in the statement. 
With the exception of the material on local authority 
mortgages and a National Housing Association, the policies 
contained in Homes of the Future reappeared in Labour's 1959 
election manifesto. Most of them were present also in the 1964 
programme. In fact there were just two main differences between 
the housing policies in the 1956 document and the 1964 
manifesto. The first was the abandonment of plans for a National 
Housing Association in favour of a proposal for a Crown Land 
Commission which would acquire land for building purposes. The 
second was the replacement of the plan for large-scale 
municipalisation with a policy which involved local authorities 
acquiring old properties from landlords who failed to meet 
Labour's new standards of modernisation. 
(25) The abandonment of 
municipalisation was an important change of policy which will be 
explained in a further chapter. When Homes of the Future was 
submitted to the Blackpool Conference, however, most delegates 
had no reservations about the proposed extension of public 
ownership in housing. Introducing Homes of the Future on behalf 
of the NEC at Conference, Anthony Greenwood emphasised the scale 
of the project which was envisaged in the document, 
, it is a full blooded Socialist policy statement which will 
involve what is probably the biggest socialisation project 
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that has yet been attempted in the democratic world. ' 
(26) 
The third policy statement produced in 1956 dealt in part 
with the implications of such collectivist policies for the 
rights of individuals. Personal Freedom was a thematic document 
written by David Ginsberg, the head of the Research Department, 
which dealt with the issues of civil liberties and individual 
freedom in an increasingly collectivist society. The draft of 
the document was presented to a meeting of the Policy Committee 
in May where it was accepted with a number of amendments. 
(27) 
After the conclusion had been rewritten the document passed to a 
meeting of the NEC in June where it was approved for submission 
to Conference. 
(28) Although there was very little discussion of 
policy proposals in Personal Freedom, the statement at least 
showed that the Party had thought seriously about the rights of 
the individual in society. The burden of the analysis was that 
socialists were committed to two forms of freedom; civil 
liberties and 'those freedoms that can only exist in a classless 
society'. 
The policy makers appeared to be relatively satisfied about 
existing safeguards on civil liberties. They argued that Labour 
would protect the independence of the judiciary, implement fully 
the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949 and ensure that the country 
retained 'the most efficient, incorruptible and "non-political" 
Civil Service in the world'. The main complaints in this area 
concerned the powers of the Home Secretary over the entry of 
aliens into Britain, the secrecy which surrounded security 
checks for certain forms of public employment and the failure to 
publish reports of inquiries held under the Town and Country 
Planning Acts. The issue of freedom within the framework of a 
'classless society' was rather more problematic than the issue 
of civil liberties. As a result, the discussion of the former 
issue was understandably vague and largely free from specific 
recommendations. For example the document stated that 
concentrations of economic, military or political power 'should 
serve, and be seen to serve, the whole community, and not 
dominate it'. It also said that 'the right to property always 
carries with it the responsibility to use and develop it in the 
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interests of the community'. These rather general assertions, 
though, were neither developed with further analysis nor 
supported by policy proposals. Indeed, there was an implicit 
assumption in Personal Freedom that individual rights in a 
classless society would be protected automatically after a 
Labour government had regained control of the state. The 
document was as much an appeal for trust in a future Labour 
government as a statement of policy. It did advocate both a more 
diverse ownership of the press and the public control of radio 
and television broadcasting, but other recommendations are 
difficult to find. 
Personal Freedom caused some controversy at Conference, 
largely because it was seen to lack enough specific proposals. A 
number of delegates at Blackpool supported demands for more 
stringent controls on the security services and for a more open 
system of appeal for individuals who were denied employment as a 
result of information supplied by the security services. A 
resolution along these lines attracted significant support but 
was eventually defeated by 3,478,000 votes to 2,625,000. 
(29) 
Although the statement was therefore approved by Conference, its 
analysis did not feature in the manifesto of 1959. Instead, 
Labour's programme for the election dealt with the issue of 
individual liberty in a way that was largely designed to avoid 
controversy. The manifesto stated that Labour aimed to remove 
'out-of-date restrictions on personal liberty'. Reform in this 
area had been advocated previously by Crosland in The Future of 
Socialism when he argued that in the blood of a socialist 'there 
should always run a trace of the anarchist and the libertarian, 
and not too much of the prig and the prude'. 
(30) The programme 
for 1959 included proposals to remove anomalies in the betting 
laws, to hold an enquiry into the Sunday observance laws and to 
set up a Royal Commission to review and recommend changes in the 
licensing laws. (31) As these propoAls involved matters of 
conscience, the manifesto confirmed that Labour members would be 
entitled to a free vote when the issues came before Parliament. 
In the 1964 manifesto the discussion of individual liberty was 
even more brief: it was simply stated in the conclusion that a 
new office of Parliamentary Commissioner would be established 
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'with the right to investigate the grievances of the citizen and 
report to a Select Committee of the House'. 
(32) 
The first three statements produced during the policy review 
generated enthusiasm in some quarters of the Party. In July 1956 
Crossman acknowledged that the policy documents which had been 
published by the NEC; 
'are having an effect on the public. They are making people 
think that the Labour Party is a party to be taken seriously, 
that it is thinking, that it is beginning to get a policy and 
that there can be such a thing as a second stage of 
Socialism. 
Moreover, there is no doubt that in the formulation of this 
second stage Gaitskell and his friends are playing the major 
role, since no one else has anything positive to propose. 
Such ex-Bevanites as Mikardo and Barbara Castle have 
contributed nothing whatsoever on the Executive and the 
Tribune is milk and water'. 
(33) 
As a member of the Home Policy Committee, Crossman was involved 
closely in the review of Labour's domestic programme. His main 
contribution to policy-making came in 1957 when he helped to 
produce National Superannuation, the new statement on Labour's 
proposals for the state pension scheme. A call for improved 
pensions had been another familiar feature of Labour manifestos 
since 1900, but the proposals put forward by Crossman and three 
academics from the London School of Economics were a radical 
departure from previous Party policy. 
(34) The draft statement was 
presented by Crossman to a meeting of the Policy Committee in 
April where it was accepted after minor amendment. 
(35) It was 
then passed to the Executive who approved the document for 
submission to Conference. 
(36) 
National Superannuation contained two main proposals: an 
immediate rise in national insurance pension payments and the 
establishment of a new state system of wage-related benefits for 
wage-related contributions. The new system of superannuation 
outlined in the document was based on similar schemes from 
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Sweden and Germany and its long-term aim was to provide a 
pension that was equivalent to half pay on retirement for the 
average wage-earner. The proposed reform of the flat-rate 
pensions scheme was a significant step and Gaitskell was anxious 
that the project might appear too extreme. 
(37) Crossman and the 
Shadow Chancellor Wilson, however, reassured the leader and the 
Executive that the rationale for reform was sound and that the 
logistics of the new scheme were workable. The principle of an 
income-related state pension plan was justified on several 
grounds. It was argued that a flat-rate contribution was a poll 
tax which affected disproportionately the lowest paid workers; 
the need to ensure that low earners could afford the flat-rate 
contribution restricted pension payments and resulted in a 
deficit in the system which the Exchequer had to cover; private 
superannuation schemes were becoming more common and this was 
creating a new form of social division - individuals with a 
private pension plan enjoyed a considerable advantage over those 
who relied on the state scheme; most private superannuation 
schemes were not transferA8z-C-_, whereas a national system would 
offer all wage earners the security of a safeguarded 
income-related pension plan wherever they worked; flat-rate 
payments meant that the average wage earner with no private 
pension allowance suffered a 75 per cent reduction in spending 
power on retirement; finally, a superannuation scheme would 
provide savings which would help the state to carry out large- 
scale capital investment. 
(38) 
After setting out the case for a state superannuation scheme 
the document explained how the new system would function. The 
details are complex but the broad principles are clear. The 
state pension scheme would be divided into two elements: a 
flat-rate element and a graded element. Workers who were covered 
by private superannuation arrangements could contract out of the 
proposed new system but all other workers would join the state 
superannuation scheme. Every insured worker would be entitled to 
the continued flat-rate element, whereas those covered by 
national superannuation would be entitled to the graded element. 
Married women who did not earn a wage would retain their old 
pension rights unchanged. In place of a flat-rate contribution 
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employees in the new state scheme would pay a set percentage of 
their wage in national insurance. Employers would pay a similar 
percentage and the Exchequer would also provide a contribution. 
In order to limit wide differentials between high earners and 
low earners in the new scheme a ceiling would be imposed on 
contributions and payments. A minimum level would also be set 
below which no state pension would be allowed to fall. In order 
to ensure that final pension payments matched the real value of 
a worker's contributions throughout their working life, 
contribution rights in any earning year would be multiplied by a 
factor which represented the increase in average national 
earnings between the year in question and the date of 
retirement. Adjustments to payments based on a periodic review 
of the cost of living would also be used to safeguard pensioners 
from inflation. In the transition period between the old and the 
new state schemes, the payment of graded benefits would be 
calculated according to the number of years a worker had 
contributed to national superannuation. 
The authors of Labour's new pensions plan did not lack 
confidence in their scheme. They believed that their work stood 
comparison with the Beveridge Report, the great symbol of social 
reconstruction in post-war Britain: 'Just as the Beveridge 
Report was attuned to the conditions of the 1940s, so National 
Superannuation is attuned to the new and changed conditions of 
the 1950s'. 
(39) Crossmdn congratulated himself on 'cooking this 
wonderful vote-winner'. 
(40) He also argued at the 1957 Brighton 
Conference that the document tackled the most pressing social 
issue in Britain at the time: 'Just as unemployment was the 
great social challenge and the great disgrace of the 1930s, 
poverty in old age is the great social disgrace and the great 
challenge of the 1950s'. 
(41) Most delegates at Brighton appeared 
to share Crossman's views and his faith in the policy document. 
Only four sec-akers from a total of eighteen in the debate on 
National Superannuation criticised aspects of the policy and the 
statement was easily ap proved by Conference. 
(42) 
Reform of the state pensions scheme was an important element 
of Labour's programme in 1959. Indeed, the increase in the basic 
pension and the establishment of a new system of superannuation 
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were the first policy proposals in the manifesto. 
(43) 
Labour's 
poster campaign and its televised broadcasts also featured 
prominently the pledge to end poverty in old age. The priority 
attached to this issue reinforced the importance of social 
equality as a theme in Labour's election campaign under 
Gaitskell. When Wilson took over the proposed superannuation 
scheme was given a lower profile in the Party's programme, but 
the significant point is that the policy on pensions in 1964 
remained virtually unchanged from 1957 - the only difference was 
the promise that private pension schemes would be made 
transferrable. 
(44) 
The two remaining policy statements for the 1957 Conference 
dealt with the most contentious issue in Labour's domestic 
programme: public ownership. Public Enterprise reviewed the 
performance of nationalised industries; Industry and Society 
outlined the Party's future policy on public ownership. 
Potentially, these two statements were the most sensitive and 
divisive elements of the whole policy review. As far as 
Gaitskell and his revisionist colleagues were concerned, 
proposed extensions of public ownership were usually unpopular 
with the electorate and were increasingly unnecessary as a means 
of achieving the Party's main goals of social equality and 
economic growth. However, they also knew that there existed 
within the Labour movement a sizeable body of opinion which 
regarded nationalisation as the centrepiece of Labour's economic 
policy and which was anxious to see more industries brought into 
public ownership. Gaitskell's objective therefore was to oversee 
the production of a policy which was flexible enough to unite 
the Party and to reassure voters at the same time that Labour 
did not intend to nationalise a long list of industries. 
The Labour leader chaired the study group which produced 
Public Entervrise and he introduced a draft of the document to a 
meeting of the Executive in June. 
(45) Although the document was 
not a policy statement its review of nationalised industries 
helped to prepare the way for the Policy Committee's proposals 
on future public ownership. The nationalisation programme of the 
Attlee Governments was defended and the document acknowledged 
that a number of gains had been made by industries after they 
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had been taken into the public sector. But the criticisms 
levelled at nationalised industries recalled the charges made by 
Crosland in The Future of Socialism. The Boards of nationalised 
companies had frequently proven no more accountable to 
Parliament or to the public than the Boards of private 
companies; Ministers had often been unwilling or unable to guide 
the investment decisions of nationalised industries; and 
concerns were expressed about the implications of public 
monopolies for efficiency and competitiveness. 
(46) 
Different conclusions could be drawn from the analysis in 
Public Enterprise. Some argued that the anticipated benefits of 
nationalisation had failed to materialise and that the Party 
should be cautious about further extensions of public ownership. 
Others believed that with appropriate reform public ownership 
could be made to operate more effectively. A composite 
resolution at the Brighton Conference identified the management 
of nationalised industries as the main cause of the problems 
outlined in the document. The delegate from Batley and Morley 
CLP argued that the solution to poor management in the state 
sector was increased participation by the workforce in the 
administration of nationalised industries. 
(47) The trade unions, 
however, were opposed to the establishment of formal structures 
for recruiting workers into management, so Public Enterprise was 
accepted by Conference without the amendment. 
(48) 
The criticisms expressed in the review of nationalised 
industries strengthened the revisionist case against new 
measures of large-scale public ownership. Industry and Society, 
the statement on industrial policy, reflected the revisionist 
position on nationalisation and ensured that Labour's programme 
contained only a limited commitment to the state acquisition of 
whole industries. The document was produced by a study group 
whose personnel had previously disagreed about the aims and 
value of public ownership: it included Gaitskell, Wilson, Bevan 
and Mikardo. 
(49) In order to give 
formation of industrial policy a 
attended all the meetings of the 
held with the Economic Committee 
maintained with the Chairman of 
the trade unions a voice in the 
research officer from the TUC 
study group, a full meeting was 
of the TUC and contact was 
the Co-operative 
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Union. (50) Despite the apparently collaborative nature of the 
project, though, Industry and Society. was written largely by 
Peter Shore. He was not given a detailed brief by the study 
group and had 'almost total freedom' in the initial drafting of 
the statement. 
(51) 
A revised draft was discussed by the Executive 
in June and approved for submission to Conference without 
apparent controversy. 
(52) 
Industry and Society was produced with two difPCKent audiences 
in mind. The Party faithful had to believe that the document 
reinforced Labour's commitment to a socialist economic programme 
in which private ownership of capital would be replaced with 
public ownership. At the same time the wider electorate had to 
be persuaded that the document signalled Labour's broad 
acceptance of the existing balance of the mixed economy. As a 
result the policy statement combined innovation and caution, 
radical thinking and conservatism. It began with a powerful 
critique of capitalism which described how private industry in 
Britain had become dominated by some five hundred large 
companies. Within these companies shareholders had ceased to 
perform any worthwhile function. They were not needed to provide 
risk capital and they had no influence over the management of 
the company; they simply collected dividends without 
contributing to the national economy. Following from this 
analysis it might have been expected that Industry and Society 
would advocate a widespread extension of public ownership to 
replace the role of the functionless shareholder. Instead, the 
conclusion was largely free of specific proposals for 
nationalisation. Peter Shore, who wrote the critique of 
capitalism in the analytical section of the document, recalls 
how the revisionists ensured that the conclusion of the policy 
statement was relatively cautious; 
'I was interested in the whole changing structure of post-war 
capitalism. Industry and Society was really very much leaning 
toward that kind of research I had been doing. It became 
sharply political rather than being to some extent rather 
research based and slightly academic when the point was 
reached in the discussion - what conclusions do you draw from 
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this? And initially the conclusions were actually very 
radical conclusions. It was questioning whether we actually 
needed a private sector in the large firm area of companies, 
questioning whether we really needed the private shareholder 
at all, he'd become irrelevant. And of course that in turn 
could lead to very radical or perhaps not very radical 
conclusions. And at the end of that particular policy 
statement I know Hugh Gaitskell was very disturbed indeed and 
he got Tony Crosland to come in and help shape the concluding 
chapter. ' 
(53) 
The revisionists' redrafting of the conclusion of Industry 
and Society was crucial because it was this section of the 
document which determined Labour's policy on public ownership. 
The proposals offered in the statement had been rehearsed 
previously in The Future of Socialism. In place of a 'shopping 
list' of industries which a Labour government would nationalise, 
two alternative forms of public ownership were envisaged. 
Individual companies rather than whole industries would be 
brought into the public sector, and the state would acquire 
shares in large companies so that the community would enjoy some 
of the profits of industry. The nationalisation of single 
companies had already been proposed by Labour in 1953 - 
Challenge to Britain had advocated the state acquisition of key 
firms in the machine-tool industry. Industry and Society implied 
that competitive public enterprise would be introduced across a 
wider range of industries than just machine-tools, but there was 
no precise definition of the criteria that would be used to 
select companies for take over by the state. The formula that 
eventually appeared in the 1959 manifesto recalled the rather 
vague formula that had been used in the 1951 manifesto: 
companies would be taken into public ownership if 'thorough 
enquiry' revealed that they were 'failing the nation'. This form 
of words was attacked with some force in The Economist; 
'What Labour has done this week is to flaunt a programme that 
is deliberately designed to have the minimum of eventual real 
effect, while instilling the maximum of interim uncertainty 
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in every board room in the country. ' 
(54) 
The proposals for the state acquisition of shares in the 
policy statement were defined with a little more clarity, but 
there was still enough ambiguity in the drafting to cause 
confusion. The document at least explained how a Labour 
government would acquire shares on behalf of the community. 
First, a National Superannuation Fund would be established under 
the control of independent trustees; these trustees would be 
given part of the surplus remaining from state pension payments 
to finance the purchase of the shares of their choice. Second, 
death duties where appropriate would be collected in the form of 
shares rather than cash. However, although the mechanics of the 
share buying scheme were clear, the amount of shares that would 
be acquired by these methods was not specified, nor was it 
explained how the dividends from the shares would be 
distributed. There was even a disagreement between those who had 
helped to produce the document about the central purpose of 
state share buying. Wilson argued that the policy should be used 
by a Labour government to gain control of industrial firms whose 
performance was unsatisfactory - he did not believe that the 
state should become a functionless shareholder. 
(55) Mikardo 
argued in a similar vein that the state purchase of shares could 
be used to increase public ownership dramatically. In his view, 
the policy enabled the state to acquire majority shareholdings 
in large groups of companies and thereafter to appoint new 
directors and ensure that these companies operated in line with 
the national interest. 
(56) The revisionists, though, disagreed 
with the interpretations of the policy offered by Wilson and 
Mikardo. Crosland argued that the state acquisition of shares 
was simply a mechanism for redistributing income from the owners 
of capital to the wider community - the aim was not to gain 
control over the management of companies, it was for the state 
to act as a functionless shareholder which left private industry 
alone to maximise the profits on which dividends were 
paid. 
(57) Gaitskell reinforced this point at Conference when he 
explained that the policy would give the state a share of the 
capital gains made by private industry - there was no mention of 
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the policy being used to gain control over the management of 
companies. 
(58) 
Delegates at the Brighton Conference also applied a variety 
of interpretations to the proposals in Industry and Society. In 
a debate which lasted for more than four hours the General 
Secretary of the railwaymen's union complained that the 
statement was ambiguous and called on the Executive to inject 
into the Party's industrial policy 'the rich red blood of 
Socialist objective'. 
(59) Herbert Morrison also criticised the 
statement, some of which he believed was satisfactory, some of 
which was unsatisfactory and some of which was 'exceedingly 
difficult' to understand; overall, he concluded, the policy was 
'too clever by half' because it attempted to appease all shades 
of opinion within the Party. 
(60) In contrast, the President of 
the engineers' union expressed his support for a policy which he 
believed was 'honest' and which recognised the practical 
difficulties involved in taking whole industries into public 
ownership. 
(61) Bessie Braddock, the MP for Liverpool Exchange, 
also defended the document on the grounds that an 'elastic' 
policy was required to meet the needs of a constantly changing 
economic situation. 
(62) 
Despite criticism from some delegates at Brighton, Industry 
and Society was approved by Conference with a majority of more 
than four million votes. 
(63) For Gaitskell and the revisionists 
this represented a considerable achievement. Surveys of public 
opinion confirmed that public ownership was unpopular with most 
of the electorate. 
(64) The leadership's main fear during the 
review of the Party's industrial policy was that the Executive 
would be forced to adopt a long and electorally damaging list of 
industries for nationalisation by a future Labour government. It 
was with some relief, therefore, that Gaitskell and his 
colleagues on the NEC managed to secure broad support in the 
Party for a statement which contained just two specific 
proposals for public ownership - road haulage and the iron and 
steel industry. The ambiguities in the rest of the document 
enabled the Party leadership to present Labour's industrial 
policy in different ways to different audiences. 
This flexibility was particularly useful during general 
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election campaigns. The section on industrial policy in Labour's 
1959 manifesto was taken directly from the recommendations in 
Industry and Society. Although the Tories continued to claim in 
1959 that Labour remained the Party of public ownership, their 
argument was based on the commitment to nationalisation in 
Labour's constitution rather than on the substance of the 
Party's industrial policy. As a result, Gaitskell attempted to 
rewrite Labour's constitution after the 1959 defeat, but the 
Party's industrial policy remained largely unchanged for the 
1964 election. Despite a renewed emphasis on the language of 
planning in 1964, the manifesto still offered just two 
candidates for public ownership - the water industry and steel. 
A new form of words replaced 'failing the nation' as the 
criterion for taking a firm or industry into public ownership, 
but the new formula was no more precise: 'If production falls 
short of the (national) plan in key sections of industry ... then 
it is up to the Government and the industry to take whatever 
measures are required. ' The manifesto also stated that in order 
to take advantage of scientific discoveries in industry, a 
Labour government would develop and establish new industries 
'either by public enterprise or in partnership with private 
industry'. (65) In other words, the ambiguities of Industry and 
Society found their way into the manifestos of 1959 and 1964, 
both of which contained only limited commitments to public 
ownership, and both of which aimed to leave an incoming Labour 
administration with the maximum room for manoeuvre over 
industrial Policy. 
With the most potentially divisive part of the policy review 
complete, and with the prospect of an early general election 
fading as the Government recovered steadily from the Suez 
crisis, the Executive embarked on the final phase of 
policy-making in an atmosphere of relative calm. The documents 
prepared for the 1958 Conference dealt with education, 
agriculture and the Party's plan for economic expansion. All 
three were readily accepted by Conference., the only minor 
controversy concerned part the statement on education, Learnina 
to Live, a draft of which was presented to the Policy Committee 
in April. 
(66) 
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Most of the document on education was uncontroversial and 
agreement was soon reached on its main proposals. This was a 
crucial policy statement for a Party which believed that the 
education system had a profound and adverse effect on the levels 
of inequality in society. As already seen, both Towards Equality 
and The Future of Socialism in 1956 had identified the education 
system as the most important cause of social inequality in the 
country. 
(67) Learning to Live reinforced this argument and began 
with a review of the problems which many pupils faced in 
Britain's schools. One-third of the children in primary schools 
were taught in classes of more than 40 pupils; two-thirds of the 
children in secondary schools were taught in classes of more 
than 30. Expenditure on education as a proportion of the 
national income was approximately the same in 1958 as it had 
been in 1938; as a result, money was not available to replace 
schools which in some cases had been built as early as 1870. New 
teachers were recruited at a rate of approximately 5000 each 
year, whereas Labour's policy makers believed that at least 
16,000 new teachers were required to make an increase in the 
school leaving age feasible. The segregation of pupils at the 
age of 11 was criticised for being arbitrary and 
counter-productive, provision for part-time education was 
attacked as inadequate, and it was argued that insufficient 
numbers of students were entering higher education. 
Learning to Live acknowledged that a future Labour government 
could not solve all of the country's educational problems in one 
term. It could not even predict with any certainty how much 
extra time would be needed beyond a five year term to carry 
through all of Labour's proposed changes. But at the very least 
it highlighted education reform as a priority for the Party. The 
broad objectives established in the document were clear and 
ambitious. Spending on education was to be increased, class 
sizes were to be reduced to a maximum of 30, slum schools were 
to be replaced, all-age schools were to be abolished, spending 
was to be increased on scientific and technical training and the 
school leaving age was to be raised to 16. In order to counter 
the shortage of teachers, more training places would be made 
available, maintenance grants for trainees would be increased 
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and a recruitment drive would be launched in tandem with the 
local authorities. In addition to these objectives, Learning to 
Live also outlined plans for the restructuring of Britain's 
education system. Most importantly, the document reaffirmed the 
Party's commitment to abolish the testing and selection of 
children at 11; local authorities would be asked to submit plans 
for the adoption of the comprehensive principle 'with all 
reasonable speed'. The provision of higher education was to be 
improved by building new universities, expanding old ones and 
increasing both the availability and scale of maintenance grants 
for university students: in order to finalise the details of 
higher education policy, the document confirmed that a Labour 
government would establish a Royal Commission on the 
universities. For those school leavers who did not enter 
university, facilities for part-time vocational or recreational 
education in colleges and works' schools would be improved. 
(68) 
After minor drafting Amendments were agreed the statement on 
education was approved by the Executive in May. 
(69) Controversy, 
however, still surrounded the policy on schools in the private 
sector. Michael Stewart, the MP for Fulham, had been asked by 
the Home Policy Committee in April to prepare a paper on the 
possibility of making 75 per cent of places in the 'major public 
schools' available to non-fee-paying pupils. 
(70) Stewart's paper 
recognised that opinion in the Party was strongly in favour of 
ending the educational privileges enjoyed by the wealthy. It 
suggested that a new Board, Commission or special Department at 
the Ministry of Education could control the allocation of free 
places at the public schools. However, difficult decisions would 
have to be taken about which schools should be included in the 
scheme and about which pupils would be given places. Stewart 
agreed with Crosland that places could not be allocated on the 
grounds of intellectual ability because this would merely 
replace one elite system of education with another. 
(71) There was 
also a strong suggestion that a Labour government might 
concentrate its attention on improving the maintained schools 
rather than spend time reforming an elite group of schools which 
would affect only a small minority of the nation's pupils. This 
was a powerful argument and the final version of Learning to 
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Live conceded that it was simply too difficult and potentially 
time consuming to alter the nature of the existing public 
schools. At Conference, the omission of proposals to reform the 
public schools caused widespread concern among delegates. A 
resolution which called for the abolition of fee paying in 
schools was defeated by 3,544,000 votes to 3,067,000 - the 
closest the Executive had come to defeat in the course of the 
three year policy review. 
(72) Once this controversy had been 
resolved, though, Learning to Live was accepted at Scarborough 
with a large majority. 
(73) 
Labour's 1959 manifesto commitments on education were taken 
directly from Learning to Live - the only main difference was 
that there was no mention of a Royal Commission on the 
universities. The Times criticised this part of the manifesto on 
two grounds: first, because there was no timetable for reducing 
class sizes to 30; second, because the section on comprehensive 
schooling was 'unintelligible'. 
(74) The Party's confidence in its 
own proposals, though, was confirmed by the fact that education 
was the second area of policy discussed in the manifesto after 
pensions. Social equality was a dominant theme in Labour's 
campaign at this time and education policy had a vital role to 
play in this context. By 1964 economic regeneration had replaced 
social equality as the first priority in the Party's programme, 
but education remained the first area of policy discussed in the 
1964 manifesto under the heading 'Modern Social Services'. 
Again, the content of the policy was taken from Learning to Live 
- the only main difference this time was the proposal to 
establish an educational trust which would recommend a way of 
integrating the public schools into the state system. As seen, a 
similar idea had been considered in 1958; there had been some 
support in principle for the policy but it was rejected as 
unworkable and omitted from the 1959 manifesto. The proposal was 
taken up again in Signposts for the Sixties but the Wilson 
Government eventually had to concede that the scheme was indeed 
impractical: a report on integration was published by the Public 
Schools Commission under Sir John Newsom in 1968, but it was 
soon shelved and quickly forgotten. 
(75) In effect, therefore., 
Labour's education policy in 1964 was largely unchanged from 
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1959. Even the 'unintelligible' section on comprehensive schools 
remained: the 1964 manifesto read, 'secondary education will be 
reorganised on comprehensive lines. Within the new system, 
grammar school education will be extended'. 
(76) 
Prosper the Plough, Labour's statement on agriculture, was 
never likely to capture the interest of the wider 
electorate. 
(77) 
Britain had long ceased to be self-sufficient in 
the production of food and in 1958 approximately half of its 
total food requirement was met by imports. The main purpose of 
the document was to reassure Britain's farming community that 
Labour would continue to abide by the terms of the Agriculture 
Act of 1947. This Act guaranteed both prices and markets for 
approximately 80 per cent of home produce, but its provisions 
were dismantled steadily by the Conservatives after 1951. Before 
the details of a return to guaranteed prices were finalised, the 
document made it clear that farmers' representatives would be 
consulted by the government in accordance with the procedure set 
down in the 1947 legislation. The central aim of the policy was 
a 'moderate' increase in home production which would not have an 
adverse affect on other trading considerations. It was 
particularly important that any increase in production did not 
disturb the balance between imports and exports: many countries 
bought British manufactured goods with the currency they had 
earned from selling foodstuffs to Britain. To assist the 
moderate expansion envisaged, credit facilities from the 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation would be improved so that 
farmers could invest more easily in new machinery. To help with 
long-term planning there was also a pledge that a Labour 
government would restore security of tenure to farmers in line 
with the provisions of the 1948 Agricultural Holdings Act. It 
was made clear, though, that unprofitable farmers would not be 
permitted to shelter behind subsidies and security of tenure. 
Some farms were too small to be profitable, so voluntary schemes 
of amalgamation would be encouraged. If exhortation failed, 
Prosper the Plough reassured readers that the 1947 Act offered a 
Labour government sufficient control over agricultural land to 
dispossess inefficient farmers - if it was discovered that these 
powers needed to be strengthened, there was a pledge that the 
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next Labour administration would take immediate action to amend 
the legislation. 
This proposal disappointed those in the Party who favoured 
the public ownership of agricultural land. Several delegates at 
the Scarborough Conference called on the NEC to follow the lead 
provided by the National Union of Agricultural Workers and to 
adopt nationalisation as Party policy. 
(78) Crossman, who spoke on 
behalf of the NEC, explained that a Labour government would not 
have the administrative resources required to take over tens of 
thousands of farms; in any case, he argued, a commitment to the 
public ownership of agricultural land would be 'absolutely 
catastrophic' in electoral terms. 
(79) As a result, the resolution 
on public ownership was defeated and Prosper the Plough was 
accepted with a large majority. 
(80) The main proposals in the 
document were included in the 1959 manifesto, along with a 
commitment to the reorganisation of water supplies under public 
ownership. Curiously, agricultural policy was not mentioned in 
the 1964 manifesto - in essence, therefore, the policy remained 
unchanged from 1959. 
Plan for Progress, the Party's policy statement on economic 
expansion, was described by its authors as the 'key' document 
produced during the three year review. 
(81) As shown in the 
previous chapter, Gaitskell and Crosland both believed that the 
delivery of Labour's domestic programme was dependent upon the 
achievement of economic growth. They were determined to 
establish the principle that a Labour administration would 
finance its programme only from the resources generated within 
an expanding economy. The idea that existing national income 
could be redistributed on a scale that would be sufficient to 
meet the cost of Labour's domestic programme was regarded by the 
Party leadership as impractical and electorally undesirable: 
indeed, one of Gaitskell's most memorable statements as Party 
leader was his denial in 1959 that a Labour government would 
need to increase income tax in order to pay for its spending 
commitments. The aim of Plan for Progress, therefore, was to 
convince the electorate that the Party was capable of producing 
the economic growth required to meet the domestic policy 
objectives which had been set out in the statements published 
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since the 1955 election defeat. 
The study group on the control of industry produced a draft 
of the document on economic expansion for the Home Policy 
Committee in June. (82) After amendment it was presented to a 
meeting of the NEC where it was approved for publication. 
Wilson, who chaired the study group, explained that 
representatives from the TUC had been involved in the production 
of the statement from the beginning and had been consulted 
regularly throughout its development. 
(83) The priority for the 
TUC during the production of the statement was to ensure that 
Labour's economic policy did not contain any commitment to an 
incomes policy. As a result Plan for Progress confirmed that 'no 
kind of wages freeze' was envisaged by the Party as a safeguard 
against inflation. It also reassured the unions that 'incomes 
should not be exclusively related to productivity in any 
particular industry'. Although an incomes policy was effectively 
ruled out, though, the document made it clear that planning 
would be applied to many other areas of the national economy. 
According to the policy makers, planning did not mean a return 
to the detailed controls which had been used during the 1940s, 
it meant instead the pursuit of broader objectives - matching 
savings with investment, imports with exports, spending with 
production and jobs with workers. 
The first objective of Labour's economic policy was to 
emulate the high rates of investment of Britain's European 
competitors. Only 15 per cent of Britain's national income had 
been spent on all forms of investment in 1956 -a rate which 
compared unfavourably with figures of 23 per cent in Germany, 25 
(84) 
per cent in the Netherlands and 20 per cent in Italy. In 
order to encourage investment Labour planned to reduce the Bank 
Rate and to relax the credit squeeze which the Tories had 
operated since 1955. Labour was also prepared to use the 
taxation system to encourage investment - company profits which 
were distributed as dividend payments to shareholders would be 
taxed at a higher rate than profits which were saved and 
invested. The document contained the rather vague threat that a 
Labour administration would 'require the larger firms to draw up 
and report their investment plans in greater detail and on a 
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longer-term basis so that measures can be taken to retard or 
accelerate them according to economic needs'. It was not clear 
which methods would be used to produce either an acceleration or 
retardation of investment: the only clue was the proposed 
establishment of a National Investment Board whose powers were 
undefined. But the passage and the creation of the Board at 
least reassured the Party faithful that a Labour government 
would exercise a degree of control over the private sector. In a 
similar vein there was confirmation in the document that 
building licensing would be used to steer investment and 
industrial units into regions which suffered from a high rate of 
unemployment. The policy makers also believed that the public 
sector had an important role to play in stimulating investment 
in a depressed economy: in their view, expenditure on capital 
equipment by the nationalised industries would send 'powerful 
currents of demand' through those firms in the private sector 
with whom orders for equipment were placed. 
Accompanying the drive for increased investment were the two 
main objecti'ves of Labour's external economic policy: the 
defence of the value of sterling and the achievement of a 
balance of payments surplus. The first step in pursuit of these 
objectives was an increase in the volume of Britain's exports. 
As part of the plan, Labour aimed to expand Britain's 
engineering and ancillary industries so that capital equipment 
could be supplied to countries which were in the early stages of 
industrial development. The document also pledged that firms 
which could contribute to the export market would be assisted in 
their search for working capital. It was clear that Britain's 
export performance had declined in relative terms since 1951 - 
only Portugal had a lower rate of growth in exports in Western 
Europe. An improvement in Britain's trade abroad was vital if 
the value of sterling was to be maintained and the economy was 
to be protected from what the document described as 'the 
variable winds of currency speculation'. In order to support 
sterling further, Labour planned to re-employ policies which had 
been used by the Attlee Governments: exchange controls would be 
strengthened and trade would be encouraged with countries in the 
sterling area in an effort to save foreign currency. As part of 
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the drive to economise on non-sterling imports, Labour also 
planned to return to the practice of establishing long-term 
orders with Commonwealth producers who could then plan for 
higher output with a market for their products already assured. 
In a document that was concerned primarily with plans for 
economic growth it was perhaps no surprise that the weakest 
section of Plan for Progress dealt with measures for controlling 
inflation. With their eyes fixed firmly on the target of growth, 
the policy makers rejected the idea of reducing demand in the 
economy as a way of restraining price increases. As shown, the 
document had committed the next Labour government to a reduction 
of interest rates and had dismissed the idea of an incomes 
policy. Two years earlier, an increase in income tax as a way of 
holding down consumption had been ruled out in Towards Equality. 
In the course of the three year review the Party had endorsed 
some ambitious proposals for social reform, so a promise to 
reduce public spending was clearly not an option. In short, 
although Labour had been sharply critical of the deflationary 
measures use. d by the Tories to control rising prices, their own 
proposals for tackling inflation consisted of little more than 
an optimistic forecast of improvements in productivity. The 
policy makers argued that improved productivity would absorb the 
effect of wage increases on labour costs and would not damage 
the competitiveness of British industry; the aim of government, 
managers and workers, therefore, was to co-operate in pursuit of 
productivity gains. The only practical suggestion on this theme, 
though, was that extra resources would be made available for 
industrial research and training: Labour pledged to expand the 
facilities of existing research associations, and to continue 
and possibly to extend investment allowances to firms engaged in 
research and development. 
The absence of any serious discussion about the potential 
problem of inflation at least helped to ensure that there was a 
clear tone of optimism in Plan for Progress. Most delegates at 
Conference were enthusiastic about such a confident presentation 
of Labour's economic plans and the statement was accepted with a 
minimum of dissent: one speaker complained that Labour had 
proposed to operate capitalism more efficiently than the 
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capitalists, but his argument attracted little support-(85)After 
it had been approved by Conference, the document became Labour's 
main statement on economic policy for the 1959 election. As seen 
in the previous chapter, the 1959 manifesto was rather more 
concerned with economic objectives than with policy: Plan for 
Progress provided the detail and outlined the methods with which 
these objectives would be pursued. Although economic policy was 
refined after the defeat of 1959, the main commitments from the 
1958 document remained. As will be shown, the 1964 manifesto 
contained new proposals for an incomes policy, regional planning 
and the creation of a Ministry of Economic Affairs and a 
Ministry of Technology. There was also a much greater emphasis 
on the need to modernise Britain's industry and economy. 
However, these new proposals aimed essentially to achieve the 
objectives which had been set out in Plan for Progress - planned 
expansion, full employment, a balance of payments surplus, 
better productivity, stable prices and a more modern and 
efficient industrial effort. The only main objective from 1958 
which did not reappear in the 1964 manifesto was the commitment 
to a strong pound. 
Labour's policy review was completed at the Scarborough 
Conference of 1958. The Home Policy Committee continued to fine 
tune parts of the programme after Scarborough, but most of the 
domestic policies which the Party offered to the electorate in 
1959 were finalised between 1956 and 1958. The only additions to 
the ten main statements were three documents on steel 
nationalisation, racial prejudice and the health services. 
(86) A 
glossy compendium of the main proposals which had been agreed 
during the period was also published at the end of 1 B. 
(87) For 
the leadership, the review of policy had been a considerable 
success. Conference had endorsed every aspect of the Executive's 
domestic programme and arguably the only disappointment was the 
failure to agree some form of incomes policy with the unions. As 
will be shown in a subsequent chapter, although Labour was 
defeated in the election of 1959, few within the Party held the 
domestic policy programme responsible for the defeat. Indeed, 
the prospect of undertaking a further review of policy after the 
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election was specifically ruled out. Instead, Labour's programme 
in 1964 was drawn extensively from the statements produced by 
the policy makers in the three year review. Civil war resumed 
over a number of issues within the Party after the 1959 defeat, 
but broad agreement was at least maintained about the domestic 
policy programme. 
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5. The road to 1964 
Labour has often failed to respond rationally to defeat in a 
general election, despite the fact that it has lost almost 
two-thirds of the contests it has fought since 1918. After the 
1951 election, Labour launched itself into a damaging and 
time-consuming civil war which left a legacy of mistrust in the 
Party. After the 1959 defeat, sections of the Party were 
overtaken by a mood of defeatism as they desperately sought 
solutions for a crisis which existed only in their imaginations. 
Senior members of the Party over-reacted to the disappointment 
of defeat in 1959, perhaps because they had expected victory, 
perhaps because the result was Labour's worst defeat since 1935. 
Gaitskell and some of his closest colleagues argued with some 
force that the Party would return to power only if radical 
changes were made to its constitution, its organisation, its 
image and perhaps even its name. The result of this campaign for 
change was a'resumption of hostilities w. ithin the Party. For a 
while at least, the good work which had taken place after the 
1955 defeat was forgotten. 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that the intiative taken 
by Gaitskell and his followers in the wake of the 1959 defeat 
plunged the Party into a series of unnecessary crises. It 
fractured Party unity, it led to a leadership contest between 
Gaitskell and Wilson, and it demonstrated in the clearest 
possible terms that Labour was uncertain about its future 
direction. It will also be argued, though, that the Party was 
able to recover from these crises by 1964 primarily because of 
developments which had taken place before 1959. Ben Pimlott has 
argued that 'it is difficult not to regard the outcome of the 
(1) 
1964 election as Wilson's victory'. This chapter will offer a 
different interpretation of Labour's return to power: Labour 
survived the crises of the early 1960s because of a residual 
strength which had been built up in the 1950s. When the heat was 
taken out of the internal Party battles, Labour was able to rely 
on an agreed policy programme, an organisational base and 
improvements in presentation which had been worked out before 
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1959. 
The Party's internal inquiry into the 1959 election defeat 
identified one main factor which had helped the Tories. 'We were 
defeated by prosperity' argued the Election Sub-Committee of the 
NEC. (2) They claimed in their report on the election that rising 
prosperity had hardened middle class opinion against Labour and 
had cut into the Party's traditional base of working class 
support: 
'To such an extent had we failed to present ourselves as the 
party of prosperity that there is some evidence of Labour 
voters who voted Labour but who did not want a Labour 
victory. ' 
(3) 
Gaitskell's pledge on income tax was also singled out as an 
important contributory factor in the defeat: in the opinion of 
the Sub-Committee, it had provided the Tories with an 
opportunity to challenge not only the financial policy of the 
Party but the integrity of the leadership. Morgan Phillips, who 
wrote a separate report on the 1959 campaign as the Party's 
General Secretary, did not criticise the tax pledge explicitly, 
but he acknowledged that the Tories had exploited the impression 
that Labour was uncertain about the cost of its own programme. 
The Tories had used this to support their claim that Labour's 
policy proposals were impractical, inflationary and a danger to 
the national economy. 
(4) The other Tory claim which was seen to 
have made an impact during the campaign was the idea that Labour 
was committed to the nationalisation of hundreds of British 
companies. Both reports on the 1959 defeat argued that the 
portrayal of Labour as a party of large-scale nationalisation 
had led to a significant loss of support. 
The NEC's inquiry into Labour's defeat concentrated on the 
immediate failings in the 1959 campaign. Neither report 
diagnosed fundamental problems in the Party or expressed 
particular concern about Labour's long-term future. The burden 
of their analysis was that the Party was unlikely to win an 
election while the Tories enjoyed favourable economic 
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circumstances; in the meantime, the lessons of the 1959 campaign 
had to be learned and the Tories' misrepresentation of Labour's 
policy on public ownership had to be challenged. This calm 
assessment of the Party's electoral performance, though, could 
not halt the torrent of rash proposals for Labour's immediate 
future which swept over the Party within days of the election 
defeat. 
The first important discussion on the Party's future took 
place at Gaitskell's Hampstead home on the Sunday after polling 
day. The Labour leader held court and discussed the election 
with several of his closest colleagues - Crosland, Jay, Gordon 
Walker, Dalton and Roy Jenkins were among those present. 
(5)This 
meeting has featured heavily in the historiography of the Party 
in the period, but its significance has perhaps been 
misinterpreted. Michael Foot has argued that 'a bold initiative 
was set in motion by the Right wing of the Party' on this Sunday 
in Hampstead; (6) Ben Pimlott has described the meeting as the 
'starting-point' of Gaitskell's campaign to change the Labour 
(7) Party; Anthony Howard has referred to the gathering as a 
'council of war'. 
(8) However, there was nothing conspiratorial 
about this post-election meeting. Sunday evening discussions 
between the group which became known as the 'Hampstead Set' had 
taken place regularly since Gaitskell had become leader. As Roy 
Jenkins pointed out, it was natural that the group should meet 
in the aftermath of a painful defeat; 'we just came together 
because Gaitskell thought we were people with whom he could lick 
his wounds at ease'. 
(9) The meeting did not mark the start of a 
right wing plot to change the Party, it represented instead the 
first significant gathering at which the despair, defeatism and 
panic that had taken hold in the PLP was demonstrated. 
Douglas Jay confirmed that the discussions in Gaitskell's 
home bore none of the hallmarks of organisation or planning; the 
talks were informal, minutes were not taken and there was no set 
agenda; 
'A whole lot of things were said by all sorts of people. But 
the idea that we were sort of taking decisions, or reaching 
agreement or laying plans was all nonsense. ' 
(10) 
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The main suggestions put forward at the meeting showed that 
Gaitskell's colleagues had drawn the wrong conclusions from the 
1959 defeat. Instead of recognising the underlying strength of a 
party that could win almost 44 per cent of the vote in 
unfavourable circumstances, they diagnosed a disease which they 
believed would prove fatal for Labour without surgery. Despite 
having won a large share of the vote, they concluded that the 
Party was too reliant on a core of working class support that 
was steadily shrinking. For Douglas Jay, the problem was clear; 
Labour was simply too old fashioned. 
(11) With no unanimity and 
with varying degress of conviction the participants in the 
discussion proposed that Labour should abandon its policy of 
nationalisation, loosen its links with the trade unions and 
change its name to show that it no longer represented the 
working class alone. Gordon Walker caught the pessimistic tone 
of the meeting in his diary; 
'The broad feeling was that unless we changed our policies in 
order to. appeal to the people we would be out permanently, 
but for an economic depression ... Perhaps we must change the 
constitution first. This would help us to change the image of 
our association with the trade unions. They must appear in a 
new and more modern light - and less the masters of the Party 
- if we are to win. ' 
(12) 
Gaitskell did not take a leading role in the discussion, he 
decided that a special post-election Conference was the proper 
place to outline his future strategy for the Party. 
Nevertheless, he was initially sympathetic to the ideas which 
had been put forward by his colleagues. When Tony Benn met him a 
few hours after the Sunday meeting had broken up, the Labour 
leader expressed support for the suggestions of the Hampstead 
Set; 
'He [Gaitskell] said several times, "I'm not prepared to lose 
another Election for the sake of nationalisation. " He also 
laid great stress on the disadvantages of the name Labour, 
particularly on new housing estates, and said, "Of course 
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Douglas Jay is going to urge us to have a new one. "... Hugh 
-also thought we must review our relations with the trade 
unions'. 
(13) 
Gaitskell's supporters would have best served the Party by 
keeping their pessimistic views about Labour's future to 
themselves. Instead, two members of the group offered their 
ideas to a wider audience. On the Monday after the Hampstead 
meeting, Roy Jenkins trailed the anti-nationalisation line on 
the BBC programme Panorama and suggested that Labour should 
consider the possibility of an association with the 
Liberals. (14) The following Friday, Douglas Jay set out more 
fully the options for change which had been discussed by the 
Hampstead Set in an article in Forward. This included the 
suggestion that the Party should change its name to 'Labour and 
Radical' or 'Labour and Reform'. 
(15) Although Jenkins and Jay had 
taken purely personal decisions to publicise their analysis of 
the election defeat, the suspicions of those who were not part 
of Gaitskell's inner circle were immediately aroused. It 
appeared that a clique of largely middle class intellectuals had 
decided on a plan of action for the Party less than a week after 
polling day. The result was widespread resentment and a 
diminution of Gaitskell's authority as leader. After winning 
high praise for his performance during the election campaign, 
Gaitskell alienated many in the Party by his association with 
colleagues who seemed to have lost faith in the Labour movement. 
Jay's article in Forward was received mistakenly by the press as 
a manifesto that had been approved by the Labour leader. The 
Times described the piece as: 'The first authoritative statement 
which may fairly be taken as representing Mr Gaitakell's views 
on the reshaping of the Labour Party's policy ... the stage is set 
for a bitter struggle for supremacy between the opposing 
factions within the party'. 
(16) The Daily Mail asked the question 
which troubled many members of the Party; 'Is it conceivable 
that Mr Jay could have been so forthright without consulting his 
leader?.. Once again the party is split wide open I. Jay in 
fact took the decision to write an article on the causes of 
Labour's defeat before the Sunday meeting in Hampstead. His 
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initial intention was to publish an anonymous piece which would 
synthesise the views of his constituency workers in Battersea 
and his own interpretation of the campaign. He was eventually 
persuaded to sign the article by the editor of Forward, Francis 
Williams, but he never intended his piece to be seen as a guide 
to the Labour leader's thinking. Because of the way in which the 
article associated the Party leadership with his own views, Jay 
continues to regret the use of his byline in this instance. 
(18) 
The confusion that was caused by Jay's piece in 
, 
Forward 
illustrates the way in which Gaitskell's supporters misplayed 
their hand after the election. Roy Jenkins has rightly conceded 
that the Hampstead Set were guilty of 'grave tactical 
errors'. 
(19) In fact, they made at least three major mistakes. 
First, they acted too quickly. The Conservatives had a secure 
majority of 100 at Westminster, so it was likely that a general 
election would not take place for several years. There was no 
need to rush any decisions about the future of the Party, but by 
publicising their proposals for radical change within days of 
the 1959 defeat, Jay and Jenkins contributed to an atmosphere of 
panic and defeatism which built up in the movement in the months 
after the election. Second, they failed to appreciate the danger 
of ignoring Labour's tradition of inner-party democracy. The 
Party's constitution was no model of democracy, but the wider 
membership at least had a role to play in decision making 
through Conference and they guarded this arrangement with some 
care. Gaitskell's circle appeared to have decided upon a course 
of action for the Party without consulting the PLP, the NEC, the 
trade unions, the socialist societies or the local parties. Of 
course the Hampstead Set were entitled to form their own views 
on issues without consulting anybody, but their close 
relationship with the Labour leader meant that they should have 
exercised a certain amount of discretion on matters which 
affected the Party. Third, the publicity which Gaitskell's 
colleagues generated for their post-election analysis recreated 
an atmosphere of mistrust in the Party and made it more 
difficult for a sensible discussion to take place about Labour's 
future. The old battle lines between right and left were redrawn 
and Crossman even suggested reviving the Bevanite group. 
(20) 
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This poisoned atmosphere placed Gaitskell in a difficult 
position. He was due to make a speech on the lessons of the 
election at a rearranged Party Conference in November. If he 
agreed too closely with the views put forward by Jay and 
Jenkins, he could be accused of leading a right-wing campaign 
for reform which threatened to split the Party; he would have 
faced the same charge of disloyalty which he had directed with 
such force in the past against the Bevanites. If, however, he 
made a conciliatory speech to reassure the movement, he would 
forfeit what he believed was his best opportunity to suggest 
some necessary changes to the Party. As Gaitskell made up his 
mind about the line he would take at Conference, bitterness and 
suspicion in Labour's ranks increased. The unity which the 
movement had enjoyed before the election had been shattered. 
Different sections of the Party warned Gaitskell that they would 
resist any attempt to alter the Party's policy, principles or 
constitution; indeed, the signs of an impending crisis could not 
have been more clear. 
At the first meeting of the PLP after the election, Bill 
Blighton, the former Durham miner and Member for Houghton- 
le-Spring, led a strong attack on Jay's proposals. 
(21) The attack 
was continued at a meeting of the PLP Trade Union group on 3 
November. This group's annual report emphasised that Labour's 
link with the unions was the basis of the Party's traditional 
strength and should not be altered. 
(22) Another meeting of the 
PLP on 11 November made it clear that a majority of Labour MPs 
would oppose any radical alterations to the policy on public 
ownership. 
(23) Wilson, who knew about the Labour leader's 
thoughts on the future from Crossman, issued a warning to 
Gaitskell in a speech at Cambridge University; 
'I would not be able to feel - and I am sure the electorate 
would not be able to feel - any confidence in a party which 
decides a few days after the election, or indeed at any other 
time, that policies it had believed to be right and 
appropriate should be thrown over because they were believed 
to be electorally unpopular. There is a lot of talk about the 
image of the Labour Party. I cannot think it would be 
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improved if we were to win, and indeed deserve, a reputation 
for cynicism and opportunism, by throwing over essential and 
fundamental parts of our creed for electoral purposes. ' 
(24) 
Jay's Forward article produced a swift rearguard action in 
defence of public ownership in the PLP; understandably, 
Gaitskell was annoyed that his colleague had helped to create a 
climate in which it became(ýlrficult to discuss any proposals for 
change on this issue without adding to the developing 
controversy. 
(25) 
As the Observer pointed out in the middle of 
November, some members of the Party had lost little time in 
warning the Labour leader that an attack on nationalisation in 
his Conference speech would provoke 'a quarrel that would soon 
make the Bevanite rebellion seem like a polite difference at a 
vestry meetingi. 
(26) 
Gaitskell, however, was still prepared to 
face a. confrontation over public ownership for two reasons. 
First, he was determined to dispel completely the Conservative 
myth that Labour was committed to widespread nationalisation. If 
this myth was not challenged, he believed, Labour faced the 
prospect of a disastrous fourth consecutive defeat which would 
be followed by a split in the Party and a resurgence of the 
Liberals. (27) Secondly, Gaitskell's approach to politics was 
marked by an instinctive dislike of compromise. After he had 
made up his mind on an issue he found it difficult to 
accommodate opposing views or to be dissuaded from a particular 
course of action. Gaitskell's supporters believed that this 
approach displayed courage, integrity and clarity of purpose. 
His critics believed that it displayed arrogance, stubbornness 
and poor political judgement. Whichever view was most accurate, 
once Gaitskell had decided that a modification of the Party's 
position on public ownership was necessary, no amount of 
warnings from within the PLP could prevent him from tackling the 
issue. When Crossman suggested that the Labour leader should 
listen to the views of Conference before deciding on the precise 
content and tone of his speech, Gaitskell replied that he had 
largely made up his mind about 'what has to be said'. 
(28) 
Gaitskell's speech on the first day of the special weekend 
Conference at Blackpool lasted over an hour and much of it was 
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uncontroversial. He began by praising Labour's efforts in the 
1959 election. He believed that Party organisation and the 
campaign itself were both very good. Particular praise was 
reserved for the policy programme on which Labour had based its 
appeal; he described this programme as 'excellent - well thought 
out, moderate, practical and yet fully in tune with our 
Socialist convictions. 1(29) The obvious problem for the Party, 
though, was that improved organisation, an impressive campaign 
and a good programme had not prevented the Conservatives from 
increasing their majority in Parliament. In an effort to explain 
this, Gaitskell worked through the familiar argument that 
welfare reforms, low unemployment, the relative decline of heavy 
manual work and a general rise in living standards had all 
eroded Labour's traditional base of support. Labour had been 
guilty of assuming that millions of workers would instinctively 
support the Party; as a result, Labour had failed to make a 
'special conscious effort' to win over younger, newer and more 
affluent social groups. Gaitskell believed that the Party had to 
change the nature of its appeal if it was to avoid defeat at the 
next election, but the necessary changes largely involved 
presentation rather than policy. He rejected the 'desperate' 
proposals which had surfaced after the election that the Party 
should change its name, abandon the link with the trade unions 
or forge an alliance with the Liberals. Instead, he emphasised 
that after winning the battles of the first half of the 
twentieth century against mass unemployment, widepsread poverty 
and inadequate state welfare provision, Labour had to address 
the new challenges of the second half of the century; 
'We have to show ... that we are a modern mid-twentieth century 
party, looking to the future, not to the past ... Above all our 
object must be to broaden our base, to be in touch always 
with ordinary people, to avoid becoming small cliques of 
isolated doctrine-ridden fanatics, out of touch with the main 
stream of social life in our time. We should be missionaries, 
not monks, a mass party not a conspiratorial group. ' 
(30) 
Gaitskell's plea that the Party should address itself to the 
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concerns of ordinary voters and be less concerned with doctrinal 
purity prepared the way for the most important passage in his 
speech. The burden of this passage was simple; 'doctrine-ridden 
fanatics' supported a wide extension of public ownership, 
'ordinary people' did not. Gaitskell began his discussion of 
public ownership by repeating the findings of the NEC's reports 
on the election campaign, both of which argued that 
nationalisation was unpopular with voters. The main problem, in 
his view, was one of emphasis and presentation rather than 
policy or principle. He supported the extension of public 
ownership in certain circumstances, but he was concerned that 
nationalisation was seen by many as a finite socialist goal - 
the main economic objective of the Labour Party. This 
misunderstanding was largely caused by Clause Four of the Party 
constitution, the only clause which attempted to define the 
political aims of the Party. 
(31) Gaitskell told the Conference; 
'Standing. on its own [Clause Four] cannot be regarded as 
adequate. It lays us open to continual misrepresentation ... It 
implies that the only precise object we have is 
nationalisation, whereas in fact we have many other Socialist 
objectives. It implies that we propose to nationalise 
everything, but do we? Everything? - the whole of light 
industry, the whole of agriculture, all the shops - every 
little pub and garage? Of course not. 
(32) 
Gaitskell's belief that Clause Four was due for revision was 
based on sound logic but poor political judgement. In practice, 
Labour aimed to manage a mixed economy in which most capital was 
owned and controlled by private individuals and private 
companies; therefore, the constitutional commitment to the 
'common ownership of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange' was illogical. In the 1959 election campaign, 
Macmillan had cited Clause Four to support his claim that 
widespread nationalisation was the ultimate aim of Labour's 
(33) 
economic policy. Gaitskell was therefore correct when he 
argued that the commitment to common ownership left Party policy 
open to misrepresentation'. The damage caused by this 
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misrepresentation was illustrated by a survey conducted shortly 
after the election. When the informants were asked to say what 
would have pleased them least about a Labour victory in 1959,33 
per cent mentioned further nationalisation; the second most 
frequently mentioned single topic was higher taxation, but this 
was put forward by only 2 per cent of the sample. 
(34) Arguably, a 
peaceful and agreed revision of Clause Four would have been 
beneficial for Labour; it would have made it easier for the 
Party to convince the electorate that it did not support 
large-scale nationalisation, but was committed instead to the 
management of a mixed economy which embraced various forms of 
public ownership. 
However, the point which Gaitskell failed to appreciate in 
the wake of the election defeat was that a peaceful and agreed 
revision of Clause Four was highly improbable. His mistake was 
to embark on a struggle which he was unlikely to win. The 
commitment to common ownership had a deep, symbolic significance 
for many in the Party. It was as much a question of ethics as 
economics. Clause Four symbolised the Party's acceptance of 
communal values above individualism; it showed that Labour 
believed in the sharing of profit across the community rather 
than in the maximisation of profit for those with capital to 
invest. For a party that was considerably younger than its two 
main rivals, Clause Four provided Labour with a link back to its 
founding fathers and a distinct sense of identity in mainstream 
British politics. It became apparent immediately during the 
Blackpool Conference that an attack on this part of the 
constitution would be met with strong resistance. The Labour 
leader's speech was accompanied by hostile interruptions from 
the floor, Michael Foot responded with a stinging rebuke for 
Gaitskell, (35) and Frank Cousins warned that the trade unions 
would never support an attempt to revise Clause Four. 
(36) Tony 
Benn, described by the Daily Mail at this time as 'pro- 
Gaitskell', 
(37) 
criticised sharply the Party leader's performance 
at the Conference; 
'I agreed with most of [the speech] ... But it was a ghastly 
failure because it was constructed in quite the wrong way and 
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without regard to the needs of the Party. In effect he asked 
himself, "How much of what we once believed will the 
electorate now stomach? " The answer he produced was not 
surprisingly, "Very little. " But that is not the question you 
should ask. If he had said, "Here is the modern world full of 
causes for us to take up. Here is what we must do. Here are 
the changes we must make in ourselves to do them" the Party 
would have risen to him to a man. But he is quite incapable 
of inspiring people. ' 
(38) 
Gaitskell's authority as Party leader was badly damaged by 
his initiative on Clause Four. After Blackpool, the Daily Mail 
claimed that Wilson was leading a plot to fight Gaitskell on 
future policy. 
(39) The Shadow Chancellor denied the report, but 
he also predicted in private that the Labour leader would not 
last another two years in the post. 
(40) Tribune 
, 
called for 
Gaitskell's resignation in January 1960, 
(41) 
and 15 Labour 
parliamentary candidates decided that their leader required a 
(42) 
public declaration of support the following February. In May, 
Tony Crosland told Gaitskell that 'your own position is weaker, 
and you yourself more criticised, than at any time since you 
assumed the leadership'. 
(43) Morgan Phillips, who eventually 
helped to resolve the crisis over Clause Four, forecast in 
August 1960 that 'the Party won't get out of its difficulties as 
long as Gaitskell's there'. 
(44) 
By this time, the public perception of a Party that was once 
again embroiled in internal conflict was well established. The 
controversy itself was played out in a series of speeches and at 
a meeting of the NEC in March. Gaitskell was forced to retreat 
on his original objective of replacing Clause Four with a new 
statement of aims for the Party. Instead he was prepared to have 
both Clause Four and his new statement of aims included in the 
constitution. Gaitskell's new mission statement contained twelve 
points which included the rejection of racial discrimination, 
the right of all people to freedom and self-government, a pledge 
to work for world disarmament, a commitment to social justice 
and equality of opportunity, and the rejection of the 
(45) 
acquisitive values of capitalism. These aims were accepted by 
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the NEC with a number of amendments, including a more forceful 
expression of support for public ownership from Jennie Lee. 
Where Gaitskell had preferred to commit the Party to 'a 
substantial measure of common ownership in varying forms', Lee 
substituted the alternative objective of 'an expansion of common 
ownership substantial enough to give the community power over 
the commanding heights of the economy'. 
(46) Although it appeared 
that the issue had been settled by the compromise on the 
Executive, the trade union delegates on the NEC had voted to 
accept the amendment to the constitution without consulting 
their rank and file. Four of the largest unions - the miners, 
engineers, railwaymen and transport workers - voted against the 
amendment at their spring conferences. The result was a further 
retreat by Gaitskell. The new statement of objectives was 
eventually accepted by the 1960 Scarborough Conference as a 
'valuable expression of the aims of the Labour Party in the 
second half of the 20th Century' and not as an addition to the 
constitution. 
(47) 
Roy Jenkins described the result of the Clause Four 
controversy as an 'unsatisfactory draw'. 
(48) In fact, it was a 
defeat for the Party leader. Clause Four remained in place and 
the attempt to amend it led to months of unwelcome publicity for 
the symbolic commitment to large-scale public ownership. Perhaps 
in a reaction against Gaitskell's initiative, the Scarborough 
Conference reaffirmed its socialist credentials by supporting a 
resolution from the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers which confirmed the Party's belief in a socialist 
commonwealth founded on common ownership. The resolution also 
offered the Executive a long list of industries which would 
(49) 
'benefit' from nationalisation. In addition to provoking a 
high-profile defence of public ownership, Gaitskell also ensured 
that the Party was riven by mistrust and hostility. He admitted 
that he would not have raised the issue if he had foreseen the 
reaction it would cause. 
(50) To be sure, this reaction was not 
just a problem for the Party, it was also a serious problem for 
Gaitskell as leader. When the 1960 Conference supported a 
unilateralist defence motion against the wishes of the 
Executive, Gaitskell vowed that he would fight to overturn the 
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decision. His critics in the Party who had just fought off his 
attempt to amend the constitution were exasperated by this 
refusal to accept the will of Conference. The resentment against 
the leadership which had built up in the preceding months 
spilled over in the weeks after Scarborough. The Party reverted 
to the state of civil war which had characterised the early 
1950s and Harold Wilson launched the first formal challenge to 
Gaitskell's leadership. 
The leadership contest between Gaitskell and Wilson in 1960 
confirmed the depth of the crisis which the Party had created 
for itself since its election defeat the previous year. It was 
an unnecessary and damaging event which lent credence to 
Dalton's occasional description of the Party as a 'suicide 
club j. 
(51) In his memoirs, Wilson argued that his challenge was 
motivated by a desire to restore Party unity. In his view, the 
Clause Four episode showed that the Party was being administered 
by a 'coterie' in Hampstead. 'It was that fact more than any 
pressure from parliamentary colleagues which persuaded me that I 
had to stand against Hugh in the next convenient annual PLP 
election for the Party Leader. ' 
(52) However, Ben Pimlott has 
shown in some detail that Wilson was pushed reluctantly into a 
contest by his former Bevanite colleagues once it was clear that 
Gaitskell was likely to be defeated in the defence debate at the 
1960 Conference. (53) Indeed, it was only after Anthony Greenwood 
had announced his own candidacy for the leadership, following 
Gaitskell's pledge to overturn the Scarborough defence vote, 
that Wilson decided to commit himself. He recognised that a 
refusal to stand could have led to a charge of cowardice against 
him -a charge which would have threatened his chances in a 
future contest either for the deputy leadership or for the 
senior post if Gaitskell was forced out. 
Wilson had expected a 'mucky' contest against Gaitskell, but 
in public at least their battle was conducted with a degree of 
restraint. 
(54) In private, however, there was no disguising the 
strength of feeling in either camp. Gaitskell's allies believed 
that Wilson had acted dishonourably by challenging the Party 
leader at a time when he was most vulnerable, particularly when 
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they knew that only minor differences separated the two 
candidates on defence policy. Bill Rodgers, who at the time was 
closely involved in the campaign to support Gaitskell, recalled 
that his colleagues shared his view that Wilson's challenge was 
the product of political calculation rather than principle: 'We 
never really trusted Harold Wilson. On policy fundamentally 
Wilson didn't seem to be that much different from Hugh 
Gaitskell, but he was always getting himself into a position 
where he seemed to be an opponent. And so we thought he was 
opportunistic. 
(55) 
On the other side, though, some of Wilson's 
supporters had genuine doubts about Gaitskell's ability to lead 
Labour effectively. Tony Benn agonised over his decision to back 
Wilson, but he eventually decided that Gaitskell's performance 
since the election had damaged Labour's future prospects. Benn 
believed that Gaitskell and his supporters were seeking to 
exploit a test of strength against their critics in order to 
justify planned expulsions from the Party. In a letter to 
Crosland, Benn argued that the long-term future of the Labour 
leader was in serious doubt, even though he could expect to win 
comfortably in the fight against Wilson; 
'I know you believe in the necessity for a paroxysmic crisis 
in the Party, out of which you hope a new political grouping 
will come. Certainly, you are in a position to precipitate 
such a crisis, but, in the process of doing so, you will be 
destroying the electoral prospects of the Party and making 
modernisation totally impossible ... It's no good winning the 
argument. You've got to win the hearts of the Party - 
whatever sort of party you have. And if you really dislike 
and distrust a very large part of your party, you can never 
lead it ... I know a 
lot of MPs who are voting for Gaitskell 
who have told me quite frankly that they don't believe it is 
possible for him to last. ' 
(56) 
On the day of the contest, the emotion felt by members of the 
PLP spilled over into the Chamber of the House of Commons. Tony 
Benn recorded in his diary; 'At 2.30 the House met and for an 
hour the Labour Party was in public shambles: Members denounced 
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each other ... We cannot survive as a united Party if this goes on 
for more than a week or two. ' 
(57) Both candidates could draw some 
satisfaction from the ballot of the PLP. Gaitskell won a 
decisive victory by 166 votes to 81, but Wilson had persuaded 
almost one-third of his parliamentary colleagues to support his 
challenge. The result confirmed Gaitskell's authority in the PLP 
and it established Wilson as his main rival, but the Party as a 
whole gained little from the contest. Gaitskell's leadership 
style remained unchanged and the campaign against the 
Scarborough defence vote continued - it was eventually 
overturned at the 1961 Blackpool Conference. After a public row 
over Clause Four, the Party had walked into another high-profile 
controversy over defence and the conduct of the leadership. It 
was no surprise, therefore, that Labour's share of the vote 
decreased in all 11 by-elections that were fought in 1960, a run 
of poor performances which included the loss of the marginal 
Brighouse and Spenborough seat. 
(58) 
Labour supporters were entitled to question why the Party 
created such difficulties for itself. The answer lay in the 
tribal divisions between left and right and the fears which they 
shared about Labour's future. Most of the protagonists in the 
disputes of 1960 were veterans of the battles which had taken 
place in the Party since 1951. Former Bevanites did not forget 
that Gaitskell had been their most forceful opponent in the 
early 1950s and they never fully trusted him as leader. After 
the 1959 election they believed that Gaitskell was leading the 
Party in the wrong direction - away from its doctrinal 
inheritance and towards another defeat by the Conservatives. In 
their view, his clumsy attempt to amend Clause Four and his 
pledge to fight a Conference decision on defence confirmed their 
doubts about his ability to lead a united Party. As a result, he 
had to be removed from his post to safeguard Labour's future. 
Crossman was convinced that Gaitskell was responsible for the 
turmoil in the Party at the end of 1960; 
'the issue in the Labour Party is not basically a defence 
issue at all but a crisis of confidence in the leadership 
created by Gaitskell's and Crosland's Revisionism. It was 
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only when he failed to push his Revisionism through that he 
chose to pick a quarrel on defence ... the Party loyalists 
spend their time telling one how terrible Hugh is, and there 
can be little doubt that George Brown, his new Deputy Leader, 
is mainly concerned to dig his grave even faster than Hugh is 
digging it for himself. It is an odious atmosphere, which of 
course stinks not only to high heaven but down into the 
electorate, and it is astounding to me that we are still 
retaining, as we are, the main structure of the Party 
intact. ' (59) 
Gaitskell shared his opponents' fears about Labour's future, 
but he differed from them in his analysis of the Party's main 
weakness. He believed that Labour appeared to be committed to 
untenable positions on major issues of policy - full-scale 
nationalisation as set out in Clause Four, and unilateral 
nuclear disarmament after Scarborough. In his view, the first 
was a misrepresentation of specific policy, the second was wrong 
in principle and both were unpopular with the electorate. 
Gaitskell had argued that if Labour's position on public 
ownership was not clarified, a disastrous fourth consecutive 
defeat beckoned. He was even more forthright on unilateralism, 
defining his pledge to challenge the defence vote as a mission 
to rescue the Party. His speech at Scarborough contained perhaps 
the most memorable peroration of his carEer; 'There are some of 
us, Mr. Chairman, who will fight and fight and fight again to 
save the Party we love. ' 
(60) 
The crises of 1960, therefore, should be set against the 
background of uncertainty about Labour's future which built up 
after the 1959 election. They were the most visible symptom of 
the pessimism which infected the Party at this time and which 
clouded the judgement of the leadership in particular. The 
Conservatives' return to power in 1959 produced speculation 
about Labour's future as a party of government in Britain. 
Serious doubts were expressed about its ability to win a future 
election without first undertaking a process of fundamental 
self-reform. This pessim%sliL appraisal of Labour's political 
fortunes had a strong influence on the nature of the disputes in 
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1960. Arguments about policy or about the constitution assumed a 
much wider significance at this time because the participants 
saw them as part of a battle for Labour's survival. 
The mood was set by a series of articles in Socialist 
Commentary which analysed the causes of the Party's successive 
election defeats. The articles were written by Mark Abrams and 
were based on a detailed survey of over 700 informants who were 
questioned about their political views. Abrams used his findings 
to argue that the Party relied too heavily on supporters who 
considered themselves to be working class. The danger of this 
reliance was that Labour's traditional working class base was 
shrinking as a result of rising living standards and structural 
changes in the economy; 
'The image of the Labour Party, held both by its supporters 
and its non-supporters, is one which is increasingly obsolete 
in terms of contemporary Britain. Both groups see Labour as 
indentified with the working class - especially the poor and 
the labouring working class; and at the same time, many 
workers, irrespective of their politics, no longer regard 
themselves as working class. Conversely, the electorate sees 
the Conservative Party as the Party of middle class people 
and young people, the party that attracts men and women with 
realistic ideals, and which offers prosperity to all and 
opportunities to the ambitious. ' 
(61) 
An editorial which drew conclusions from the survey was equally 
pessimistic. 'A new epoch has been entered, in which the 
policies Labour has stood for are losing support ... 
People appear 
concerned chiefly with their own ambitions ... they set 
high store 
on possessing a house of their own - and, once possessed, they 
shift noticeably into the Conservative camp'. 
(62) Subsequent 
research discredited the 'embourgeoisement' thesis - the idea 
that working class Labour voters aspired to middle class values 
as they became more prosperous and consequently abandoned the 
Labour Party. 
(63) But in the aftermath of the 1959 election, the 
argument that Labour's traditional base of support was being 
eroded was largely accepted by Gaitskell and his allies and this 
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strengthened their belief that the Party required urgent reform. 
Peter Shore, the head of Labour's Research Department, recalled 
the impact which the survey for Socialist Commentary had on the 
leadership: 'We had Mark Abrams producing all kinds of 
depressing analyses. This greatly infected Hugh Gaitskell's 
thinking in that period. Generally, the right-wing intellectuals 
in the Party really were rather defeatist'. 
(64) 
This defeatism contributed to the formation of a right-wing 
pressure group within the Party - the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism (CDS). The formation of this group was the product of 
a number of different factors, but ultimately it was based on a 
flawed analysis of Labour's future. CDS was formed to rescue the 
life of a party that was in no danger. It was arguably the 
clearest symbol of the panic which gripped the Party temporarily 
after 1959. Bill Rodgers, the chief organiser of CDS, confirmed 
that the overall objective of CDS was to rescue the Labour 
Party; 'we believed that the Party could be saved from itself 
and Hugh Gaitskell offered the best prospect of saving 
it'. (65) As a result of this mission, CDS became associated 
closely with the maintenance of Gaitskell's authority in the 
Party. In order to achieve this and to counter what they 
believed was a resurgence of the Left after 1959, CDS was 
prepared to risk the accusation that they were a 'party within 
the Party' - the same charge that had been used successfully 
against the Bevanites a decade before. 
The origins of CDS can be found in the public declaration of 
support for Gaitskell by 15 Labour parliamentary candidates in 
February 1960. Several of the signatories to this declaration 
went on to support CDS - including Merlyn Rees, Dick Taverne and 
Shirley Williams. 
(66) More importantly, the declaration was 
organised by Bill Rodgers, who, together with Denis Howell and 
Frank Pickstock, launched CDS with the 'Victory for Sanity' 
manifesto in October 1960. 
(67) The launch was timed to coincide 
with the success of the unilateralist resolution at Scarborough, 
the reversal of which was the first short-term objective of CDS 
- in their viewy unless the resolution was overturned within a 
year, Gaitskell could not have remained as leader. 
(68) With the 
counter attack on unilateralism ready to begin, the 'Victory for 
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Sanity' manifesto set out the three long-term objectives of CDS: 
the marginalisation of the Left, the reassertion of the 
authority of the PLP leadership and the acceptance of 
Croslandite revisionism. The content of the manifesto contained 
few surprises - after all, Crosland was one of its main authors 
- but the tone was perhaps more strident than might have been 
expected. CDS fought a hard campaign, but arguably they fought 
without recognising that a war against members of their own 
Party might damage the Labour movement as a whole. Their 
manifesto stated; 
'This is the culmination of a long period in which the voice 
of moderate opinion in the Labour Party has been drowned by 
the clamour of an active and articulate minority. As 
socialists who are loyal to its central tradition yet aware 
of the changed conditions of the 19609, we seek to reassert 
the views of the great mass of Labour supporters against 
those of doctrinaire pressure-groups ... the party must be seen 
to represent all sections of society, and it must be made 
absolutely clear that no one has the power to instruct, 
control or dictate to the Parliamentary Labour Party. ' 
(69) 
Rodgers believed that this crusade was justified by the 
Party's need to reform itself in order to survive. The model for 
reform which he and others referred to at this time was the 
German Social Democratic Party, which had formally renounced its 
Marxist inheritance in favour of social democracy at its 
Godesberg congress in 1958. He recalled: 'I and my friends at 
that time felt strongly that the Labour Party had to go through 
a cathartic experience. It had to demonstrate to the world that 
it was a democratic socialist party if it was really to go 
forward-The failure to do what the SPD did in Germany, to have 
its Godesberg, was an albatross round its neck, even though 
Labour won in 1964 and won again in 1974. ' 
(70) Dick Taverne, who 
became CDS Treasurer, recalled a similar motivation behind his 
commitment to the organisation: 'There was a group of us who 
were very worried about the direction in which the Labour Party 
was going, because it appeared to be moving into a mood where it 
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was to become a sort of Marxist Party. It seemed to me at the 
time that the direction in which we should go was much the same 
as the German Social Democrats ... We weren't motivated primarily 
by loyalty to a leader, it was the future of the Party that 
mattered. ' 
(71) 
Taverne and others were dismayed by Gaitskell's 
compromise over Clause Four because it represented a failure to 
break the symbolic association of Labour with state 
(72) 
ownership. However, they were prepared to continue with CDS 
because they believed that other important battles had to be 
fought. 
Planning and fighting battles was the central purpose of CDS. 
Tony Crosland recognised this when he described his colleagues 
in the group as 'apparatchiks'. 
(73) They did not aim to generate 
ideas or initiatives on policy, instead their speciality was 
organisation against their opponents within the Party. At its 
height, CDS had 260 'whips' who co-ordinated support in local 
parties and trade unions. It also had a permanent central office 
in London, considerable funds and a regular publication, 
Campaign, to counter the influence of Tribune. 
(74) Initially, the 
group took up Gaitskell's challenge to fight the Conference 
endorsement of unilateralism. This meant persuading the trade 
union executives who controlled the block vote to support the 
Party leadership's defence policy at the 1961 Blackpool 
Conference. CDS workers wrote speeches for delegates at union 
conferences, they approached senior union officials individually 
and they produced briefing material which supported Gaitakell's 
position. 
(75) After the defence issue was resolved to their 
satisfaction in 1961, CDS turned their attention to candidate 
selection in local parties. Contacts were made with regional 
organisers and lists were compiled where possible of CDS 
supporters in constituency parties. Bernard Donoughue, a CDS 
organiser, explained how the battle over candidate selection was 
fought; 
'In the summer of 1964, the MP for Finsbury died and I was 
telephoned by a friend, a left-wing journalist, and told that 
I must watch out, that there had been a meeting of key 
left-wing people and they had decided to capture Finsbury ... 
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I contacted one or two friends and the list of CDS people in 
Finsbury including the Post Office and Telegraph Union people 
and they organised very actively. It emerged that the Left, 
despite its incompetence, had their candidate and had 27 
potential votes. CDS campaigned in the constituency and we 
won by 31 to 27.1 
(76) 
The activities of CDS caught the attention of Morgan Phillips 
and Sara Barker, the National Agent - the Party officials who 
monitored possible infringements of Labour's internal rules. 
Despite their interest, CDS was neither outlawed nor declared a 
'party within the Party' as the Bevanites had been in the early 
1950s. Bill Rodgers maintained that in contrast to the 
Bevanites, CDS was a legitimate organisation because it worked 
in the open and not in secret. When Phillips indicated that the 
NEC might investigate CDS, Rodgers told him that the Executive 
could have access to all of the group's papers; 'We were far too 
clever. Everything we did, I was prepared to see the light of 
day. Even the things which were most confidential were written 
in such a way that there was never any question about our 
loyalty to the Party as a whole ... it was all above board. ' 
(77) 
Obviously, CDS was helped by its association with the Party 
leader, who gave the group his 'distant blessing'. 
(78) According 
to Dick Taverne, Sara Barker also eventually became a 'staunch 
supporter' of CDS. 
(79) In addition, the group attracted the 
support of elder statesmen in the Party like Attlee and Dalton, 
and the March 1961 edition of the monthly CDS broadsheet, 
Campaign, carried a pledge of support from 45 members of the 
PLP. (80) It was probably these connections with the Party 
hierarchy which safeguarded CDS from thorough investigation or 
disciplinary action by the NEC. 
Although CDS was well organised, with support in the PLP, the 
trade unions and local Parties, the degree of success it enjoyed 
was minimal. Patrick Seyd, who wrote an early study of the 
group, argued that the Scarborough defence vote would have been 
reversed even without the work of CDS, because trade union 
leaders were concerned about the long-term implications for the 
Party if it continued to endorse a policy of unilateralism. 
(81) 
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The group's influence over the selection of parliamentary 
candidates was also unremarkable, not least because of the slow 
rate at which vacancies occurred in seats where Labour stood a 
chance of victory. Finally, although CDS was inspired by John 
Kennedy's commitment to efficiency and drive as President of the 
United States after 1960, it failed to contribute significantly 
to the modernisation of Labour's organisation before 1964. On 
balance, therefore, it seems that a good deal of effort and 
money was wasted on CDS between its formation in 1960 and its 
disbandment after the 1964 election. Its main significance in 
the context of this study is the way in which it heightened 
mistrust in Labour's ranks after Scarborough. It also 
illustrated graphically the fear which some felt about the 
future of the Party. 
Ironically, the civil war which CDS helped to sustain in the 
Party coincided with an improvement in Labour's political 
fortunes from 1961 onwards. Labour was fortunate that its inept 
performance in the country at this time was at least better than 
that of the Government. Macmillan's administration, which had 
once seemed so assured, stumbled from one crisis to another in 
the early 1960s. The root of its difficulties was the economy. 
In a mirror image of the way in which confidence in the economy 
had helped to produce the Conservative victories of 1955 and 
1959, anxiety about the economy helped to produce the 
Conservative defeat of 1964. In the early 1960s, the Government 
struggled to cope with four related economic problems: sluggish 
growth, rising prices, a balance of payments deficit and 
pressure on sterling. High levels of consumer spending in the 
late 1950s had left an awkward legacy for Britain. Consumers had 
often used easily available credit to buy imported manufactured 
goods - this pushed Britain's current account further into the 
red and caused a loss of gold and dollar reserves. Although this 
problem was evident in 1960, Macmillan believed that immediate 
remedial action would bring into disrepute the tax cuts and 
optimistic forecasts which his Government had made before the 
(82) 
1959 election. As a result, the first serious attempt to 
reduce demand in the economy was delayed until July 1961, when 
an emergency budget increased the Bank Rate and introduced a 
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'pay pause' for public sector workers. Teachers, nurses and 
other state employees were unhappy about the policy on wage 
increases, while borrowers stood to lose as a result of higher 
interest rates. In the month after this budget, Labour overtook 
the Conservatives in the Gallup Poll for the first time since 
March 1959 - the Conservatives did not regain a stable lead in 
the Gallup poll until February 1965. 
(83) 
Britain's economy continued to grow after 1960, but the 
growth rates of its main competitors were markedly more 
impressive. As Britain's relative decline became more apparent, 
Macmillan tried and failed to find a cure for the country's 
economic weakness. In August 1961, the Government formally 
applied for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
There were a number of factors which influenced the decision to 
apply, but among the most important was the impressive economic 
growth of the six founder members. In the same month as the 
application, the Government also appeared to abandon its 
long-held suspicion of state planning. The Chancellor met 
leading employers and trade union officials to discuss the 
creation of a tripartite body to oversee economic planning - the 
result was the formation of the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC) in February 1962. Neither of these measures, 
though, helped to revive the Conservative Party's flagging 
political fortunes. The application to join the EEC caused a 
split in Tory ranks and ended in the humiliation of de Gaulle's 
veto at the start of 1963. Meanwhile, the NEDC, which was not 
designed to produce an immediate improvement in Britain's 
economic performance, failed to capture the imagination of the 
public. The scale of the Conservatives' unpopularity at this 
time was signalled by a sequence of poor performances in 
by-elections. A week after the inaugural meeting of the NEDC in 
March 1962, the Conservatives lost one of their safest seats to 
the Liberals in the Orpington by-election. At the time it was 
the largest by-election swing in British political history: 
compared with the 1959 general election, the Liberals more than 
doubled their share of the vote from 21 per cent to 53 per cent 
while the Conservative share dropped from 57 per cent to 35 per 
cent. 
(84) This was followed in June by Labour's first by-election 
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gain since the 1959 election at Middlesbf-cv&H West. 
(85) 
After 
the Liberals pushed the Tories into third place in the Leicester 
North East by-election in July, Macmillan decide-d that drastic 
action was required. 
(86) 
The Cabinet reshuffle of July 1962 was a political manoeuvre 
on the grand scale. Seven Cabinet Ministers were dismissed in a 
move which The Times saw as an indication of the electoral 
crisis in which the Government found itself. 
(87) Macmillan had 
hoped to revitalise his Cabinet with new talent, but his 
reshuffle looked dangerously like a panic decision. The Prime 
Minister's image of calm authority, which Gaitskell had been 
unable to disturb before 1959, was lost forever. Meanwhile, the 
Government's electoral disappointments continued. In November 
1962 Labour gained Dorset South and Glasgow Woodside from the 
Conservatives. Labour also came very close to gaining Norfolk 
Central, where the Conservative share of the poll fell by 12.6 
per cent. 
(88) By the end of the year, Labour's lead in the Gallup 
poll had climbed to 7.5 per cent. 
(89) Without having undertaken 
any of the internal reforms which had been proposed in the Party 
since 1959, Labour appeared to be back on the road to power. 
Although Labour's recovery from the crises of 1960 and 1961 
was largely a product of Conservative failure, the Party also 
helped itself by gradually re-establishing unity from the 1961 
Blackpool Conference onwards. A new domestic policy statement, 
Signposts for the Sixties, assisted this process. The document 
was broadly acceptable to both wings of the Party because it 
combined the language of social equality with the language of 
state planning - the actual policies, though, were largely 
(90) 
unchanged from the 1959 programme. The leader of the 
transport workers' union protested about the lack of specific 
commitments to public ownership, but Conference accepted the 
policy statement by a large majority. Crossman, in his closing 
remarks as chairman at Blackpool, made his contribution to Party 
unity by declaring that the leadership issue had now been 
settled 'once for all'. 
(91) 
Relations in the Party continued to improve throughout 1962 
as Labour built on its lead in the opinion polls. Gaitskell 
rallied support for his leadership with a principled and 
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sustained attack on the Government's Commonwealth Immigrants 
Bill, a measure which aimed to restrict the entry of Indians and 
West Indians into Britain. The leader's rehabilitation in the 
eyes of his former critics was carried a stage further at the 
Brighton Conference in 1962, when he dismayed many of his 
closest allies by opposing Britain's entry into the EEC on the 
grounds that the terms which the Government had negotiated were 
unacceptable. Gaitskell's stance on the European issue was a 
severe disappointment to the leading members of CDS, most of 
whom believed that Britain should join the Community. Crosland, 
Jenkins and Rodgers went to see Gaitskell on the night before 
his Conference speech in an attempt to persuade him of the 
European case. Rodgers recalled: 'We were led to believe that 
although [Gaitskell's speech] would not be comfortable for us, 
it would not be as extreme as it turned out to be. It was a sad 
experience for all of us who had launched the [Victory for 
Sanity] manifesto. ' 
(92) Dick Taverne reacted similarly to the 
speech: 'It was a bitter disappointment. When he died there was 
a certain amount of bad blood between several people in CDS and 
Hugh Gaitskell. ' (93) The Left, in contrast, took heart from 
Gaitskell's opposition to Britain's entry into the EEC. Tribune 
described the events at Brighton as 'A great week for democracy 
and socialism. 
(94) A bulletin produced by writers on the New 
Left Review for the Conference was similarly optimistic. 'So far 
as an election is concerned, the party is now, as never in 
recent years, a united and confident Party. It is united because 
the Party Leader has at last discharged his function in speaking 
for its vast majority. As a matter of practical politics, there 
is not now a question of the Leadership. 1(95) Although the 
European issue was a potential source of division in the Party, 
de Gaulle's veto at least ruled out the immediate prospect of a 
split to rival the controversies over Clause Four and 
unilateralism. By the end of 1962, Labour was more united than 
at any time since the Hampstead Set had mishandled their attempt 
to reform the Party in 1959. 
When Hugh Gaitskell died from a rare immunological disease in 
January 1963, Labour appeared to be well placed to win the 
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general election which was expected in 1964. The Party had a 
strong lead in the opinion pollsy morale was high after 
by-election success, and Government misfortune and mismanagement 
combined to make the Conservatives increasingly unpopular. After 
winning his battle on defence policy and largely uniting the 
Party over Europe, Gaitskell was seen as a Prime Minister 
in-waiting. The loss which many in the Party and the country 
felt at his death was heightened by a sense of frustration that 
a national leader had been denied his rightful inheritance. 
Labour made great progress during the seven years in which 
Gaitskell led the Party, even though his judgement faltered 
temporarily after the 1959 election. Organisation, policy and 
the presentation of policy all improved under Gaitskell - his 
legacy was a Party that was fully equipped to take advantage of 
Conservative misfortune in a General Election. Although it was 
natural for the press to be generous in its assessment of a 
political career that was cut short in its prime, the tributes 
that were paid to Gaitskell were sincere in their view that 
Labour had lost an extraordinary statesman. The Observer argued 
that Gaitskell's death represented a disaster for the Party, 
because his role in Labour's political recovery had been so 
crucial; 
'in writing the epitaph of Hugh Gaitskell it is difficult to 
avoid writing, also, the epitaph of the Labour Party he loved 
- so commanding a figure had he become. The immediate effect 
of his death is bound to be to reduce the Labour Party's 
political effectiveness and electoral appeal ... Gaitskell's 
death has not only robbed Labour of the chance of victory but 
probably means the end of the party in its present form. ' 
(96) 
The Times was less pessimistic about Labour's future, but it 
believed strongly that Gaitskell would prove a difficult leader 
to replace. Its leader writer's assessment of the potential 
successors was downbeat: 'There is no active Labour politician 
whose present standing in the country approaches that acquired 
by Mr Gaitskell. ' 
(97) 
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It was no surprise that this view was shared by Gaitskell's 
disciples in CDS, for whom the pain of bereavement was 
particularly acute. All of the group had lost an inspirational 
leader, some had lost a close friend, too. The main candidates 
for the vacant leadership were George Brown, deputy leader since 
November 1960, and Harold Wilson, Shadow Foreign Secretary since 
November 1961. Many in CDS were uninspired by this choice. In 
their view, the prospect of a contest between Brown and Wilson 
simply reinforced the scale of the tragedy which Gaitskell's 
death represented. Wilson, according to Rodgers, was seen by CDS 
as 'a bit shifty and shabby'. 
(98) They saw him as opportunistic 
and untrustworthy and they had not forgiven his challenge to 
Gaitskell in 1960. Brown, to use Taverne's phrase, had 'certain 
weaknesses'. 
(99) He was a politician who failed to exploit his 
natural gifts to the full. He was passionate but dangerously 
volatile; he had a fine intellect, but his judgement was 
sometimes clouded by alcohol. Christopher Mayhew, who discussed 
ways of defeating Wilson at a CDS meeting, described the two 
main candidates for the leadership as a 'crook and a 
drunk'. (100) As a result, members of CDS persuaded James 
Callaghan to enter the contest as an alternative to Brown and 
Wilson. 
Wilson and his supporters were 'overjoyed' at Callaghan's 
decision to stand because they knew that he was likely to take 
votes away from Brown. 
(101) Both Callaghan and Brown appealed to 
the broad right wing of the Party, whereas Wilson knew from his 
previous challenges for the leadership and deputy leadership 
that he could rely on exclusive support from Labour's broad left 
wing. According to Ben Pimlott, Wilson's campaign in 1963 was 
conducted with a 'scientific precision' which had never been 
seen before in such a contest. 
(102) Wilson and his lieutenants 
compiled lists of potential supporters who were then categorised 
according to ideology, social group or region. This enabled 
members of Wilson's team to identify waverers and to reassure 
them about their candidate's credentials for the leadership. The 
result of this detailed work, combined with a clumsy campaign by 
Brown and the intervention of Callaghan, was a lead for Wilson 
on the first ballot of the PLP on 7 February. He polled 115 
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votes, compared with 88 for Brown and 41 for Callaghan. 
(103) 
After Callaghan withdrew from the contest, Wilson defeated Brown 
comfortably on the second ballot by 144 votes to 103. 
(104) 
Wilson's victory was due in part to his exceptional political 
talents. He was arguably the Party's most effective debater in 
the House of Commons, he had demonstrated his administrative 
abilities in Attlee's Cabinet and his intellect was as sharp as 
any in the PLP. Perhaps his main asset in February 1963, though, 
was George Brown's volatile temperament, which a majority in the 
PLP believed disqualified him from the leadership. Wilson often 
faced charges that he was cold, calculating and devious, but at 
least his colleagues knew that he would not embarass the Party 
with the type of public outburst to which Brown was prone. With 
the Tories trailing in the opinion polls, Labour could not 
afford to risk the selection of a leader whose lack of 
self-discipline might distract attention from the Government's 
difficulties. Wilson, therefore, succeeded Gaitskell partly by 
default. His second piece of good fortune was to take over as 
leader at a time when Labour appeared to be back on the road to 
power. As The Times pointed out on the day after the second 
ballot; 'Mr Wilson embarks under favourable omens. He inherits a 
party which is in good shape, having been laboriously rescued 
from irrelevance and schism by his predecessor, and with 
excellent prospects of winning power at the next general 
election'. 
(105) 
Labour's new leader took his Party towards victory by 
building on the foundations which had been laid during 
Gaitskell's years in charge. The most important of these 
foundations was Labour's domestic policy programme. Shortly 
after his victory on the second ballot Wilson told the editor of 
the Daily Herald that there would be no major changes to this 
programme before the next election. He was content to use the 
policies which had been set out in Signposts for the Sixties. As 
the Daily Herald told its readers, on policy 'Harold Wilson will 
hold the Gaitskell line'. 
(106) A year later this theme was 
restated when Wilson told radio listeners that he had differed 
with his predecessor mainly over Party management rather than 
policy. 
(107) To be sure, Wilson needed to highlight the common 
155 
ground he shared with Gaitskell to reassure voters that his 
left-wing reputation was largely undeserved, but his claim that 
there was continuity in policy after his succession had real 
substance: it was not simply a statement for public consumption, 
it was a statement of fact. After all, Wilson had made a major 
contribution to the formation of the domestic programme during 
his years of service on the NEC and the Home Policy Committee. 
As leader, there was little reason for him to abandon policies 
which he had helped to shape in the first instance. And as 
Crossman recognised in March 1963, the programme did not require 
alteration because, 'the Labour Party had quite radical policies 
on every topic under the sun'. 
(108) 
In his first period as opposition leader, therefore, Wilson 
altered the presentation and interpretation of Labour's 
programme rather than its content. Whereas Gaitskell had placed 
equality and social justice at the top of the Party's agenda, 
Wilson preferred to emphasise the commitment to economic growth, 
modernisation and efficiency which had appeared both in the 1959 
manifesto and in Signposts for the Sixties. This reordering of 
priorities was politically astute. First, it enabled Wilson to 
steer a middle course between the revisionist commitment to 
social equality and the left-wing commitment to more public 
ownership, thereby maintaining Party unity. Secondly, it enabled 
Labour to present itself as an up-to-date, dynamic party in an 
era of automation, atomic power and space exploration. The new 
Labour leader offered a combination of the Soviet Union's 
economic planning - which appeared to produce impressive results 
- and the political talents and vigour of Kennedy's team in the 
United States of America. The skill with which Wilson identified 
his Party with scientific and technological advance is a 
familiar feature of the historiography of British politics in 
this period. 
(109) Similarly, his vision of a social revolution in 
which talent and merit would be recognised above social 
background is well known. The issue which needs to be considered 
in the context of this study, though, is whether Wilson's 
reinterpretation of policy made a significant impact on the 
electorate in the approach to the 1964 General Election. 
This is a difficult issue to resolve with any degree of 
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certainty, but the Gallup Polls and the 1964 election results 
provide some useful clues. There is no doubt that Labour's lead 
in the opinion polls increased temporarily under Wilson, but 
arguably this owed much to the 'honeymoon period' which new 
political leaders usually enjoy. When Gaitskell died, Labour's 
lead in the Gallup Poll had been 11.5 per cent, under Wilson the 
gap widened to 15.5 per cent. By July 1963, though, the Party's 
lead over the Conservatives began to slip back to the levels 
which had been recorded at the end of 1962. 
(110) Significantly, 
Labour's advantage in the Gallup Poll continued to fall after 
the 1963 Conference, during which Wilson set out his vision of a 
new Britain forged in the 'white heat' of the scientific 
revolution. 
(111) According to Gallup, therefore, Wilson's 
emphasis on growth and his association of socialism with the 
planning of science did not increase support for the Party in 
the country. If his vision was to make an impact, it was most 
likely to occur in the months after the 1963 Conference or in 
the weeks before the 1964 election - at both times, though, the 
Conservatives closed the gap on Labour. Wilson's speech on the 
new Britain was warmly received by delegates, it helped to 
increase morale in the Party and it drew praise from the 
national press, but its electoral impact was not significant. 
The results of the 1964 election support this conclusion: as 
will be shown, Labour's share of the vote in this contest 
increased only slightly from 1959 while its aggregate vote 
showed a small decline. 
As well as inheriting an opinion poll lead over the Tories 
when he succeeded Gaitskell, Wilson also enjoyed the advantage 
of operating in the most favourable political climate for his 
Party since 1947. First, the economic news helped Labour. During 
the month in which Wilson won the Party leadership unemployment 
reached its highest level since the 1940s. Second, the 
Conservative Party continued to create problems for itself. 
Stories which combined sex, Tory politicians and national 
security dominated the headlines and were exploited to the full 
by a new generation of political satirists. The effect was to 
make the Government appear incompetent, accident prone and 
faintly ridiculous. Shortly after the Conservatives had begun to 
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recover from the Vassall affair in 1962 - when Ministers were 
falsely accused of protecting a homosexual Admiralty clerk who 
had been blackmailed into spying - the Profumo scandal broke, 
providing further ammunition for the Government's critics. In 
retrospect, the Profumo episode was a sad affair which involved 
no breach of national security. But at the time it was seen as a 
symbol of the degeneracy and decline which some believed had 
taken hold in the country under the Tories. In June 1963 John 
Profumo resigned as Secretary of State for War because he had 
lied to the House Of Commons about his relationship with 
Christine Keeler -a model who had been involved in a close 
relationship with a Soviet diplomat at the same time as she was 
seeing Profumo. The cast list in this drama also included 
Stephen Ward, an London osteopath whose interest in Anglo-Soviet 
relations had already attracted the attentions of M15. 
Macmillan, who had been aware of rumours about this case for 
months, was criticised for failing to act before the episode 
became a public scandal. Wilson, in contrast, handled the affair 
with delicate but devastating skill. His tactic was to 
concentrate on the security issues raised by the affair and to 
avoid being seen to exploit the allegations against Profumo for 
party political purposes. 
By adopting a position of cool but concerned detachment, 
Wilson ensured that his Party came out of the Profumo affair 
with its hands clean and with maximum political advantage. 
Meanwhile, Macmillan looked like a Prime Minister who was old 
and tired and who had lost his political judgement. His 
carefully refined portrayal of an Edwardian, gentleman 
politician seemed almost embarrassingly out of date against 
Wilson's equally refined portrayal of a professional, classless, 
down-to-earth meritocrat from Huddersfield who was excited by 
the potential of the scientific revolution. As ridicule was 
heaped upon the Prime Minister - led by the satirical television 
programme That Was The Week That Was and the magazine Private 
Eye - speculation intensified that he would resign in the wake 
of the Profumo affair. 
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But if Macmillan's Conservative critics had hoped to replace him 
with a more dynamic leader who could match the political skills 
of Wilson, they were soon disappointed. When it was announced in 
October 1963 that the Prime Minister had retired because of ill 
health, the aristocratic Lord Home emerged as his successor - 
not because of any outstanding ability, but because he was the 
canididate with the fewest enemies in the senior ranks of the 
Conservative Party- (112) His elevation to the Premiership without 
an open contest reinforced the impression that the Tories were 
trapped in a bygone age. Wilson poured scorn on a Prime Minister 
who used matchsticks to help solve economic problems. Home, who 
soon renounced his peerage to become Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was 
also an easy target for the satirists. David Frost, the 
presenter of That Was The Week That Was, dismissed the new Tory 
leader with contempt as he joked; 'And so there is the choice 
for the electorate - on the one hand Lord Home and on the other 
Mr Harold Wilson: Dull Alec versus Smart-Alec'. 
(113) 
Labour's preparations for a general election - which was due 
before the end of 1964 - were already in progress when 
Douglas-Home succeeded Macmillan. In October 1961 the NEC had 
formed a nine-member campaign committee to oversee pre-election 
strategy: the committee rallied morale in the constituency 
parties, channelled funds to marginals and organised a 'Festival 
of Labour' in June 1962 which attracted a crowd of more than 
100,000 to Battersea Park in London. 
(114) Drawing on a technique 
which the Tories had used in 1959, the committee also recruited 
a team of advertising artists and copywriters to help with 
public relations in 1962. This team used data from social 
surveys to select the most appropriate issues for posters and 
advertising and to monitor public reaction to the Party's 
propoganda. By January 1963 the team had agreed on the 
'thumbs-up' sign and the slogan 'Let's Go with Labour'. The idea 
was to rid the Party finally of its puritanical image and to 
persuade the public of Labour's dynamism and enthusiasm for 
progress. In May 1963 advertisments which featured the sign, the 
slogan, some text and a picture of Wilson began to appear 
in the 
national newspapers. 
(115) Labour had learned the value of 
continuous campaigning and its election budget for the 
1964 
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contest was trebled compared with 1959. 
(116) 
The work of the NEC's campaign committee and the publicity 
department meant that the broad shape of the Party's 
pre-election strategy had been decided long before Wilson became 
leader. Although lessons had been learned and refinements had 
been made since Labour's previous defeat, there were some 
important similarities between the campaigns of 1959 and 1964. 
Labour was determined to fight a forward-looking campaign in 
1964 but the focus remained on a limited and familiar range of 
domestic issues - housing, education, prices and economic 
management. In an attempt to repeat the success of the Party's 
campaign on television in 1959, Tony Benn was reappointed in 
charge of Labour's broadcasts by Wilson in one of his earliest 
actions as leader. When the two first held formal discussions 
about broadcasting in March 1963 it soon became clear that 
Wilson. intended to dominate Labour's forthcoming election 
campaign to an even greater extent than his predecessor had done 
in 1959. 
(117) Benn, who had insisted that Gaitskell's image as 
Party leader had to be amplified for the election in 1959, was 
understandably pleased that the new leader was ready to repeat 
and extend this strategy. 
(118) Echoes of 1959 were to be found 
also in the use of daily press conferences throughout the 
election - Wilson, rather than the Party's General Secretary, 
took charge of these meetings with the press in 1964. 
The main difference between the campaigns of 1959 and 1964 
concerned the tone of Labour's appeal to the electorate. 
Although economic growth through efficient management had been 
an important theme during the 1959 campaign, there had been an 
equal emphasis too on concepts such as equality and social 
justice. By 1964, however, there was an almost exclusive 
concentration on planned expansion, economic efficiency and 
modernisation as the heart of Labour's message. The old crusade 
against poverty had been marginalised; in contrast to 1959, for 
example, there were no posters which promised that Labour would 
remember the pensioners in 1964. Instead, Wilson drove home his 
claim that Labour was modern and forward-looking while the 
Conservatives were out of date and out of touch. Adapting a 
formula which Kennedy had used in 1960, Wilson committed an 
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incoming Labour administration to 100 days of vigorous action as 
part of a drive to create a 'New Britain'. 
(119) In this 'New 
Britain' individuals of outstanding ability - irrespective of 
social background - would work in partnership with the 
government to regenerate the nation's economy, industry and 
public services. This attempt to recreate Kennedy's 'New 
Frontier' campaign was short on detail, but in reality its main 
objective was simply to reinforce the idea that Labour was a 
team of classless professionals in a contest with well-heeled 
Tory amateurs - technocrats against aristocrats. The other 
lesson which Wilson had learned from Kennedy was the way in 
which youthful appeal could be used as a political weapon. 
Wilson even ran up the stairs at Labour's pre-election rally at 
Wembley in September 1964 to emphasise the contrast between his 
relatively youthful leadership and a Prime Minister who was in 
his sixties. 
Let's Go with Labour for the New Britain, the manifesto for 
the 1964 election, was infused with the energy and commitment to 
modernisation which dominated the Party's campaign. The language 
used in the document left the reader in no doubt about the zeal 
with which a Labour administration would approach the task of 
regenerating Britain. It stated that the Party was, 'Impatient 
to apply the New Thinking that will end the chaos and sterility' 
and 'restless with positive remedies for the problems the Tories 
have criminally neglected'. The preface outlined the basis of 
Labour's forward-looking appeal. It promised; 
'A New Britain - mobilising the resources of technology under 
a national plan; harnessing our national wealth in brains, 
our genius for scientific invention and medical discovery; 
reversing the decline of thirteen wasted years; affording a 
new opportunity to equal, and if possible surpass, the 
roaring progress of other western powers while Tory Britain 
has moved sideways, backwards but seldom forward. The country 
needs fresh and virile leadership'. 
(120) 
In short, the manifesto was a vigorous attack on Conservative 
complacency. But if the tone and the rhetoric of the document 
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are set aside, strong similarities in terms of policy between 
the manifestos of 1959 and 1964 become apparent. As already 
stated, only three domestic policies from 1959 did not reappear 
in the 1964 document - the nationalisation of road haulage, the 
large-scale municipalisation of rented housing and a 'plan for 
cotton'. The only significant new policy proposals which 
appeared in the 1964 programme concerned the public schools and 
the details of welfare provision. The other new proposals in 
1964 were essentially concerned with the machinery of government 
and planning - the Party was committed to the creation of a 
Minsitry of Economic Affairs, a Ministry of Technology, regional 
planning boards, a Land Commission and an office of 
Parliamentary Commissioner. The details of how these new bodies 
would operate were left unclear. And as The Guardian pointed 
out, administrative changes on this scale had no precedent in 
peace-time. 'The amount of work, planning and adjustment, 
cajolement and negotiation involved in the establishment of 
regional planning alone would be tremendous. ' 
(121) 
Fortunately for Wilson and his colleagues, the awkward 
questions which were raised by Labour's new proposals for the 
machinery of government were largely ignored during the campaign 
itself -a contest which The Times described as 'this most 
formless and aimless of election campaigns I. 
(122) Wilson kept a 
firm control over Labour's campaign in an effort to ensure that 
the Party was not drawn on contentious issues - he was anxious 
to avoid the kind of controversy which Gaitskell had caused by 
his comments on income tax in 1959. 
(123) The result was that the 
two main parties frequently failed to engage in a debate with 
each other: Wilson continually emphasised the issue of 
modernisation, while Douglas-Home drew on his experience as a 
former Foreign Secretary and made the security of Britain his 
predominant theme -a sense of priority which was reflected in 
(124) 
the structure of the Conservative manifesto. Labour made 
little attempt to exploit previous Government difficulties such 
as the Cabinet purge of 1962, unemployment in 1962 and 1963 or 
the security scandals during Macmillan's final years in office. 
The main skirmishes in the campaign were over trivial issues: 
the moral standards of either front bench; industrial stoppages 
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during the election which Wilson believed were politically 
motivated; and organised heckling which disrupted the public 
appearances of the Prime Minister. A fortnight before polling 
day Tony Benn complained that there was a 'certain flatness 
about the campaign'. 
(125) But as the end of the contest 
approached, tension increased as opinion polls predicted the 
closest result in a general election for decades. 
Despite the best efforts of Wilson, Labour's lead over the 
Tories in the opinion polls narrowed sharply from the summer of 
1964 onwards. During the election campaign proper this lead at 
times disappeared completely - the three main polling 
organisations all found that the Conservatives were ahead at 
some stage of the campaign. The final result confirmed the 
pollsters' eventual belief that Labour would emerge with a 
narrow victory. Wilson led the Party back into government with 
an effective majority of just five seats. On a slightly reduced 
turnout, Labour's aggregate vote fell by almost 10,000 compared 
with 1959. Its share of the vote at 44.1 per cent was an 
improvement'of just 0.3 per cent from the previous election - 
which meant that Labour took office with the lowest share of the 
popular vote of any majority government since 1922. But the 
collapse in the Conservative vote and the resurgence of the 
Liberals meant that Labour could return to office without 
improving substantially on its performance from 1959. Support 
for the Conservatives haemorrhaged. Their aggregate vote fell by 
almost 1.75 million and their share of the vote dropped by 6 per 
cent - the heaviest loss of any major party since the 
Conservative disaster of 1945. The Liberals meanwhile increased 
their aggregate vote by almost 1.5 million and won nine 
victories in three-cornered contests for the first time since 
1929. The rise in the Liberal vote can be explained largely by 
the increase in the number of candidates fielded by the Party in 
1964, but the figures also suggest that the Liberals picked up 
support from a number of disaffected Conservatives. 
The average swing to Labour in 1964 was 3.5 per cent. The 
Party's best gains were made in Liverpool and there were greater 
than average swings to Labour in the North West, Clydeside and 
Greater London. Traditional areas of strength such as Wales and 
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Scotland continued to return Labour MPs in large numbers - in 
other words, thereforey it was the Party's core support combined 
with the drop in the Tory vote which carried Labour back into 
office. Although surveys found a slight increase in Labour 
support among the middle and lower middle classes, the bulk of 
the Party's votes continued to come from male, skilled or 
unskilled manual workers who belonged to a trade union. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, given the tone of its campaign, Labour 
apparently won support from less than 40 per cent of voters who 
were aged 65 or above in 1964. In contrast, the Party appeared 
to attract support from a majority of voters aged between 21 and 
44. (126) 
Labour enjoyed several advantages in 1964. Without doubt, 
Wilson was a vibrant and accomplished leader who shone against 
Douglas-Home in all arenas - at Westminster, on television, on 
public platforms and at press conferences. And as Ben Pimlott 
has shown, Wilson made few errors in his first election campign 
as leader. 
(127) But the failure to increase Labour's vote in 1964 
- despite more favourable circumstances than Gaitskell had 
enjoyed in 1959 - calls into question the extent to which the 
Party's return to power can justly be descibed as 'Wilson's 
victory'. Labour's triumph in 1964 was essentially the product 
of a retention of support from the 1950s. Arguably, this 
retention of support owed much to long-term factors rather than 
the inspiration provided by a new leader. As already shown, 
Labour had begun to plan for an election in 1961 and had 
overtaken the Tories in the opinion polls in 1962. More 
importantly, though, the fundamentals in the Party were right 
long before Wilson took charge; Labour had a carefully agreed 
policy programme; Party unity was patiently restored after the 
controversies of the early 1960s; and constituency party 
activists continued to work for a Labour victory on the ground. 
The following chapters will examine these three areas in turn in 
an attempt to show that the origins of Labour's victory in 1964 
are to be found in the 1950s. 
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6. Policy-making, 1959-1964 
Much of the period between the defeat of 1959 and the victory of 
1964 was marked by controversy and division within the Labour 
Party. As shown, though, the three main issues at the centre of 
this conflict were Gaitskell's leadership, Clause Four and the 
retention of Britain's nuclear deterrEnt. Despite a reopening of 
hostilities in Labour's ranks after the 1959 defeat, the 
domestic policy programme which had been agreed during the three 
year review continued to enjoy broad support within the Party. 
It has been argued already that most of the domestic proposals 
which had appeared in the 1959 programme reappeared in the 1964 
manifesto. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
policy-making process after the 1959 election and to show that 
the development of Labour's programme before the victory of 1964 
was relatively limited. Only four major domestic policy 
statements were published by the Party during this period, so 
the work of the Policy Committee did not begin to approach the 
scale of the project which had been undertaken after 1955. 
Although some notable changes were made to Labour's economic 
policy after 1959, it will be argued in the following paragraphs 
that the significance of these changes was relatively minor. 
Labour's victory in 1964 owed more to policies which had been 
developed before 1959 than it did to Wilson's vision of a 'New 
Britain'. In policy terms, Labour's return to power was a 
belated triumph for the architects of the three year review. 
Policy-making in the months after the 1959 defeat took place 
against a background of recrimination and mistrust in the Party 
- caused in the main by the ill-conceived initiatives of the 
Hampstead Set. Partly as a result of these fractured relations, 
the Policy Committee decided not to embark on a critical 
analysis of Labour's programme after the election. They were 
well aware that a detailed examination of policy could open up 
issues which were likely to exacerbate tension in the Party; for 
example, after Gaitskell had proposed to amend Clause Four of 
the constitution, it would have been difficult for the Party to 
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have engaged in a calm discussion about Labour's plans for 
public ownership. At a meeting in January 1960, the Policy 
Committee discussed and approved a research paper from Peter 
Shore which argued that the detailed phase of policy-making was 
complete and that 'it would be unwise to embark on a new policy 
marathon - at least at this stage. ' 
(1) Rather than review the 
content of Labour's programme, the paper continued, the 
Committee should focus instead on the trends and problems which 
were likely to shape British society in the first half of the 
1960s. In order to help with this process, the Research 
Department had begun to construct a picture of the likely needs 
and problems of Britain in 1964 - the year in which the Tories 
were expected to call an election. 
(2 )The burden of the analysis 
in the paper was that detailed policy-making should be replaced 
by an attempt to think in wider, strategic terms: the aim was to 
identify the themes and issues which the Party could exploit to 
most effect in the next general election. 
The development of a future vision of Britain was taken a 
stage further in March when the Policy Committee discussed a 
research paper entitled 'Britain in 1964'. 
(3) This suggested that 
a series of papers should be produced on the challenges that 
were likely to be encountered in specific areas of policy in 
1964. The first paper in the series was on education: the other 
proposed topics were pensions, housing, health, the standard of 
living, changes in industry and employment, and town planning. 
It was emphasised, though, that the purpose of the exercise was 
not to produce policy proposals but simply to 'think about the 
future'. (4) In other words, there was no plan at this stage to 
amend the specific policy recommendations of the 1959 programme. 
This position was reinforced in July when the NEC discussed a 
document from Morgan Phillips and Peter Shore entitled 'The 
j (5) State of the Party Primarily, Phillips aimed to use this 
document as part of his campaign to restore unity in the Party. 
As Labour's Chairman, he was deeply concerned about the 
controversy which was likely to accompany the debates on Clause 
Four and unilateralism at the 1960 Conference: in order to 
off-set the effect of these debates, Phillips aimed to provide 
an opportunity for the Party to focus on a less immediate and 
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less divisive issue - Labour's strategy for victory in 1964. 
Again it was emphasised that the intention was not to examine 
the detail of Labour's policy. Indeed, it was even argued that 
the Party had spent too much time on the discussion and 
refinement of its programme after 1955; 
'In recent years we have obviously failed to put across our 
policies. This is partly because we have had far too much 
policy for the electorate to absorb -a mistake that we must 
not repeat. ' 
(6) 
The document argued that the Party should 'rigorously limit the 
number of policy statements that are produced'. Instead it was 
suggested that the NEC should write 'a small number of broad 
statements, showing what is wrong with Britain, and pointing the 
new direction which the Labour Party wishes to give to our 
affairs'. 
(7) 
The analytical sections of 'The State of the Party' examined 
the trends and challenges which were emerging in British society 
in 1960. Peter Shore, who wrote these sections, aimed to show 
that the justification for economic planning in Britain in the 
1960s was as powerful as ever. In fact, Shore was convinced that 
Crosland had failed to emphasise fully the case for planning in 
T hm V, ,+,, o ru, ima rn 
'I think the influence of Tony Crosland on Party thinking was 
really at its peak before the 1959 election. Although he'd 
done in my view a very brilliant analysis of how things had 
developed in the post-war period, Crosland was terribly 
passive in his prescriptions: the market was going to be 
alright, the great contradictions had been eliminated in 
contemporary capitalism and therefore we could take a kind of 
relaxed view, you don't have to intervene very much, you 
don't plan very much, you leave it to the market. And on the 
social side, on the ownership side, you deal with it with 
taxation rather than with public ownership. But that was not 
the mood after 1959. It might have been Gaitskell's mood for 
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a time, but it certainly wasn't my mood and it wasn't the 
mood of Harold Wilson and others. ' 
(8) 
Shore at this time was influenced heavily by the analysis of 
contemporary capitalism which the economist J. K. Galbraith had 
outlined in The Affluent Society. 
(9) Galbraith argued that in 
capitalist countries there was an imbalance between the 
proportion of national resources which was spent on private 
consumption and the proportion of resources which the state 
devoted to public services: the result of this imbalance was an 
increasing contrast between private wealth and inadequate public 
services. In 'The State of the Party' Shore complained that 
Britain suffered from this maldistribution of resources and 
argued in addition that the main centres of private capitalist 
power were not subject to adequate democratic control: 
'These adverse features of our society tie in, of course, 
with defects in our national system of values. We must 
emphasise; that we cannot have a sane society when the values 
of private acquisitiveness and private advancement, so 
strongly excited by the techniques of modern mass persuasion, 
dominate the values of public service and mutual aid. We must 
show too, that we cannot have a genuinely democratic society 
when so many of the key decisions are made without reference 
to democratic control. Perhaps the most important question 
for us to answer in the next few years is how democracy can 
be made effective in a society where private power has become 
so powerfully concentrated. 
We need not, indeed should not, take a sour attitude to 
the growth of general prosperity. But we must make it quite 
clear that in the more prosperous '609 as in the poverty- 
stricken '30s, the struggle for the primacy of the community 
interest over private selfishness goes on; and that in the 
struggle we know where we stand. 
(10) 
In order to ensure that proper provision was made for community 
interests, Shore argued that the state had to control and to 
plan the nation's resources. It was recognised, for example, 
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that economic growth and rising living standards had created 
problems which only the state could address: controls over the 
location of industry had to be strengthened in order to stem the 
drift of population to the prosperous Midlands and South; public 
transport and urban planning had to be developed in order to 
deal with the crisis in the transport system as the number of 
vehicles on Britain's roads increased. Perhaps more importantly, 
it had become apparent that British investment in industrial 
research and development was inadequate - even the Conservative 
Government had recognised that it was necessary for the state to 
make public money available for this purpose. In an attempt to 
encourage the Party to lift its eyes from the conflicts over 
defence policy and Clause Four, 'The State of the Party' offered 
a vision of some of the challenges which Britain was likely to 
face in the 1960s. The significant point here, though, is that 
its proposed solutions to these challenges had all been outlined 
previously in the three year policy review. The idea that state 
intervention was required in the areas mentioned in the document 
had been accepted already in the Party's 1959 programme. The 
manifesto - which remained the official policy of the Party 
until the 1964 election - had committed Labour to the full use 
of the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act in order to control the 
location of industry; it committed Labour to a 'national plan 
which [covered] all the transport needs of an expanding 
economy'; it also promised 'an energetic application of science 
in all phases of our national life' - Plan for Progress in 1958 
had stated that a Labour administration would use investment 
allowances to encourage industrial research and development. 
The Executive endorsed 'The State of the Party' after 
amendment and agreed that it should be commended to Conference 
under a new title of 'Labour in the Sixties'. 
(11) At an otherwise 
divisive meeting of delegates at Scarborough, the document's 
theme of scientific progress as a justification for economic 
planning was an idea on which the Party could unite. Wilson, who 
replied to the debate on the document on behalf of the 
Executive, delivered at Conference a message which was to become 
familiar in the years which followed: 'The world into which we 
are moving ... 
is a world characterised by a scientific 
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revolution. That is why we say today that socialism must be 
harnessed to science and science to socialism'. 
(12) The document 
was approved by delegates on a show of hands and the Executive 
was instructed to prepare a statement on home policy in line 
with the recommendations made in 'Labour in the Sixties'. This 
had suggested that five domestic issues required particular 
attention: regional and urban development, transport, the crisis 
in education and the youth services, the decay of the welfare 
state, and capital investment in industry. 
Work on the new policy statement began in November 1960 with 
the creation of a small sub-committee under the Chairmanship of 
Wilson. (13) It was agreed that the aim was to produce a statement 
which avoided 'unnecessary detail' on policy but which 
identified as sharply as possible Labour's main criticisms of 
the affluent society. 
(14) By April 1961 a draft version of the 
statement was ready for submission to the Policy Committee. At a 
meeting on 10 April the Committee accepted the broad framework 
of this draft but called for it to be shortened. 
(15) The revised 
draft was di-scussed at a futher meeting on 20 April and 
particular attention was paid to the sections on building land, 
public ownership and education - the latter topic was especially 
significant as the Policy Committee had already agreed to review 
the Party's position on the public schools. 
(16) When the draft 
was presented to the NEC in May there were further complaints 
about the length of the statement. It was felt that the document 
should be written more like a short proppganda pamphlet and less 
like a long election manifesto. There was particular concern 
about the section on public ownership - mainly that it was too 
long and that there were too many commitments about the 
machinery that would be created for extending the public sector. 
On education it was suggested that the priorities should be 
taken from the 1958 statement, Learning to Live, and that 'while 
accepting the principle of integration, the section on public 
schools should be shorter and less definite on their future 
role'. 
(17) It was agreed finally that the statement should be 
rewritten by the Party's officers and research staff - 
Gaitskell, Brown, Crossman, Wilson and the team led by 
Shore. 
(18) Their draft was discussed, amended and approved at a 
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special meeting of the Executive on 27 June: the agreed title 
for the statement was Signposts for the Sixties. 
(19) 
The document agreed by the Executive in June 1961 was the 
final general statement on domestic policy which Labour produced 
before the publication of the 1964 election manifesto - the 
other statements published after 1961 were on housing, social 
security and science. The principal theme of Signposts for the 
Sixties was taken from Labour in the Sixties: it argued that 
state planning was required to modernise Britain's economy at a 
time when the potential offered by scientific and technological 
progress was remarkable. There was also a reaffirmation of 
Labour's commitment to redress the imbalance between private 
wealth and public squalor which had been highlighted by 
Galbraith. As Peter Shore recalled; 
'Signposts for the Sixties was very strongly influenced by 
the Galbraithian critique of the affluent society which we'd 
absorbed and found to be both helpful and relevant. So the 
mood from 1961 onwards was very much in favour of expansion 
of the public sector in general to make up for these great 
gaps between the development of people's private standard of 
living and their social and community services. We were in 
favour of increased public expenditure and indeed said so and 
had no doubts about it. And we were also - very much with the 
Harold Wilson input - in favour of using the public sector in 
the modernisation and rejuvenation of industry. So all the 
inhibitions about stopping nationalisation ended by saying - 
well no it's not nationalisation, it's an extension of the 
public sector generally to take on tasks which the private 
sector was failing to perform. ' 
(20) 
The statement began with a review of Britain's economic 
performance which would have been familiar to readers of Plan 
for Progress. The main charge was that Conservative 
mismanagement of the economy had enabled competitors in Europe 
to outstrip Britain's rate of economic growth; in the words of 
the document, the nation had fallen into 'comfortable 
complacency'. Production increases were constantly followed by 
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balance of payments problems and credit restrictions which 
reduced output and consumption - this sequence was known as the 
'stop-go' economic cycle. The prime cause of the problem was the 
Conservative's 'refusal to plan' and their 'obstinate 
determination to use only the bluntest monetary controls'. 
Labour's proposed solution to economic failure was to realise 
the potential of the scientific revolution as a means of 
achieving econmomic growth. According to Signposts for the 
Sixties, efficient planning and supervision of the economy would 
ensure that the 'forces released by science' were directed to 
the service of the community: growth would be achieved and there 
would be a fair distribution of the product of expansion. The 
authors of the statement calculated that if Britain's rate of 
industrial growth had matched the average rate of growth in 
Western Europe, Government revenue would have increased by some 
E1,500 millions per annum without any rise in taxation. It was 
also claimed that Britain had suffered from increased inequality 
and a rapid concentration of economic power since 1951: again, 
this was a charge that had been made during the three year 
review - indeed, even the figures which were used to suport the 
claim were taken from the 1956 document Towards Equality. 
(21) 
The 1961 policy statement established increased investment in 
industry as the first objective of Labour's economic planning. 
To achieve 'speedy and purposive industrial investment' the 
Party proposed to create a National Industrial Planning Board. 
The origins of this policy for Labour can be traced back to 1931 
when the Party's manifesto contained a commitment to establish a 
National Investment Board. (22) As we have seen, the same proposal 
also featured in Plan for Progress. However2 whereas the 
rationale for increased investment in 1931 had been the 
reduction of unemployment, by 1961 the policy was designed 
primarily to improve Britain's rate of economic growth. In 
pursuit of the same objective, Signposts for the Sixties also 
stated that a Labour government would enlarge the National 
Research Development Corporation. The aim here was for the state 
to place research and development contracts with teams of 
scientists, to stimulate technical advance in civil industry, 
and to modernise industries which had fallen into decline. An 
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enlarged National Research Development Corporation with enhanced 
powers was envisaged as the agency through which the public 
sector of industry would be expanded; 
'Once this Corporation was firmly established, the public 
sector would be able to advance where it is most needed - at 
the growing points of the British economy and in the new 
industries based on science. ' 
(23) 
This section of the policy statement can be contrasted with 
Crosland's thesis on the relationship between the state and 
industry. Crosland had argued that state involvement in industry 
should be confined in the main to the acquisition of equity 
shares - the idea was to provide the state with a stake in 
industrial profits, not to gain management control of companies 
or industries. 
(24) In contrast, the 1961 statement emphasised 
that the state should intervene in the management of industry to 
ensure that the potential offered by scientific and technical 
advance was-exploited fully by companies. However, this 
justification for state intervention should be seen as a 
development of policy from the 1959 programme rather than as an 
innovation. As shown, the 1959 manifesto had promised 'an 
energetic application of science in all phases of our economic 
life', and had also pledged that a Labour government would 
ensure that industrial giants 'plan their operations in 
accordance with our national objectives of full employment and 
maximum efficiency'. 
(25) This at least implied that Labour was 
prepared to use the authority and resources of the state to 
achieve a modernisation of British industry. The difference in 
Signposts for the Sixties was that the mechanics of intervention 
were explained in rather more detail and that the policy itself 
was given a higher priority in the Party's programme. As Tudor 
Jones has argued recently, though, this renewed emphasis on 
public ownership and public control in Labour's programme can be 
seen in part as a strategy for healing the division in the Party 
which had been caused by Gaitskell's attempt to amend Clause 
Four: in practice, the apparent rehabilitation of public 
ownership as an instrument of economic planning was not followed 
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by an extensive commitment to an expansion of the public sector 
in the 1964 manifesto. 
(26) 
Much of the remainder of Signposts for the Sixties was based 
on policies which had been agreed before 1959. The section on 
social security contained a renewed commitment to the National 
Superannuation scheme of 1957: the addition to this policy was a 
proposal for wage-related sickness and unemployment insurance 
benefits. The proposals for education were taken directly from 
the 1958 statement Learning to Live: the new development in this 
area was the plan to establish an Educational Trust which would 
decide on a scheme for the integration of the public schools 
into the state sector. As argued in a previous chapter, however, 
this proposal should not be interpreted as a major change of 
policy or principle for the Party. Labour's policy makers had 
supported the principle of integration in 1958, but they did not 
believe that a viable method could be found to implement the 
plan; by 1961, they were apparently more optimistic about the 
feasibility of integration and so a commitment on the public 
schools was-added to Labour's programme. In essence, though, the 
new commitment was little more than a pledge to re-examine the 
feasibility of integration after the election of a Labour 
government - as shown, the outcome of this re-examination was 
the maintenance of the separate status of the public schools 
after 1964. 
Labour's taxation plans were not set out in detail in the 
1961 statement. Instead, the simple commitment to fair taxation 
which had appeared in Towards EqualitY_ and earlier policy 
statements was repeated. More specific proposals were outlined 
in the section which dealt with the ownership and the use of 
land. The most significant addition to Party policy in this area 
was the proposal for a Land Commission which would be empowered 
to purchase the freehold of land on which building or rebuilding 
was to take place. This policy was largely the work of Hugh 
Gaitskell, who described the idea as 'a hobby of mine for a 
number of years I- 
(27) The rationale for the proposal was that it 
would halt the uncontrolled rise of land values and at the same 
time facilitate effective town and country planning. One of the 
consequences of Labour's increased commitment to town and 
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country planning at this time was the abandonment of 
municipalisation as a component of the Party's housing policy. A 
Research Department paper in June 1960 had argued that the 
problem of housing and the issue of the ownership of tenanted 
accommodation had been super5. eded by problems such as rising 
land values and uncontrolled urban sprawl. 
(28) The principal task 
of the state, therefore, was to exercise a wide control over 
construction in urban and rural areas rather than to transfer 
the control of tenanted accommodation to local authorities. The 
omission of municipalisation from Signposts for the Sixties was 
criticised at the 1961 Blackpool Conference, but the document 
was accepted by delegates and it went on to form the basis of 
Labour's 1964 manifesto. 
The Party's declared strategy in 1960 had been to avoid the 
production of a long series of policy statements: accordingly, 
Signposts for the Sixties remained Labour's main statement of 
domestic policy until September 1964. Three additional 
statements appeared in 1963, but none of them contained any new 
proposals of significance. The first of the three, Labour's Plan 
For Old Houses, set out the Party's plans for slum clearance and 
for the repair of properties which failed to meet a new minimum 
standard of quality. 
(29) New Frontiers For Social Security 
offered a more detailed account of Labour's proposals for 
wage-related welfare benefits and for an 'Income Guarantee', 
which would ensure that all retirement pensions were 
supplemented where necessary to meet a national minimum. 
(30) The 
final document in 1963, Labour and the Scientific Revolution, 
reinforced one of the main themes of Signposts for the Sixties: 
the commitment to science as the agent of social and economic 
change. 
(31) 
As we have seen, this theme was at the heart of Wilson's 
speech at the 1963 Party Conference. 
(32) It also dominated the 
first half of Labour's 1964 manifesto, in which it was claimed-. 
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'This is an age of unparalleled advance in human knowledge - 
and of unrivalled opportunity for good or ill. In ever- 
widening areas of the world the scientific revolution is now 
making it physically possible for the first time in human 
history to provide the whole people with the high living 
standards, the economic security, and the cultural values 
which in previous generations have been enjoyed by only a 
small wealthy minority'. 
(33) 
In order to realise the potential that was offered by the 
scientific revolution, Labour's manifesto promised to create a 
'New Britain' by 'mobilising the resources of technology under a 
(34) 
national plan' . In addition to the 'national plan', the 
manifesto also outlined a 'plan for industry', a 'plan for the 
regions', a 'plan for transport', a 'plan for stable prices' and 
a 'plan for tax reform'. The degree of emphasis which Labour 
assigned to planning in 1964 is therefore clear. However, in 
assessing the significance of this strategy a degree of caution 
is necessary. The first point to re-emphasise is that similar 
policies on planning had appeared in the 1959 programme. New 
proposals for economic planning in 1964 were limited in the main 
to the creation of a Ministry of Economic Affairs and a Ministry 
of Technology. The first of these new bodies was to be 
responsible for drawing up the national plan, the second aimed 
to bring new technology and new processes into industry. The 
only other new development in terms of planning in 1964 was the 
commitment to the creation of Regional Planning Boards. It 
should be noted, however, that this proposal represented an 
innovation in the structure of government rather than a new 
approach to the function of government at a regional level. 
Essentially, regional planning continued to mean the operation 
of the Distribution of Industry Act, the clearance of slums and 
the fight against overcrowding. Alongside these familiar tasks? 
the only new functions that were envisaged for the Regional 
Planning Boards were the implementation of programmes for new 
town and overspill development, and the rather vague aim of 'the 
co-ordination of higher education , further education and 
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industrial training required to maintain economic 
expansion'. 
(35) 
The second point to make about the emphasis on planning in 
the 1964 manifesto concerns its impact on the electorate. In the 
General Secretary's analysis of Labour's 1964 victory no mention 
was made of the national plan, the New Britain campaign or the 
scientific and technological revolution. According to the 260 
Labour candidates who completed questionnaires for this 
analysis, the most important issues in the election campaign 
were pensions, housing and education. 
(36) As we have seen, the 
Party's policies on these issues were based on proposals which 
had been agreed during the three year review. Education policy 
was taken from Learning to Live, with the additional proposal 
for the integration of the public schools. The policy on 
pensions was taken from National Superannuation, with the 
additional proposal for an income guarantee. To be sure, 
Labour's housing policy was altered in two important ways 
between 1959 and 1964 - municipalisation was abandoned and there 
was a new proposal for a Crown Land Commission - but the rest of 
the proposals were taken from Labour's 1959 manifesto. This 
continuity of policy was present in the remainder of the section 
on social services in the 1964 manifesto. The proposals for 
health care were taken from a policy statement which had been 
produced in June 1959 outside of the main three year review. 
(37) 
Social security policy also remained largely unchanged from 
1959; the only new proposals were for wage-related sickness and 
unemployment benefits and for a new National Severance Pay 
scheme which would be applied to the whole work force. 
Two conclusions should be drawn from this assessment of 
policy-making between 1959 and 1964. First, the 1964 manifesto 
differed from its predecessor mainly in tone rather than 
content; there was a continual emphasis on the language of 
planning, but the substantive policies remained largely 
unchanged from 1959. Secondly, this change of tone does not 
appear to have made a significant impact upon the electorate. 
Labour's own candidates found that many voters believed in 'the 
(38) 
need for a change' of government in 1964. But they also found 
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that the Party's promise of a 'New Britain' with a national plan 
was not mentioned frequently as they 
election. Instead, voters focused on 
been at the centre of Labour's campa 
policy review which the revisionists 
provided most of the programme which 
into government in 1964. 
canvassed during the 
the social issues which had 
ign in 1959. The three year 
had dominated, therefore, 
helped to bring Labour back 
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7. The Labour Left, 1955-1964 
Hugh Gaitskell and his supporters dominated policy-making in the 
Party between 1955 and 1964. It will be argued here that the 
weakness of the Left opposition within the Party during the 
period made this domination of policy possible. In part, the 
continued marginalisation of the Labour Left was the result of 
disciplinary action on behalf of the leadership - this use of 
managerial authority has been discussed in detail by Eric Shaw 
and Lewis Minkin. 
(1) But marginalisation also reflected the 
failure of the Left to formulate a coherent, alternative 
programme to the revisionists. As will be shown, the domestic 
politics of the Left at this time continued to focus almost 
exclusively on the demand for increased public ownership. A 'New 
Left' outside Parliament produced some interesting ideas after 
1957, but these ideas were often concerned with cultural 
analysis rather than with specific issues of policy. To be sure, 
the Left enjoyed some limited success after 1955 - they helped 
to defeat Gaitskell over his plan to amend Clause Four, and they 
forced him to make some tactical concessions on the issue of 
public ownership after this defeat - but their failure to 
influence policy overall was clear. The revisionists dominated 
policy-making because they won the battle of ideas within the 
Party after 1955 - there was no equivalent of the Future of 
Socialism produced by the Left. Although Wilson's election as 
Labour leader was seen by the Left as a victory, the previous 
chapter showed the extent to which Party policy remained 
unchanged after February 1963. 
This thesis has argued that the preparation for the 1964 
election victory began in the main in 1955. The aim of this 
chapter is to show that the weakness of the internal opposition 
to the Labour leadership at this time helped to make the 
recovery possible. In the absence of a Left opposition with new 
ideas, new strategies or a new analysis, the revisionists were 
able to dominate the PLP and the NEC with relative ease. The 
only real challenge which the leadership faced from the Left 
occurred after the 1959 election: as we have seen, though., the 
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development of this crisis owed more to the tactical mistakes of 
the leadership than it did to the vitality of the Left. Before 
discussing these issues further, it is perhaps useful to begin 
with a clarification of the meaning of the term 'the Left'. 
The difficulties involved in defining and identifying the Left 
in the Party between 1955 and 1964 have been recognised in 
previous studies. Patrick Seyd referred to the ideological 
argument within Labour's ranks as 'Left/Right factionalism', but 
he conceded that there were divisions within either camp and 
acknowledged that politicians and activists could not always be 
classified in such simple terms. Seyd explained that the most 
persistent critics of the leadership often portrayed themselves 
as the guardians of the Party's socialist conscience. 
(2) Alan 
Warde also used the term 'the Left', but he qualified this usage 
with a description of the Left's political philosophy, which he 
referred to as 'fundamentalism'. Warde claimed that 
fundamentalists retained an understanding of socialism which had 
been developed during the inter-war years; and they still held 
to the central socialist assumption that social justice was 
impossible without common ownership of the means of 
production. 
(3) 
Throughout this study the term 'Left' will be used to 
describe those individuals within the Labour movement who were 
opposed to the Gaitskell leadership and who shared an 
alternative, if at times ill-defined, vision of economic, social 
and industrial policy. The 'Left' was never a homogenous unit, 
but it existed as a group which consistently adopted a similar 
position on a wide range of policy issues: the points on which 
they agreed outnumbered the points over which they disagreed. 
The forms which the Left opposition assumed are rather more easy 
to define. Left activity within the apparatus of the Party took 
place inside the PLP, in the NEC and at Conference. Left 
opposition outside the Party apparatus took the form of extra- 
parliamentary groups such as 'Victory For Socialism' and the 
'New Left' which emerged towards the end of the 1950s. 
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The Left shared a common understanding of most domestic and 
foreign issues, but their challenge was to persuade the Party as 
a whole to adopt this analysis. The first opportunity to begin 
this task was provided by the 1955 election defeat. It was no 
surprise that the Left blamed the Party leadership for the 
result of the election. Tribune's interpretation of the defeat 
was predictable enough, despite that fact that the paper had 
endorsed the Party's manifesto and campaigned for the 
implementation of its proposals. Labour, it now claimed, had 
lost because its policies were too cautious and too moderate to 
encourage enough of its potential supporters to turn out and 
vote. According to Tribune, the Party would have been served 
better by a campaign which had been based on genuine 'socialist' 
policies. 
(4 )A 
careful selection of readers' letters reinforced 
the point. One socialist from Chelmsford wrote: 
'I never voted in this election, not because of anything 
Bevan has said or done, but simply because the Labour 
leadership just did not give a fighting Opposition policy. I 
am a Socialist, and have been for many years. When Labour 
gets back to a real socialist policy (symbolised by Nye Bevan 
or anyone else) I shall go to the poll again. ' 
(5) 
It was of course simple for the columnists and readers of 
newspapers to call for 'real socialist' policies. It was much 
more difficult to construct these policies in detail and to 
persuade the Party leadership that they would win support from 
the electorate. As Crossman acknowledged in June 1955, the task 
of the Left in the second respect had been made more difficult 
by social and economic change in post-war Britain. He correctly 
perceived that in a prosperous society, the larger proportion of 
the electorate preferred to maintain the status quo and not to 
engage in radical change; 
I people in Britain are more prosperous and more 
contented ... 
We suddenly feel that our mission to save people 
from cataclysm and disaster has come unstuck. We are 
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missionaries without a mission, or missionaries more and more 
dubious about the mission. ' 
(6) 
This was the dilemma that a party of change faced in an era 
of widespread affluence. The Left, however, largely ignored the 
political implications of increased prosperity and full 
employment and continued to demand the transformation of the 
economy. According to their analysis, economic objectives such 
as full employment, redistribution of income and wealth, and 
increased investment in training and technology could only 
follow from increased public ownership. In fundamentalist terms, 
a dominant public sector was the prerequisite of the economic 
and social transformation of society which lay at the heart of 
the Left's mission. According to Benn Levy, a signatory to the 
'Keep Left' manifesto in 1947, a belief in the widespread 
extension of nationalisation was the defining characteristic of 
the socialist. In an article in Tribune., Levy argued that while 
there was a consensus among the main political parties on the 
need for a degree of public enterprise - for the Post Office, 
the roads and the railways - the true socialist believed that 
public ownership should be the rule rather than the exception, 
even if the industries concerned produced profits and were 
(7) 
managed competently in the private sector. Levy criticised 
Gaitskell for seeking to reform capitalism while leaving the 
basic structure of the economy untouched. Although he accepted 
the need to campaign for better schools, better medical 
facilities, better roads and more civil liberty, he also 
believed that Labour needed to offer much more if it was to 
continue as a socialist party; 
'The essential thing to remember is that socialism is an 
economic system. It advocates the complete transformation of 
the basic economic structure of society ... In short ... 
it is a 
doctrine of replacement. ' 
(8) 
Jennie Lee reinforced this analysis during a parliamentary 
debate on government expenditure in July 1956; 
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'Economic situations have to be dealt with months, indeed 
years, ahead of events ... we must be prepared to go forward 
with more controls, planning of our own resources, and more 
nationalisation. We cannot have some industries nationalised, 
with the price of their goods controlled, and other great 
industries allowed to go free with the sky as the ceiling so 
far as profits are concerned. ' 
(9) 
With these arguments the Left rejected the revisionist view 
of nationalisation and reaffirmed their commitment to an idea 
that had been a central strand in British socialist thought 
since the 1880s. It was no surprise that the Left attacked 
Crosland's analysis of post-war socialist economics. The review 
of The Future Of Socialism in Tribune was entitled, 'Socialism? 
How Dare He Use The Word! ', but it offered nothing more 
constructive than a defence of nationalisation as a 
principle. 
(10) 
As the publication of the NEC's new policy 
document on public ownership in 1957 approached, the Left put 
forward a list of industries which they believed should be taken 
into the state sector. This included the motor-car industry - in 
the aftermath of major stikes at car plants in Coventry, Oxford 
and Birmingham - road transport, shipping, motor insurance, 
aircraft manufacturing, and the chemical and petroleum 
industries. There were also calls to nationalise land, 
private schools, credit finance houses and the football 
pools. 
(12) As a result., the delegates' approval of Industry and 
Society at the 1957 Conference was a serious defeat for the 
Left. Thirty-two Labour MPs had already described the document 
in Reynolds News as a 'betrayal of socialism'. 
(13) Tribune also 
distanced itself from the policy, with a response to the 
Conference endorsement of Industry and Society that was 
1 (14) headlined, 'We'll Keep The Red Flag Flying Here! Barbara 
Castle made clear her reservations about the policy and rejected 
the claim that leading left-wingers in the trade unions and on 
the Executive had been satisfied with the document as it had 
been prepared for submission to Conference. She explained that 
Frank Cousins - the General Secretary of the Transport and 
General Workers' Union - Bevan and herself had criticised the 
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document at a joint meeting of the TUC Economic Committee and 
the Home Policy Sub-Committee of the National Executive. (15) 
To be sure, Cousins expressed his reservations about Industry 
and Society at the Brighton Conference, but he cast his union's 
votes in favour of the document and helped to ensure that it was 
accepted with a large majority. 
(16) 
The exercise of block votes 
at Conference by Cousins and other trade union leaders was a 
matter of particular concern to the Left. In addition to their 
demands for more public ownership, the Left at this time was 
preoccupied with the distribution of power within the Party. 
They were aware that they needed to change the way in which the 
Party was managed and controlled if they were to end their 
marginalisation. The conclusion which they drew from the 
Bevanites' failure to amend Challenge to Britain in 1953 was 
that the constitution of the Party required alteration before 
the Left could exercise its influence over policy-making. In 
their view, the rules and procedures which were applied both to 
the PLP and to the NEC were in need of reform. Bevan opened the 
campaign for reform at a Tribune meeting in Manchester on 4 
February 1956 - two days after he failed to defeat Jim Griffiths 
for the Deputy Leadership of the Party. 
(17) He complained that 
the revisionists' transformation of policy had been achieved at 
the expense of democracy within the PLP. Labour MPs, he 
explained, were expected to vote in Parliament in accordance 
with the strategy that was agreed in secret at PLP meetings. 
Constituency party members and Labour voters were unable to find 
out how their elected representatives had voted on policy issues 
at these meetings, and if a Labour Member decided to ignore the 
decision of a Party meeting and to exercise their own judgement 
in a parliamentary division the possible consequence was 
expulsion from the PLP. In this way, control of the movement at 
Westminster was kept firmly in the hands of the parliamentary 
leadership, minority points of view were stifled and the 
principle of democratic accountability was undermined. 
(18) 
In March Bevan switched the focus of his criticism to the 
voting arrangements at Conference. His complaint this time was 
that a small number of trade union leaders elected a majority of 
the National Executive and then decisively influenced voting on 
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the policy documents which the NEC produced for Conference. In 
short, trade union leaders elected the policy makers and 
controlled the process by which policy was endorsed. As Bevan 
pointed out, this arrangement excluded the rank and file 
membership of the Party from decision making. 
(19 )Throughout the 
remainder of 1956, though, Bevan's commitment to the reform of 
Labour's constitution became less vocal. As we have seen, in 
February 1956 he accepted Gaitskell's invitation to become 
Shadow Colonial Secretary. And as the working relationship 
between the two old rivals improved in the months that followed, 
Bevan became less inclined to create problems for the Party 
leader. As Bevan quietly retreated on the issue of internal 
Party democracy, the lead in the campaign was taken over by a 
new group which called itself Victory for Socialism (VFS). 
VFS was a left-wing ginger group whose main concerns were the 
organisation of the Party and the promotion of two policies: 
public ownership and unilateralism. The name had been used 
originally by a Labour group in London in 1944 and this enabled 
the organisers of VFS to claim that they had simply revived an 
organisation which the NEC had tolerated in the past. 
(20) The 
aims of the new group were outlined in a pamphlet entitled 
Tho'Cowards Flinch, which was produced jointly by VFS and 
Future, the socialist monthly publication, in 1956. 
(21) The 
overall theme of this pamphlet was democracy within the Labour 
Party - in particular, the distorting influence of the block 
vote. Labour, it was argued, would never adopt the policies 
required to carry through the 'democratic socialist revolution' 
until it transferred power away from the trade unions and 
parliamentary leadership and towards the individual 
membership. 
(22) A study of voting figures from Party Conferences 
was used to show the extent to which the constituency parties 
had been marginalised: only on the rare occasions when the trade 
unions were evenly divided on an issue could the local parties 
hold the balance of power and exercise an influence over policy. 
Usually, however, the major trade union executives supported the 
wishes of the PLP leadership at Conference and ensured that the 
Party hierarchy could rely on a majority on most issues. This 
relationship, according to the pamphlet, resulted in the 
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constant adoption of cautious, reformist policies and an 
unhealthy divergence of opinion between the leadership and the 
rank and file; 
'The evidence suggests that the Constituency Parties will not 
succeed in committing the Labour Party to the more radical 
policies they advocate unless and until they are able to 
secure a majority for such policies at the Trade Union 
Congress or in the Parliamentary Party. ' 
(23) 
No detailed attempt was made to outline any 'radical 
policies' as the authors were concerned primarily with the 
internal machinery of the Party. 
(24) Three main suggestions for 
reform of this machinery were put forward which the authors 
believed would end the leadership's domination of policy and 
enable the Party to adopt a 'radical' programme. First, it was 
proposed that meetings of the PLP should be opened to the 
public, except on occasions when parliamentary tactics were 
discussed. (25) The rationale for this was that constituency party 
members and Labour voters should have the right to know how each 
Labour MP voted at Party meetings - it was also argued that 
constituency parties should have the right to replace Labour 
members whose views on policy differed consistently from their 
local activists. Secondly, it was suggested that standing orders 
in the PLP should be abolished. 
(26) This would allow the Left to 
have their views represented in the parliamentary party without 
the fear of disciplinary action. Finally, it was argued that the 
block vote should be 'decentralised'. Under this arrangement, 
trade unions would lose their right to vote as a national block 
on political matters at Conference. They would continue to be 
represented nationally at the TUC on industrial matters, but on 
political matters individual trade union branches would be 
represented by the constituency party to which they were 
affiliated. 
(27) The authors conceded that this change would take 
time to organise, but they insisted that it was the best way to 
ensure that the Party accurately reflected the views of its 
membership. 
(28) 
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Victory For Socialism aimed to gather support for its 
proposals in the spring of 1956 by inviting delegates from the 
various strands of the Party to a conference on internal Party 
democracy in London. (29) Predictably, the NEC was concerned by 
this development. Morgan Phillips informed the organisers that 
the NEC 'strongly opposed Conferences of this kind, whose only 
purpose can be to try and secure organised unofficial groups 
within the Party. ' 
(30) 
When VFS refused to cancel the meeting, 
Phillips wrote to the Secretaries of all the CLPs in London and 
the Southern Region and warned them not to participate in action 
that was 'calculated to impair the unity of the Party'. 
(31) 
The 
warning was deliberately vague because it was far from clear 
whether VFS had infringed any Party rules. Also, the NEC was 
understandably reluctant to threaten specific disciplinary 
action against more than 50 local parties. Instead, the NEC 
chose to monitor the group. Len Williams, the Party's National 
Agent, drew up a list of the 13 leading parliamentarians in VFS, 
together with their election majorities for 1951 and 1955 and 
their local party membership figures for the period between 1952 
and 1954. The aim was to build up a 'general picture of the 
state of the organisation [of VFS1 in the constituencies'. 
(32) 
According to the organisers, the effect of the NEC warning 
was to increase the attendance at the VFS meeting. 
(33) Delegates 
from 53 constituency parties, together with representatives of 
other affiliated groups, took part in the conference on 
'Democracy within the Labour Party' in April 1956. 
(34) The report 
of the meeting in The Times stated that most of the delegates 
appeared to be 'loyal but restless' members of the Party with a 
lower average age than was usual at Labour Party meetings. 
(35) 
Discussion at the meeting focused mainly on the proposals which 
had been put forward in Tho' Cowards Flinch; particular interest 
was reserved for the suggestions which dealt with the reform of 
the block vote at Conference - these voting arrangements were 
codified in Clause Six of the constitution. It was important for 
supporters of reform to push this issue at the time because 1956 
was a year in which constitutional changes could be discussed at 
the Party Conference. Under Labour's rules., amendments to the 
constitution could be considered only at every third annual 
194 
Conference. 
Victory for Socialism's campaign for democracy in the Party 
appears to have made an impact. The agenda for the 1956 
Blackpool Conference included several proposed amendments to 
Clause Six which drew directly on ideas from Tho' Cowards 
Flinch. (36) Ultimately, though, the attempt by VFS and its 
supporters in the constituency parties to reform the block vote 
was unsuccessful. The main problem they faced was clear enough. 
Constitutional changes had to be carried by a vote at 
Conference. As long as the trade union executives wished to hold 
on to their power, no other section of the Party had sufficient 
voting strength to take it away. In the words of Tribune, the 
outcome of the votes on the reform of the constitution in 1956 
were 'as close as a race between a jet plane and a 
helicopter'. (37) The proposed changes to the voting arrangements 
at Conference were defeated during a private session of 
delegates at Blackpool. 
(38) 
This defeat led to a temporary decline in VFS activity. Under 
the rules of the Party, the next opportunity to change Labour's 
constitution would not arrive until 1959, and there was little 
reason to expect that a renewed campaign would be more 
successful than before. It was the leadership's victories at the 
1957 Brighton Conference which eventually provided the impetus 
for the second revival of VFS. For the Left, Brighton was a 
disaster. As we have seen, in addition to the approval of 
Industry and Society, the Left was defeated on a motion which 
called for Britain to renounce unilaterally its nuclear weapons. 
To make matters worse, the opposition to the unilateralist 
motion had been led by Aneurin Bevan. Michael Foot recalled the 
impact which this made on the Left in his biography of Bevan: 
'The Left of the Party looked for a moment as if it had 
exterminated itself. Without its incomparable leader it was 
unlikely to regather strength for years. ' 
(39) 
In the aftermath of the defeats at Brighton, it appeared that 
the marginalisation of the Left within the PLP., the NEC and at 
Conference ruled out the possibility of victories on policy 
195 
inside the Party apparatus. Disillusioned ex-Bevanites decided 
instead to revive Victory for Socialism and to continue to fight 
for the Left outside of the PLP and the NEC. The main initiative 
this time was provided by Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo and Stephen 
Swingler, who became chairman of the new organisation. 
(40) The 
revival was announced in February 1958 - the same month that CND 
was launched - and the general aims, according to Swingler, were 
to fight apathy in the Labour ranks, stimulate support for a 
forthright socialist policy and reaffirm the validity of Clause 
Four. (41) In an attempt to achieve these objectives, the revived 
VFS adopted an ambitious organisational structure which included 
an Executive Committee, two policy committees, fourteen area 
groups and an annual conference. 
(42) The plan was to recruit 
members from the constituencies, the unions and the PLP who 
could fill this network throughout the country. Some areas were 
more receptive than others. The north-west, for example, was 
described by one Gaitskell supporter as 'an absolute hotbed of 
Victory for Socialism'. (43) 
This assessment, though, should be placed in perspective - 
even at its height in 1958 VFS managed to recruit only 
approximately 1000 members. 
(44) In fact, according to the sample 
of local parties that was used for this thesis, throughout the 
second half of the 1950s VFS encountered a mixed reception in 
the constituencies. For example, Sheffield Hallam CLP opposed 
the campaign to amend the block vote., and no mention is made of 
VFS in their General Management Committee minutes. 
(45) Newcastle 
West CLP opposed VFS, but York CLP and Salford City CLP both 
supported the group unequivocally- 
(46) Stockport CLP rejected 
the suggestion from Croydon CLP that an annual meeting of 
constituency parties should precede Conference, but in 1956 
their delegate to Conference was instructed to support any 
composite resolutions which called for an increase in the 
influence of the local parties. 
(47) Woolwich CLP received 
literature from VFS, but the minutes of their meetings contain 
(48) 
no response to the group's overtures. Hornchurch CLP agreed 
that 'something should be done to overcome the block vote', but 
the local party leadership was equivocal about the attendance of 
(49) 
its members at VFS meetings. Hornchurch CLP was in an 
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interesting position on this issue because its prospective 
parliamentary candidate was Jo Richardson, the secretary of 
Victory for Socialism. In July 1960 she was asked to appear 
before the General Management Committee of the local party to 
defend VFS against a charge of disloyalty to the Labour Party - 
this was after the group had issued a statement of no confidence 
in Gaitskell's leadership. (50) The vote of censure was lost, but 
the episode confirmed that VFS had to operate with a degree of 
caution to maintain its support among the local parties. 
Despite the relatively low membership of VFS, the NEC was 
again disturbed by the prospect of a new organisation within the 
Party with its own policy groups. Morgan Phillips reminded VFS 
and all local Labour parties of the rules which governed 
separate organisations within the Party. 
(51) Representatives of 
the group were also asked to meet the Chairmen's Sub-Committee, 
the body within the NEC which at the time dealt with 
disciplinary matters. 
(52) The NEC argued that the unity of the 
Party was essential as a general election was expected in 1959. 
Phillips, in a letter sent to every CLP in the country, 
complained that the publication of alternative policy statements 
would lead to confusion., especially as the Executive had almost 
completed its own three year review of policy. If VFS was 
allowed to organise in the constituencies., he argued, it would 
distract Labour from its real aim of defeating the Tories and it 
would help to persuade the electorate that serious divisions 
continued to exist within the Party. 
(53) Representatives from 
VFS, though, emphasised that they 'had no intention of adopting 
a separate programme or policy' during their meeting with the 
Chairmen's Sub-Committee in March. (54) The simple aim of the 
group, they argued, was to stimulate discussion on socialist 
principles. Gaitskell was not persuaded by this argument and 
told the leaders of VFS that their organisation was unacceptable 
because it represented a party within the Party. According to 
the minutes of the meeting, Gaitskell argued that; 
'A national organisation composed of like minded people, with 
an executive committee, an annual conference and branches, 
existing not only to discuss policy, but also to propogate 
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particular views seemed to go beyond the limits of what was 
permissible'. 
(55) 
The precautionary measures which the NEC took against VFS 
were understandable. The amendment to the constitution which 
dealt with the existence of separate groups within the Party had 
been passed by an overwhelming majority of delegates at the 1946 
Conference. (56) It was an important part of the NEC's function to 
enforce the rules and constitution of the Party, especially if 
it believed that action by a group within the movement might 
damage Labour's prospects of electoral success. The policy 
review had signalled the leadership's desire to modernise the 
Party and to move Labour away from an economic policy which was 
based upon increased state ownership through public 
corporations. Victory for Socialism effectively wished to 
reverse this process and to return to a policy which was driven 
by Clause Four fundamentalism. Michael Foot, at the revived 
group's inaugural meeting in London in March 1958, based his 
argument for increased public ownership on the most 'spectacular 
fact' of the last 30 years - the way in which the Communist 
states had revived their economies. 
(57) According to the account 
of his speech in the Manchester Guardian, Foot also predicted 
that the world was heading towards another economic slump and 
that increased nationalisation was required to enable Britain to 
deal with this impending crisis; 
'Did anyone in the Labour Party really think that it would be 
able to cope with this [crisis] without more extensive public 
ownership than was at present foreseen in the Party's 
programme'? ' 
(58) 
The revisionist Labour leadership rejected Foot's economics 
as firmly as they rejected his unilateralism. The national press 
was broadly united in its support for the leadership's action of 
the NEC against VFS. 
(59) In the Daily Mirror, for example, 
Cassandra argued that while the Tories were unpopular in the 
country, there was still little enthusiasm for Labour. Instead 
there was only apathy; 
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'This lassitude will not be swept away by Mr Mikardo and his 
band of political liquorice all-sorts. The voters will either 
yawn more widely or will turn their backs on a party that 
spawns discontent on the eve of battle. Victory for Socialism 
is one of the great misnomers of recent political history. It 
is defeat for Socialism and victory only for dissension, for 
apostasy, for chaos and for selfish muddleheadedness. ' 
(60) 
The chairman of VFS denied that the group created division 
within Labour's ranks. Instead, he argued that VFS aimed to 
infuse Labour with a 'Socialist spirit' and to contribute to a 
'living unity' in the Party by stimulating discussion on 
important issues. (61) Nevertheless, the attention of the 
Chairmen's Sub-Committee of the NEC led Victory for Socialism to 
change the descriptions of its activities in an attempt to lower 
its profile and to deflect accusations that it was a party 
within the Party. As a result, VFS 'branches in the 
constituencies' became 'discussion groups' and VFS 'manifestos' 
became 'statements to the press'. 
(62) Neither the representatives 
of the group nor the Chairmen's Sub-Committee was willing to 
discuss their meeting in March in any depth, beyond stating that 
a 'full and frank discussion' had taken vlace - an ominous 
formula. (63) The press, meanwhile, noted the absence of Aneurin 
Bevan from the meeting with his former colleagues. As Party 
treasurer, Bevan was included on the disciplinary committee 
which had called for a meeting with VFS, but he failed to 
attend. 
(64) 
Although the meeting with the Chairmen's Sub-Committee was a 
clear warning to VFS, the group decided to publish its Statement 
of Aims as a basis for discussion within the Labour Party on 21 
March 1958. A summary of this statement illustrates the extent 
to which the the domestic policy priorities of the group 
differed from those of the leadership. Victory for Socialism 
called for; 
'1. A rapid expansion of the social ownership of all the 
centres of financial, commercial, industrial and land-owning 
power., by selecting the most appropriate of a number of 
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different means - nationalisation, municipalisation and 
co-operative enterprises. 
2. More accountability to Parliament in the public sector of 
the economy and the creation of an effective system of 
workers' and consumers' participation in management. 
3. Meanwhile, the private sector must be subjected to 
effective controls, financial and physical, to ensure that it 
operates in the national interest. The gambling functions of 
the City must be eliminated. 
4. The widest possible extension of the social services, 
including an education system in which every form of 
privilege is removed and the public schools are placed at the 
disposal of the nation. 
5. The creation of a society with full civil and personal 
freedom, and with the widest opportunities for every man a nd 
woman to take part in shaping it. ' 
(65) 
The statement's first aim was the most important departure from 
official Labour policy. Despite the ambiguities which Party 
statements on public ownership frequently contained, it was at 
least clear that Labour's programme did not aim to achieve an 
extension of the public sector on the scale that was envisaged 
by Victory for Socialism - even in the longer-term. One of the 
aims expressed in the second point in the statement, increased 
workers' participation in management, was discussed by delegates 
at the 1957 Conference during the debate on Public Enterprise, 
and it was rejected after the trade unions had made it clear 
that they were opposed to the idea. And as we have seen, the 
absorption of public schools into the state system was 
eventually rejected by the policy makers in 1958 on the grounds 
of impracticality. The aims expressed in the third and fifth 
points of the statement were much closer to official Labour 
policy, but the task of finding a practical way of achieving 
these aims was an entirely more complex matter. The absence of 
new thinking by the Left, or even a recognition that structural 
changes had taken place in the British economy since the war, 
was a marked feature of the Statement of Aims. The impact of the 
welfare state, the increase in white-collar work, the growing 
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influence of the managerial sector and the opportunities which 
seemed to be offered by Keynesian economic management were not 
addressed. Aside from the fact that VFS called for an expansion 
of the public sector and the welfare state - because progress 
had already been made in these areas - their main ideas differed 
little from those of the Labour Left of the 1930s. 
(66) 
After the initial interest which had accompanied the group's 
revival and its problems with the Executive, VFS faded from 
public view during the months which led up to the 1959 election. 
Jo Richardson, the group's secretary, has rejected the idea that 
the threat of disciplinary action by the NEC seriously impaired 
VFS activity, but she acknowledged that the organisation 
backtracked after March 1958. 
(67) The original vision of a highly 
organised, national group was not realised, primarily because of 
a lack of support in the constituencies. Even if a high degree 
of organisation had been achieved, though, there is no reason to 
believe that VFS wished to engage in an open conflict with the 
Party leadership, especially when a general election was 
imminent. To be sure, the Left disagreed with Gaitskell's 
development of policy, but their desire to see a Labour victory 
at the election was genuine. Recrimination could always come 
after the campaign. 
The Left did not welcome the 1959 defeat., but they saw it as a 
vindication of the attacks which they had made on the 
leadership's policies and this strengthened their resolve to 
continue the fight. Under the headline 'What Are We Going To 
Do? ', Tribune offered its analysis of the election result and 
its early thoughts on Labour's future. According to this 
article, the Party's main weakness was its economic policy. It 
argued that while voters were attracted by many of Labour's 
promises, particularly on housing and pensions, they did not 
believe that a socialist government would be able to finance 
these commitments without higher rates of income tax. 
Gditskell's promise to fulfil the manifeJ<o pledges without 
increasing income tax was blamed for persuading the public 'that 
Labour did not believe in its own programme I. 
(68) The solution 
offered by Tribune. was predictable: increased state planning and 
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an expansion of the public sector. Commitments on public 
ownership were unpopular with the electorate, it was claimed, 
because the Labour leadership had failed to present this part of 
the programme with any enthusiasm; 
'Of course, nationalisation is unpopular. How could it be 
otherwise, when at each successive election Labour leaders 
show that they regard it, not as a means to advance Britain's 
future, but as an outdated dogma they would love to 
discard? ' (69) 
The defence of nationalisation was continued by the Left in 
the weeks after the defeat. The Executive Committee of Victory 
for Socialism published its new manifesto, The Age For 
Socialism, a month after the election. Its central theme was the 
defence of traditional socialist principles. Instead of revising 
socialism, the manifesto argued, the Party should undertake a 
long-term programme to educate voters about its history and 
purpose. A return to policies that were based firmly on the 
Party's old principles was offered as a route to electoral 
success. This meant an expansion of social ownership, 
redistribution of income and wealth, dispersal of economic 
power, full employment and disarmament. 
(70) According to the 
authors, these policies had to be combined with a vision of a 
society which was based on 'higher moral values' - though this 
section of the manifesto was understandably vague. The familiar 
demand for constitutional change in the Party was also included 
in the manifesto. 
(71) 
The response of Victory for Socialism to the election defeat 
showed that the group was still preoccupied with the battles of 
the mid-1950s. However, there were at least signs after October 
1959 that members of the Left were prepared to engage in new 
thinking. Richard Crossman, the former Bevanite., moved from 
being a 'temporary Gaitskellite' to a 'rogue elephant' after the 
election. 
(72) He began to question the direction in which the 
Party was led and he produced the first significant challenge to 
the revisionists' analysis of Party strategy in the post-war 
prosperous society. His estrangement from the Party leader was 
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motivated both by personal and political factors, but for the 
purposes of this study the result of the breach is of greater 
significance than the cause. Crossman's Fabian pamphlet of June 
1960, Labour in the Affluent Society, was based upon a lecture 
he had delivered in November 1959. (73) Its theme was the future 
of the Labour Party in a society which enjoyed economic growth 
and rising living standards. The important question for Crossman 
was whether Labour still had the potential to win elections when 
the Conservatives apparently had the ability to manipulate both 
the economic cycle and the electoral timetable in their fdvour. 
The answer, according to the pamphlet, depended on the political 
role which the Labour Party chose for itself. 
The two roles which the party in opposition could choose, 
according to Crossmdn, were either 'Fighting Opposition' or 
'Alternative Government'. As a fighting opposition, Labour would 
need to present itself as an 'dnti-Establishment' party of 
radical change which was committed to a thorough reorganisation 
of the British economy. As an alternative government, the 
emphasis would be on caution and responsibility. There would be 
a commitment to minor reforms and to an increase in social 
expenditure, but the basic structure of the mixed economy would 
remain untouched. As we have seen, alternative government was 
the role which Gaitskell had chosen for Labour: Crossman likened 
the Party in this respect to the Democrats in the USA and 
described Labour as 'an alternative team of management inside 
the Establishment'. 
(74) 
Crossman believed that Gaitskell and the revisionists had 
chosen the wrong role for Labour and he accused them of having 
placed too much faith in the 'swing of the pendulum' in British 
politics - this pendulum theory was based on the assumption that 
political power oscillated between the two major parties at 
regular intervals. Gaitskell and his colleagues had concluded 
apparently that concessions which the Left had won on policy had 
prevented the pendulum from swinging. In particular, the 
leadership appeared to believe that the electorate saw Labour as 
a party which was 'dogmatically wedded to wholesale 
nationalisation'. In essence, revisionists argued that Labour 
had to regain the trust of the floating voters by adopting a 
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cautious, moderate programme which did not include radical 
economic measures and which did not imply a return to the 
austerity of the Attlee years. Crossman argued that this 
approach was mistaken because the pendulum theory on which it 
was based was simply untenable. Power was not shared between the 
parties in modern Britain, he explained, it was usually held by 
the Conservatives. According to Crossman, Labour governments 
were only elected in exceptional circumstances; 
'A left-wing government is required only where the change 
must be radical and involve a repudiation of orthodoxy; and 
the occasion for it will be a crisis in which the people, 
shaken out of its complacency, loses confidence in its 
traditional rulers ... and quite deliberately insists that what 
the country needs are new men and a big step forward. ' 
(75) 
If this proposition was accepted., the revisionists' strategy for 
Labour in opposition had to be reversed. Instead of moderation, 
Labour needed to offer the electorate a new approach to 
economic., social and foreign issues which differed clearly from 
the policies of the Conservatives. The Party needed to have 
radical policies in place in order to offer a way out of the 
'crisis' when it came. Labour had to maintain a 'Socialist 
challenge to the A order' and to wait in the wings for 
the inevitable call from the electorate once the Conservatives 
had been overtaken by crisis. Crossman was aware that his thesis 
implied long periods out of office for Labour, but a left-wing 
party which attempted to adapt its policies in order to gain 
regular power in his view ultimately lost its principles and its 
sense of direction. 
This strategy, of course, was reliant on the arrival of a 
crisis from which Labour could rescue the country. Crossman 
believed that he had detected such a crisis in the distance. The 
affluent societies of the West, he argued, were inherently 
unstable because of the way in which they neglected investment 
in the public sector. Schools, housing, roads and public 
services generally were starved of resources because Western 
governments preferred to keep taxation to a minimum in order to 
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fuel consumerism - this was the familar Galbraithian critique of 
private affluence and public squalor. Consequently, according to 
Crossman, Western economies would be overtaken by the planned 
economies of the Communist world; 
'in terms of military power, of industrial development, of 
technological advance, of mass literacy and, eventually, of 
mass consumption too, the planned Socialist economy, as 
exemplified in the Communist States, is proving its capacity 
to outpace and overtake the wealthy and comfortable Western 
economies. ' 
(76) 
Labour's task, therefore, was to convince the electorate about 
the impending crisis in the nation's public services and 
infrastructure., and to explain that the economies of the West 
were failing to match the economic growth rates of the Communist 
states. The proposed solution to this 'crisis' of declining 
public services and low growth was a reversal of the balance of 
the economy. In other words, an interesting analysis was 
followed by the familiar call for state planning and public 
ownership: 
'It is, I believe, for this creeping crisis of the 1960s and 
1970s that the leadership of the Labour Party should hold 
itself in reserve, refusing in any way to come to terms with 
the Affluent Society, warning the electorate of the troubles 
that lie ahead and explaining why they can only be tackled by 
ensuring that public enterprise dominates the whole economy 
and creates the climate in which private enterprise 
works. ' 
(77) 
Crossman was characteristically pleased with his work. In a 
letter to Thomas Balogh, at the time Wilson's unofficial 
economics adviser, he decL-Ared that his pamphlet had 'filled a 
vacuum by providing the first reasoned., serious reply to the 
Crosland - Jenkins - Jay - Gaitskell Revisionist 
offensive I- 
(78) Not only had trade union leaders apparently 
accepted his analysis., Wilson had taken over the whole argument 
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and George Brown had accepted his ideas. In the same way that 
the Party would eventually rescue the country from crisis, so 
Crossman believed that he had rescued the Party from 
intellectual stagnation. 'The fact is the Party hasn't got any 
theory, and this miserable little pamphlet has provided them 
some. ' 
(79) 
It is now clear of course that Crossman over-estimated both 
the scale of the 'crisis' which was required to bring Labour 
back into power in 1964 and the strength of the Communist 
economies. His analysis nevertheless had an impact in the Party 
in the first half of the 19609. Wilson's 'New Britain' campaign, 
with its emphasis on scientific planning as a means of reversing 
economic decline, recalled the tone if not the substance of 
Crossman's thesis - the 1964 manifesto did not focus on the 
decline of the West generally in relation to the Communist 
states, it emphasised instead Britain's failure to match the 
'roaring progress of other western powers'. 
(80) 
It was perhaps to 
be expected that Crossman and others on the Labour Left would 
look to the Communist states for evidence of the success of 
state planning and public ownership. This did not necessarily 
imply, though., that they supported other aspects of Communist 
rule. Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Krusý4cHc-\Ps 
denunciation of Stalin in the same year had led to mass 
resignations from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
and a growing disillusionment with communism on the broad left 
of British politics. As a result of this disillusionment, a 
group of Marxist intellectuals in Britain sought to establish a 
New Left. Their aim was to adapt the traditional Marxist concern 
with class structure and power to the new conditions of the 
affluent society and the Cold War. This New Left had no tangible 
influence on Labour politics - there is no evidence to suggest 
that a single line of Labour's policy documents would have been 
different if the New Left had never existed - but it offered a 
sustained critique of the Party and the Labour Left which is 
relevant to this study. 
The origins of the New Left can be traced back to May 1957 
and the first publication of The New Reasoner, a journal which 
was edited by two Marxist intellectuals and historians who 
had 
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resigned from the CPGB, John Saville and E. P. Thompson. This 
publication shared similar concerns with another journal, the 
Universities and Left Review. In January 1960 the two 
publications merged to form the New Left Review with an 
editorial board that contained a novelist and specialists in 
history, sociology and literature. This eclectic collection 
demonstrated the desire of the New Left to move towards a 
broader concept of politics - one that examined cultural and 
social developments in Britain as well as the traditional narrow 
concerns of economics and politics. 
According to the New Left, socialists had to recognise that 
political views and attitudes were continually shaped by 
everyday experience. The influence of advertisers, film-makers, 
television programmes and popular music, for example, were a 
central part of the political process because they shaped 
individuals' expectations and perceptions. In its first 
editorial the New Left Review argued that the narrow materialism 
which was constantly promoted in the affluent society had to be 
challenged, the benefits of co-operation and living as a 
community had to be set against a world in which self-interest 
and the accumulation of luxury consumer goods were the principal 
guides to behaviour. In their view, Labour's mistake was that it 
continued to rely on poverty and exploitation as factors which 
would drive voters to support the Party; 
'People have to be confronted with experience, called to the 
"society of equals", not because they have never had it so 
bad, but because the "society of equals" is better than the 
best soft-selling consumer-capitalist society, and life is 
something lived, not something one passes through like tea 
through a strainer'. 
(81) 
The New Left had an ambivalent attitude towards the Labour 
Party. They constantly accused both wings of the Party of 
conservatism, but they were aware too that Labour was the only 
party which could implement some the economic and social changes 
in Britain which they believed were necessary. Where possible, 
therefore, the New Left Review engaged in constructive 
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criticism, though this often meant that difficult questions were 
asked rather than answered. After the Clause Four debate in the 
summer of 1960, for example, the 'weakness' of the Labour Left 
was outlined in an editorial. 
(82) This accused the Left of 
failing to convert a manoeuvre that was intended to destroy them 
into a political debate that could have transformed the 
movement. It argued that the Left received the backing of the 
constituency parties purely because of past loyalties, not 
because they had been convinced by the arguments: 'The 
constituency parties are still instinctively inclined to the 
left, but they have not heard a convincing case for common 
ownership since 1945'. 
(83) The concluding paragraph aimed to give 
some hope to the Labour Left, but the scale of the tasks which 
it was set was more likely to induce despair; 
'There are, surely, three main tasks for the Left. The first 
is to develop the moral and economic case for socialism in a 
developed and so-called 'affluent' society. The second is to 
recreate the tattered vision of a new society. The third is 
to discover the political means for taking us through to that 
society in the sixties, without the risk of nuclear 
extermination. Are there no answers to these questions? ' 
(84) 
If the editors had any answers they chose not to print them. The 
New Left Review preferred analysis to practical politics. It 
aimed primarily to provide a forum for new ideas about the 
development of the Left, but too often it failed to acknowledge 
that new ideas and quality writing were of little or no 
political value without a corresponding strategy for winning 
power in Britain. In New Left politics, winning power was never 
a primary consideration. 
Ralph Miliband, a leading theorist on the New Left, argued 
that the election of a Labour government was largely meaningless 
until the Party was committed to radical change. And on the 
evidence of the recent past, Miliband did not believe that a 
Labour government that was elected in the early 1960s would 
implement any substantive reform. He was particularly critical 
of Gaitskell and the revisionists for their belief in the 
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virtues of a mixed economy. By adopting a cautious, empirical 
approach in an effort to reassure voters, Miliband believed that 
the Party had lost sight of the need to challenge modern 
capitalism. Instead, Labour presented socialism as 'a mean 
little experiment in bureaucratic piecemeal social engineering', 
which emphasised reform on single issues. 
(85) Miliband believed 
that Labour had to rediscover its class consciousness and to 
commit itself to the alteration of the structure of Britain's 
economy - even though the evidence suggested that the bulk of 
the electorate would reject the policy. Indeed, he attacked the 
Party's preoccupation with winning power and argued that the 
1945 election victory had given Labour a 'ministerial 
obsession'. His alternative strategy for Labour in opposition 
could have appeared in any Tribune editorial since the first 
edition was published in 1937; 
'In terms of programme and in the immediate, local context, 
this means, above all, a specific and unambiguous 
rededication to common ownership as Labour's central and 
distinctive purpose. ' 
(86) 
For all the professed new thinking of the New Left, therefore., 
the centrepiece of their economic policy remained a dominant 
public sector. Long articles which criticised Crosland's thesis 
on the changed nature of capitalism ended with a straightforward 
call for more public ownership. 
(87) For these writers., Crosland 
had underestimated the significance of the profit motive as the 
driving force behind the dominant private sector. This was a 
similar argument to the one which had been presented by J. K. 
Galbraith and Crossman. According to the New Left., the 
structural problems within capitalism could be solved only by 
transforming the economy and ensuring that capital and profits 
were held in the main by the public sector and used for the 
benefit of the whole community. Increased taxation of the 
profits of the private sector was not seen as a viable 
alternative., because high levels of taxation would discourage 
private inward investment in Britain. Public ownership, the New 
Left argued, was the only mechanism a government could use to 
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direct the economy, to safeguard public services and to achieve 
steady growth without inflation. This proposition, however, led 
to a series of difficult questions which the New Left failed to 
answer satisfactorily. For example: how would units in the 
private sector be transferred to the public sector? Once these 
units were transferred, who would decide how to allocate 
resources between them or define what the 'interests of the 
community' meant in practical terms? 
Although questions remained about the implementation of the 
policy of public ownership, the New Left and the the Left were 
at least clear that one of the justifications for the policy was 
the contined existence of poverty in the affluent society: 
Tribune and the New Left Review carried regular articles on this 
topic. 
(88) The imbalance between poverty and prosperity in 
Britain, though, had long been recognised by the Party 
leadership - as we have seen, social equality was at the centre 
of Labour's election campaign in 1959. Nevertheless, the New 
Left believed that a Party which was led by Gaitskell would 
never be able to tackle the poverty and economic problems which 
they publicised. As a result, his death in 1963 caused them 
little grief. Tom Nairn, writing in the New Left Review in the 
summer of 1964, referred to Gaitskell's 'utterly uninventive 
mind' and 'political blunders' and described him as a 
'one-dimensional figure'. (89) He concluded his article with a 
strong personal attack; 
'Gaitskell's death was not tragic ... The tragedy lay in his 
life, in the very ignominious triumph which occasioned the 
idolatry of his name ... It was the tragedy of the Labour 
Party, and above all of the Labour left, trampled upon so 
easily by mediocrity acting in the service of dead 
ideals ... Bourgeois society no 
longer gives birth to heroes, 
only to charlatans. But only in British bourgeois society can 
a great charlatan act out his part as head of the Labour 
movement., as the political guide of the working class., under 
d socialist banner, and without fear of detection by his 
victims. ' 
(90) 
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The views of the New Left on Wilson during this period were 
much more favourable. In 1964 the New Left Review published this 
analysis of Gaitskell's successor; 
'For the first time in its history, the Labour Party is now 
led by a man who by any standards is a consumately adroit and 
aggressive politician. The long reign of mediocrity is over, 
MacDonald, Henderson, Attlee, Gaitskell - whether honourable 
or contemptible, the leaders of the Labour Party have always 
had in common political timidity, tactical incapacity and 
miserable intellectual vacuity ... The Labour Party has at last 
after 50 years of failing, produced a dynamic and capable 
leader. ' (91) 
To be sure, the belief that 'one of their own' had captured 
the leadership in 1963 was a fillip for the Left. As Mikardo has 
pointed out, even if the change of leadership was not 
accompanied by a corresponding change of policy, the symbolic 
importance of the result was clear: 'Harold's victory was a 
negative triumph for the Left because it was a defeat for the 
Right I. (92) The proposition that Wilson's succession was a 
'triumph for the Left', though, requires some qualification. As 
we have seen, the election of Wilson by the PLP was by no means 
an endorsement of policies which had been advocated by the Left 
- to a large extent, his success was a comment on the personal 
problems of George Brown. Also, the main gains for the Left 
under Wilson concerned personnel rather than policy. Five Labour 
rebels from whom the whip had been withdrawn in March 1961 for 
voting against the defence estimates were readmitted to the 
PLP. (93) Crossman was brought back to the front bench and it was 
made clear to Barbara Castle and Tony Greenwood that they could 
(94) 
expect to be promoted to senior positions. As we have seen, 
though., policy remained largely unchanged under Wilson. The Left 
were no doubt reassured by Wilson's continual use of the 
language of planning, but substantive changes of policy are 
difficult to find. 
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To conclude, Wilson's victory should be set against a 
background of failure for the Left since 1955. They consistently 
failed to prevent the revisionists from dominating policy 
formation, mainly because of the balance of power within the 
NEC, but also because they failed to construct policies which 
attracted widespread support in either the Party or among the 
wider electorate. Their main policy concerns - more public 
ownership and less armaments - remained unchanged over the 
period. Indeed, it was even argued that policies which had 
served the Party in the 1930s and 1940s continued to be relevant 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Michael Foot argued in Tribune in 1958 
that 'the old dogmas are as good as ever'. 
(95) Tom Swain, the 
Labour MP, reinforced this view in the same publication in 1962; 
'Let us return to the simple leadership of the Cloth Caps. Is 
it so difficult for some of our leaders to believe that the 
passionate, deep yearnings of the people can only be 
satisfied by the Socialism of the Cloth Caps with their 
direct demands? ' (96) 
The absence of new policy ideas among the Left was largely 
matched by a failure to offer a new strategy which would help 
Labour to defeat the Conservatives. Crossman at least offered 
some thoughts on the subject, but his analysis essentially 
implied that the Party should resign itself to long periods of 
opposition which would end only when the country was overtaken 
by a crisis. Fortunately for the Party this analysis was flawed: 
to be sure, the Conservative Government was unpopular in 1964, 
but Labour was not elected at this time to rescue Britain from 
an economic crisis. Writers on the New Left offered an 
alternative analysis and argued that the Party in opposition 
should not be concerned primarily with its electoral fortunes - 
in their view it was better to be a 'radical' opposition than a 
'moderate' government. This interpretation of Labour's role in 
British politics was shared by others on the Left. Fenner 
Brockway, the former Bevanite and an original member of Victory 
for Socialism, conceded in his autobiography that he preferred 
the comfort of opposition to the responsibility of power: 
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'I have never wanted to be in government because not even a 
Labour Government will do things which I feel are 
fundamentally important. But this has allowed me uninhibited 
action without responsibility ... To be in a pressure group is 
child's play compared with participation in administration 
tackling day-to-day problems which inevitably compel 
compromise. ' 
(97) 
The apparent inability of the Left to understand either the 
importance or the requirements of winning power was perhaps 
their greatest failing after 1951. This failing alone justified 
the leadership's marginalisation of the Left throughout the 
period under discussion. 
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8. Local Labour politics in the affluent society 
This thesis has concentrated so far on the Labour Party at a 
national level - it has focused primarily on the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, the National Executive Committee, annual 
Conference and the Party's general election campaigns. The aim 
of this final chapter is to review briefly the Party's strength 
at a local level during the thirteen years of opposition. This 
is an area which has been ignored frequently by historians. No 
attempt has been made to assess in any depth the effect of 
post-war affluence or the disappointment of consecutive election 
defeats in the 1950s on Labour's core supporters - the members 
and activists in the constituencies. The following paragraphs, 
therefore, will focus on the local party members, their role in 
the Party and their attitude towards domestic policy issues. 
Using records from wards, constituency and divisional parties, 
and interviews with activists who were present in the Party 
during the period, it will be argued that Labour retained a high 
degree of enthusiasm and support among its membership in the 
1950s and early 1960s. 
(1) The real significance of this 
commitment in the local parties is that it should be seen as 
part of a wider picture of Labour renewal and strength between 
1951 and 1964. 
The first point to make about local Labour politics at this time 
is the relatively high and consistent level of Party membership 
in the constituencies. Although individual membership peaked at 
over 1 million in 1952, by 1964 the total was only slightly 
lower than it had been in 1951: the official figures were 
(2) 
876,275 in 1951 and 830,116 in 1964. Despite successive 
Conservative victories in general elections, therefore, the 
average size of Labour's membership in the 1950s easily 
surpassed any previous or subsequent decade. 
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Table 1 
Average Individual Party Membership per Decade, 1930 - 1989 
Decade 
1930 - 1939 
1940 - 1949 
1950 - 1959 
1960 - 1969 
1970 - 1979 
1980 - 1989 
Average No. of members 
382,700 
435,000 
907,500 
767,600 
678,600 
297,600 
Source - Figures calculated on the basis of NEC Reports. No 
record of Party membership was published before 1928. These 
figures represent individual members rather than levy payers 
who affiliate to the Party through the trade unions. 
These figures should be used with a degree of caution because 
almost certainly they overstate the true level of individual 
Labour membership. Since 1928 constituency parties have been 
required to enrol a minimum number of members in order to 
affiliate to the national Party. In 1929 the minimum requirement 
for affiliation was a constituency party membership of 250. This 
was increased to 800 in 1957 and to 1000 in 1963, but it was 
lowered to approximately 250 in 1980. These minimum requirements 
have encouraged local activists where necessary to exaggerate 
the size of their party's membership at a ward or constituency 
level in order to maintain their affiliation. 
(3) Even allowing 
for inaccuracies in the compilation of totals, though, the 
pattern in the figures shows that the high point of Labour's 
individual membership coincided with the sequence of election 
defeats which began in 1951. This indicates that the morale and 
commitment of Labour's core support in the 19509 can be compared 
favourably with any other period. 
Although crude totals for membership are a useful guide to 
the strength of Labour's core support, they disguise significant 
local variations. An analysis of 600 constituencies in 1958 
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showed that the size of local parties could vary between several 
hundred members and over 4,000. The smallest were to be found in 
very safe Labour and Conservative seats and some marginals, but 
the rest were distributed in a haphazard fashion. The 
socio-economic character or location of a constituency were 
found to have had little effect on the strength of the Labour 
membership; instead, the usual reason for a strong local party 
was the presence of an efficient full-time agent or a group of 
committed members who were prepared to spend time building up 
the size of the party. 
(4) 
As a result, there was no guarantee 
that the distribution of Party members across the country would 
necessarily best meet Labour's electoral requirements. 
Despite the regional variations, the high totals for 
individual membership can be seen as evidence of the Party's 
strength during the period under discussion. A large individual 
membership has long been important for Labour because the 
constituency parties perform a number of vital functions. 
Primarily they are the organisational and electoral machine of 
the national Party at a local level. It is significant in this 
respect that both the major political parties have recognised 
the need for a large, active and well organised membership. The 
Conservatives, for example, responded to the surprise defeat of 
1945 with the Maxwell F-ife report into party organisation. 
(5) As 
we have seen, Labour followed this precedent after the 1955 
election defeat with the most thorough and methodical enquiry 
into grass roots organisation in the Party's history. Of course, 
the Wilson report of 1955 did not help to solve all of Labour's 
organisational problems overnight, but at least it acknowledged 
the importance of the CLPs in electoral terms. It also led to 
improvements in organisation in parts of the country. For 
example, Len Williams, the Party's National Agent, discussed 
with the London Labour Party new forms of regional organisation 
in May 1957. 
(6) Partly as at result of discussions such as this, 
Williams was able to point to 'a noticeable improvement in 
electoral organisation in the marginal. constituencies' in the 
(7) 
1959 election. The size of Labour's membership between 1951 
and 1964 should be seen in this context: the first requirement 
of effective organisation across the country during elections is 
221 
a large and active membership. 
In addition to their organisational responsibilities during 
election campaigns, the local parties also helped to publicise 
Labour policy in their constituencies in the longer term. 
Bermondsey CLP, for example, emphasised throughout 1959 that 
Labour's policies were the 'only possible solution' to the 
housing problem in its area. The constituency party's annual 
report for 1959 described how its weekly advice bureau dealt 
with approximately 30 enquiries each week, the majority of which 
were about housing. As well as attempting to deal with each 
specific enquiry, the advice bureau also ensured that Labour's 
policies on rents and municipalisation were outlined in the most 
positive light for its clients. 
(8) Other constituency parties 
publicised Labour policy by sending resolutions to the local 
press and some produced their own publicity material: Abingdon 
CLP published the bi-monthly Digest from 1962 which frequently 
covered 20 pages or more. 
(9) 
As we have seen, the local parties did not simply publicise 
Labour's programme, they also contributed to policy-making. They 
elected seven representatives on the NEC and their delegates 
voted on resolutions and statements at annual Conference. 
Equally as important in this respect was the role of the larger 
local or divisional parties in investigating the particular 
policy needs of their own areas. Between 1957 and 1959, for 
example, a working party of the Executive Committee of the 
London Labour Party studied the practical implications of the 
national Party's policy for the municipalisation of housing. The 
working party concluded that municipalisation was a practicable 
proposal, but it also made several recommendations which it 
(10) 
believed should accompany the policy. On a related theme, the 
London Labour Party arranged a delegate conference in the 
capital in November 1961 to discuss the issue of 
homelessness. 
(11) This work by a local party was beneficial in 
two particular ways. First, it enabled the London party to 
establish its policy priorities in housing - both in terms of 
municipalisation and homelessness. These findings could then be 
passed to the National Executive for use by the Party as a 
whole. Secondly, the efforts of the London party demonstrated to 
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the electorate in the capital that Labour was working to tackle 
issues such as housing and homelessness. In short, even though 
Labour was not in government nationally, at a local level the 
Party was seen to be engaged in detailed work on important 
issues. The reward for the London party came in April 1964 when 
Labour won 64 seats against 36 for the Conservatives in the 
first elections for the Greater London Council. (12) This success 
was repeated six months later when the swing to Labour in 
Greater London in the general election was greater than the 
national average. 
(13) 
In order to perform their functions in terms of organisation 
and policy, the local parties required a high level of active 
participation by the membership as well as a high aggregate 
total. Many members would pay their subscription, but attend few 
if any meetings and take no part in any of the other functions 
of their local party. A study of Labour wards in Leeds in the 
1950s, for example, found that party meetings at which more than 
one-fifth of the membership attended were unusual. 
(14) The 
secretary of the Central ward of Bermondsey CLP in 1955 stated 
that attendance at meetings was frequently restricted to a 'few 
stalwarts' and argued that the problem of low attendance was 
caused in the main by the rival attractions of television and 
radio. 
(15) In fact, frequent participation in local Labour 
politics was usually confined to those activists who served as 
delegates on their constituency party's General Management 
Committee (GMC). The GMC was the governing body of the Party at 
constituency level. Its decisions were binding upon the local 
party, it selected resolutions for Conference, it selected 
candidates for local and national elections and it could take 
action to expel members. The size of each constituency's GMC was 
governed by the size of their local membership, but on average 
the monthly meetings of the Committees were attended by 60-90 
delegates. 
(16) 
In constituency parties which contained several thousand 
members, committed activists clearly represented only a fraction 
of the whole local party. However, although the proportion of 
active members was smaller when there was a large total 
membershipi it is reasonable to assume that the total number of 
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activists in the Party peaked in the 19509 along with the record 
level of individual membership. In other words, the morale of 
Labour activists does not appear to have suffered as a result of 
electoral setbacks after 1951. This impression was confirmed by 
an activist from Hornchurch CLP who recalled; 
'1951 to 1964 was an exciting time. The great spirit of 
renewal and achievement brought about by the Labour 
Government between '45 and '50 still carried on in the Party, 
even though the country had rejected Labour in 1951 ... Even 
after Labour lost again in 1955 we still felt that this was 
just a temporary aberration on the part of the British public 
and that they would swing back our way in 1959. ' 
(17) 
A similar interpretation was offered by a member of Romford 
CLP's League of Youth - the forerunner of the Young Socialists. 
Although part of the attraction of this branch of the League of 
Youth was its provision of social activities, young Labour 
supporters in Romford clearly believed that the Party had a 
mission that was relevant in post-war Britain; 
'We met as a League of Youth. We had about 60 active members 
and we did something almost every day. We did rambles on 
Sunday, we had drama groups, music groups; you name it, we 
had it ... Politically, we thought that a start 
had been made 
in 1945, but we felt that there was still a lot of work to 
do, particularly in public ownership. We believed that 
running things for the sake of the community was the highest 
aim that you could have. 
(18) 
After the 1955 election defeat, one of the wards of Bermondsey 
CLP explained that they were 'deeply disappointed' but 'not 
disillusioned' by the result. 
(19) The same resolve was displayed 
after the 1959 defeat by the London Regional Organiser, who 
explained to the National Agent; 
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'Organisationally we have never been better. We were 
brilliantly led; our T. V. programmes and other publicity was 
excellent. The help and service from Head Office enabled 
Parties to plan their work from the outset. Inside the 
Parties there was a wonderful spirit'. 
(20) 
The commitment and the resolution of Labour activists at this 
time suggests that they were satisfied on the whole with Party 
policy. Ultimately, the membership remained loyal to the Party 
and campaigned for official policy in local and national 
contests, even though specific aspects of Labour's programme 
were sometimes criticised by individual CLP9. This overall 
support for the Party's policies should be set against the 
familiar descriptions of Labour activists as ideologues and 
extremists. For example, Sydney Webb in 1930 complained that the 
CLPs consisted of 'unrepresentative groups of nonentities 
dominated by fanatics and cranks and extremists'. 
(21) Douglas Jay 
borrowed Webb's description and referred to activists as 
'extremists, cranks and theorists'. 
(22) 
Denis Healey was less 
dismissive, but he believed nonetheless that activists were 
'rarely typical of Labour voters, or even of Labour Party 
members'. 
(23) From a more detached perspective, Nick Tiratsoo has 
argued recently that the majority of Labour activists in 
Coventry in the mid-1950s were 'well to the left' of the 
national leadership. 
(24) 
To be sure, Labour has attracted its share of members who 
disagree with what they would perceive to be a moderate national 
leadership. The Independent Labour Party before 1932, Victory 
For Socialism in the 1950s and Militant in the 1980s all found 
support within the Party's ranks. With an individual membership 
of several hundred thousand, it was to be expected that the 
Party would embrace a range of political opinion. However, most 
Labour activists in the years under discussion were much closer 
politically to the Party leadership than is often believed. The 
majority of members endorsed the work of the policy makers on 
the National Executive Committee and caused few if any problems 
for the Party hierarchy. A survey of more than 2,500 resolutions 
submitted by CLPs to annual Conference between 1955 and 1960 
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confirmed this point. It found that 65 per cent of the 
resolutions were either non-ideological (these would include, 
for example, calls for more teachers, better roads or the relief 
of the housing shortage), or they simply supported distinct 
Labour policies (for example, comprehensive secondary education 
or the restoration of a free health service). As the author of 
the survey concluded; 
'The analysis immediately reveals that the description of 
local parties as a force constantly pressing extremist 
views upon national party leaders is false-Differences 
in policy exist within parties, and conflict is sometimes 
great, but this is not a conflict between a monolithic bloc 
of activists and a monolithic leadership. Rather it would 
seem that factional disputes divide parties vertically, 
joining some Privy Councillors, MPs, lobbyists, activists 
and. voters into a faction which is in conflict with another 
which also contains members drawn from all ranks of the 
party- 
(25) 
CLP minute books between 1951 and 1964 endorse the view that the 
local parties were not necessarily to the left of the Labour 
leadership. In fact, several of the resolutions passed by CLPs 
in London during the period were surprisingly conservative and 
in isolated cases perhaps even reactionary. In 1953 Greenwich 
CLP called on the Government to consider the payment of an extra 
week's money to pensioners in order to help them to enjoy the 
celebrations for the Coronation. 
(26) The Falconwood ward of 
Woolwich CLP followed this with a complaint that the Borough 
Council had failed to supply each child of school age in the 
area with a permanent memento of the Coronation ceremony. 
(27) 
West Ham South CLP called for the reintroduction of corporal 
punishment for violent crime in 1955. Later, a ward resolution 
in the same constituency suggested that all immigrants into 
Britain should undergo medical examinations and should only be 
admitted if they had arranged accommodation and employment in 
advance. 
(28) 
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The assumption that activists tended to be to the left of the 
Party leadership in this period was mainly based on two points: 
the CLPs support for extensions of public ownership and the 
success of left-wing candidates in elections for the 
constituency section of the NEC after 1952. Both of these 
factors, though, should be seen in part as a manifestation of 
the entrenched commitment of activists to traditional socialist 
symbolism and rhetoric, not as confirmation that there was 
clear-sighted support in the local parties for a specific 
left-wing programme which differed from the policies produced by 
the NEC. In a sense, both factors illustrated the conservatism 
of the CLPs rather than their radicalism. Many activists were 
most comfortable with an interpretation of British democratic 
socialism which had its roots in the 1880s and 1890s and which 
was expressed in simple form in 1918 when Clause Four of the 
Party constitution positioned public ownership at the centre of 
Labour's ideology. All of the local parties which were sampled 
for this thesis supported extensions of public ownership between 
1951 and 196.4. Some called for specific measures of 
nationalisation. For example, Greenwich CLP advocated public 
ownership of the chemicals industry and the British Oxygen 
Company. 
(29) 
York CLP and West Ham South CLP both called for 
public ownership of land as d priority. 
(30) Hornchurch CLP took a 
different line and consistently pressed for a more wide ranging 
programme. In 1953 it called for the 'full ownership of land, 
wealth and industry'. 
(31) It followed this in 1957 with a 
resolution for annual Conference which said that the local party 
would 'welcome any further extension of the powers of public 
ownership'. 
(32) In 1960 it demanded the nationalisation of all 
companies with more than 50 employees and the public ownership 
of all British owned shares in foreign companies. 
(33) 
The most widespread demonstration of support for public 
ownership in the constituencies, though, came when Gaitskell 
attempted to amend Clause Four of the constitution after the 
1959 election defeat. Sixty local parties sent resolutions to 
the NEC protesting against any proposed changes to the 
constitution which would downgrade the status of nationalisation 
as a central socialist objective. 
(34) Feelings clearly ran high 
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in some of these parties. In Stockport CLP only one delegate on 
the GMC supported Gaitskell's line. The remainder of the 
Committee endorsed a resolution which called for; 
'new proposals for social ownership which will make workers 
and consumers feel that they have a full share in the 
management and control of socialised industries. ' 
(35) 
Similarly, in Newcastle West CLP only one member voted against a 
resolution which described Clause Four as 'the main foundation 
plank of our movement', and which went on to state that a 
departure from this principle 'can only end in the destruction 
of the Party as an effective working class force'. 
(36) West 
Salford CLP went further and twice passed motions of no 
confidence in Gaitskell as leader of the Party - once in 
December 1959 and again in October 1960. 
(37) 
This controversy showed that the leadership had run ahead of 
the membership on the issue of Clause Four. As we have seen, 
Gaitskell was right to argue that nationalisation was unpopular 
with most voters, but he failed to appreciate the powerful 
symbolic importance of Clause Four for Party activists. The 
significance of this, though, should not be overstated. Although 
the leadership was defeated over the amendment to the 
constitution, nationalisation had already been downgraded as an 
element of policy by 1959. Labour's position on the ownership of 
industry was based mainly on the 1957 policy statement Industry 
and Society, a document which was at best lukewarm about the 
future nationalisation of whole industries. In fact, the only 
specific commitment to full-scale public ownership which 
survived in all three manifestos of 1955,1959 and 1964 was the 
renationalisation of the steel industry. In practice, therefore, 
the leadership largely freed itself from commitments in this 
area without encountering a substantial loss of support from the 
membership. As Harold Wilson observed in 1959, the local 
parties' commitment to Clause Four was largely a matter of 
tradition and ethics rather than policy; 
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'The Party faithful could paste Clause Four over their beds 
at night, but, provided no one rewrote the Constitution, in 
the morning they would happily work for the opposite'. 
(38) 
The activists' rearguard action over Clause Four, therefore, 
should not be seen as a major breach with the leadership. After 
the Clause Four controversy, it was noticeable that policy 
statements appeared to be much more positive about the role of 
public ownership as a component of economic management, but it 
was also significant that there was no increase in specific 
commitments on nationalisation. In other words, the local 
parties were uneasy about the abandonment of traditional 
socialist rhetoric, but they endorsed the policy of the Labour 
leadership -a policy which was based increasingly on the 
Croslandite thesis about public ownership and socialist 
objectives. 
In the same way that the activists commitment to public 
ownership can be seen to be rather more equivocal than is 
sometimes assumed, their apparent support for left-wing 
candidates for the constituency section of the NEC also deserves 
re-examination. As we have seen, this section of the NEC gained 
a reputation as a stronghold of the Left when Bevanites, who 
were locked in a struggle with the Party leadership, captured 
all seven of its places in 1952. Yet three of the longest 
serving members on the constituency section after 1955 were 
James Callaghan, Richard Crossman and Harold Wilson. All of 
these were associated closely with the Party hierarchy for much 
of the period under discussion. Wilson was Shadow Chancellor and 
later Shadow Foreign Secretary, Crossman was chosen to 
co-ordinate the 1959 election campaign and Callaghan was a 
loyalist who took over as Shadow Chancellor in 1961. Crossman 
and Wilson both fell out with Gaitskell after the 1959 defeat, 
but neither of them could have been mistaken for a member of the 
Labour Left-Their presence along with Callaghan on the NEC 
meant that there was only a bare left-wing majority in the 
constituency section after 1955. The four members who usually 
made up the left-wing block on this section - Barbara Castle, 
Tom Driberg, Anthony Greenwood and Ian Mikardo - owed their 
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success mainly to a combination of exposure through Tribune. and 
what Lewis Minkin has described as 'powerful forces of inertia' 
which enabled representatives to retain their seat on the NEC 
once elected. 
(39) Tribune was read widely in the constituencies 
and was often sold at local party meetings; it usually presented 
the socialist case in simple, fundamentalist terms and it 
provided left-wing candidates for the NEC with useful publicity. 
After election at Conference, constituency representatives 
benefitted from the exposure they gained as a members of the 
NEC, and also from the custom of CLPs to support virtually the 
same group of candidates each year. The composition of the 
constituency section of the NEC, therefore, did not reflect the 
presence of a strong left-wing ideology among activists nor a 
lack of support for the leadership. 
Although it has been argued so far that the local parties 
were a source of strength for Labour in this period, a recent 
charge against them is that they helped to prevent the Party 
from adapting to social change in the affluent society and thus 
contributed, to the sequence of election defeats in the 
1950s. (40) In essence, the local parties are accused of failing 
to understand the way in which society was changed by post-war 
prosperity and the development of new forms of consumerism. 
Consequently, it is argued, Labour lost touch with important 
sections of the electorate. It made little attempt to appeal 
specifically to women or to younger voters and instead continued 
to direct its message to male, working-class trade union 
members. 
The evidence of the local parties used in this study suggests 
that a proportion of CLPs were indeed suspicious of some of the 
social and cultural changes which took place after 1951 - 
particularly in terms of the development of consumerism and 
popular culture. For example, York CLP's resolution for 
Conference in 1963 expressed concern about the growing power of 
advertising and its effect on national life; it called on the 
NEC to devise policies which would ensure that a future Labour 
government stop waste, exploitation of the consumer, and other 
abuses by commercial advertising'. 
(41) Woolwich CLP had earlier 
supported a branch resolution from the engineers' union which 
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opposed the start of commercial television on the grounds that 
it would be dominated by 'big business concerns'. The same 
branch also called for a boycott of cinemas which showed 'the 
degrading American films which glorify violence, war and 
brutality thus poisoning the minds of the young people of this 
country j. 
(42) One activist from Hornchurch CLP believed that 
people's priorities became confused in the 19509. In his view, 
spending on durables and luxuries replaced spending on 
essentials; 
'We could see British society changing and we were desperate 
to put a halt to that element of Conservatism that was coming 
in - the get-rich-quick society of Harold Macmillan ... the 
first signs of me first and greed. Outside the Labour Party, 
it was obvious that people were beginning to get more 
concerned with their own affairs and improving their own 
position and the wonderful spirit that was around in 1945 had 
dissipated ... I remember the horror my wife and I felt when we 
saw a young family from the East End at Stratford Co-op - the 
children obviously needed some decent footwear, the mother 
was rather shabbily dressed - discussing the merits of 
various television sets. ' 
(43) 
The Party's 1959 election manifesto certainly reflected the 
idea that consumerism and affluence were in some way 
superficial. Instead, the emphasis was on traditional Labour 
themes such as tackling poverty, narrowing the gap between the 
'haves' and the 'have nots', and criticising the Tories for 
their refusal to use economic controls. 
(44) The Conservatives in 
contrast caught the mood of a greater share of the public with a 
campaign which emphasised the optimism of the late 1950s and 
which promised to protect individual prosperity - it was 
summarised by the slogan, 'Life's better with the Conservatives, 
Don't let Labour ruin it'. But is it reasonable to argue that 
the CLPs acted as a brake which prevented Labour from broadening 
its appeal to the wider electorate in the years of prosperity 
after 1951? Were the CLPs in some way responsible for Labour's 
election defeats in the 19509? 
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These are difficult issues to resolve with any degree of 
certainty, but three points are worthy of note. First, it has 
been argued throughout this thesis that Labour was unlikely to 
win the elections of 1955 and 1959, regardless of the way in 
which it shaped its appeal. There was simply no compelling 
reason for the country to vote for a change of government in 
either of these contests, so to hold any section of the Party 
responsible for the defeats makes little sense. Secondly, it 
should be recongnised that individual Labour Party members 
played a vital role in elections between 1951 and 1964. Much of 
the credit for the consistency of Labour's electoral performance 
in this period should be given to the local activists who 
ensured that Labour supporters cast their vote. After the 1955 
defeat, Labour's National Agent calculated that the Party had 
lost 35 seats in marginal constituencies primarily because of 
poor organisation. 
(45) This shows the impact which a sharp drop 
in Labour's membership could have made before 1964. The Party 
was at least organised a little more efficiently after 1955, but 
this was only made possible by the continued commitment of Party 
activists. Labour won a very narrow victory in 1964 - the loss 
of just two marginal seats through poor organisation at a local 
level would have cost Wilson his majority. The third and final 
point to make is that the collapse in Labour's share of the vote 
in general elections since 1970 has coincided with a sharp 
decline in individual membership (see Table I). This implies 
that a large individual membership is important in electoral 
terms for Labour and that the size of the Party's membership 
between 1951 and 1964 was a further sign of Labour's strength 
and vitality in the period. 
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9. Conclusion 
Post-war prosperity damaged the electoral fortunes of the Labour 
Party for at least a decade after it left office in 1951. In an 
era of full employment, economic growth and widespread affluence 
there was simply no compelling reason for the country to vote 
for a change of government in the general elections of 1955 and 
1959. The remarkable feature of the Party's support in these 
circumstances, therefore, is its consistency rather than its 
decline. Despite the fact that economic conditions favoured the 
Conservative Governments, Labour's average share of the vote in 
the general elections of 1955 and 1959 was 45.1 per cent. In the 
context of Labour's performance in elections since the extension 
of the franchise in 1918 this is an unusually high percentage. 
Between 1918 and 1951 the Party's average share of the vote was 
36.2 per cent. Between 1918 and 1992 its average share was 37.7 
per cent. In fact, Labour has not managed to poll more than 40 
per cent of the vote since 1970. 
(1) It should also be remembered 
that no British party since 1918 has won a greater share of the 
vote than Labour in 1955 or 1959 and failed to secure a majority 
of seats in Parliament. 
(2) 
Historians who wish to emphasise the decline in Labour's 
electoral support between 1951 and 1959 have pointed to the fall 
in the Party's aggregate vote over the period: this declined 
from 13.9 million in 1951 to 12.2 million in 1959. 
(3) These 
figures, however, should be approached with a degree of caution. 
Labour's aggregate vote in 1951 was unusually high largely 
because of the reduced number of Liberal candidates in the 
contest. Only 109 Liberal candidates fought in the 1951 
election, whereas 216 stood in 1959. 
(4) If the 1955 election is 
used as the basis for comparison, Labour's aggregate vote in the 
period which is covered by this thesis remained stable: the 
totals are 12.4 million in 1955,12.2 million in 1959 and 12.2 
million in 1964. 
(5) 
Again it should be recognised that these are 
historically high totals for the Labour Party. Only in 1950, 
1951 and 1966 has the Party secured d greater aggregate vote 
than it did in the contests of 1955 and 1959. 
(6) One other factor 
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also supports the proposition that Labour maintained its 
electoral popularity in the 1950s in difficult circumstances. 
The Party enjoyed a lead in the Gallup opinion polls on voting 
intentions for most of the period between December 1951 and 
December 1959 - this included an unbroken Labour lead between 
November 1955 and June 1958. 
(7) 
As we have seen, it was the consistency of this support which 
helped to bring Labour back into government in 1964. The Party's 
aggregate vote in 1964 was approximately 10,000 fewer than it 
had been in 1959, and its share of the vote rose by just 0.3 per 
cent. This level of support was sufficient to secure Labour's 
victory in 1964 because of a sharp decline in Conservative 
support and a large increase in the Liberal vote. As the General 
Secretary's analysis of the 1964 result acknowledged; 
'Labour won not by any increase in Labour support, but by 
massive defections from the Tories ... The large scale 
intervention of Liberal candidates no doubt was responsible 
to some degree for the failure to increase the Labour 
vote ... In terms of seats Liberal intervention probably was 
more helpful than harmful.. '(8) 
The fact that Labour was able to return to power in 1964 with 
approximately the same level of support as it enjoyed in 1955 
and 1959 suggests that the familiar descriptions of weakness and 
failure which have been applied to the Party in the 19509 are 
inAccurate. It has been argued throughout this thesis that 
Labour won the 1964 election largely because of developments 
which took place in the Party before 1960. These developments 
ensured that Labour was able to take advantage of the political 
misfortune of the Conservatives after 1960; as the elections of 
1983,1987 and 1992 demonstrated, Labour does not profit 
inevitably from the unpopularity of Conservative governments. 
(9) 
After the defeat of 1951, the Labour leadership asserted its 
authority in the Party, marginalised its opponents on the Left 
and began to formulate a programme which aimed to build on the 
reforms of the Attlee Governments. After the 1955 election the 
Parliamentary Labour Party was organised into a more effective 
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opposition with the allocation of shadow posts to front bench 
spokesmen. Organisation of local parties in marginal 
constituencies was improved and the commitment of Labour 
activists was maintained, despite the disappointment of 
consecutive election defeats. In addition to improvements in 
organisation, the Party also adopted more modern campaigning 
techniques after 1955 and made particularly effective use of 
televised broadcasts in the 1959 contest. More importantly, 
Labour began a long-term review of policy in 1955 which 
eventually provided the basis of the Party's manifestos in 1959 
and 1964. The programme which the policy makers produced during 
the review was dominated by the ideas of Gaitskell, Crosland and 
the revisionists: it was marked by optimism in the existing 
balance in the mixed economy and by a strong commitment to 
increased social and economic equality. As we have seen, this 
programme remained largely unchanged between 1959 and 1964. The 
main development in Labour's programme after 1959 was an 
increased emphasis on the theme of planning. However, this 
emphasis on planning appears to have made only a limited impact 
on the electorate. It is also worth noting that the commitment 
to economic planning was one of the least successful components 
of the Wilson Government's programme after October 1964. The 
national plan was effectively abandoned in July 1966 and the 
achievements of the Ministry of Technology were limited. 
(10) In 
contrast, the commitment to greater social equality, which had 
been at the centre of Labour's programme in 1959, provided the 
Wilson Government with some of its most notable successes. 
Important reforms were carried out in the fields of education, 
pensions, social security and housing. Liberal legislation was 
passed on homosexuality, divorce and abortion between 1964 and 
1970 and progress was also made on equal pay between the 
(11) 
sexes. 
A full comparative study of the Wilson Government's reforms 
and policy-making in the Labour Party during the thirteen years 
of opposition will not be possible until the public records for 
the whole period are available. An examination of the Party 
between 1951 and 1964 which makes full use of Hugh Gaitskell's 
papers is similarly impossible until the collection is made 
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available to researchers. Much more work is also required on the 
history of Labour's constituency parties. This thesis, however, 
has focused on the Labour Party's attempt to recover from the 
loss of office in 1951. It has argued in particular that the 
1950s can be seen as a positive and productive period for the 
Party. Post-war prosperity for a time appeared to threaten 
Labour's future as a party of government in Britain: 
developments in the Party in the 1950s helped to ensure that 
Labour regained power at the first realistic opportunity after 
1951. 
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Appendix 
United Kingdom General Election results, 1951-1964. 
General Election, October 1951 - Turnout 82.6 per cent 
Percentage 
Party Total votes of vote Candidates Elected 
Conservative 13,718,199 4?. o 617 321 
Labour 13,948,883 48.8 617 295 
Liberal 730,546 2.6 109 6 
Others 198,966 0.6 23 3 
Total 28,596,594 100 1,376 625 
General Election, May 1955 - Turnout 76.8 per cent 
Percentage 
Party Total votes of vote Candidates Elected 
Conservative 13,310,891 49.7 624 345 
Labour 12,405,254 46.4 620 277 
Liberal 722,402 2.7 110 6 
Others 321,182 1.2 55 2 
Total 26,759,729 100 1,409 630 
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General Election, October 1959 - Turnout 78.7 per cent 
Percentage 
Party Total votes of vote Candidates 
Conservative 13,750,875 49.4 625 
Labour 12,216,172 43.8 621 
Liberal 1,640,760 5.9 216 
Others 254,845 0.9 74 
Total 27,862,652 100 1,536 
General Election, October 1964 - Turnout 77.1 per cent 
Percentage 
Party Total votes of vote Candidates 
Conservative 12,002,642 
Labour 12,205,808 
Liberal 3,099,283 
Others 349,415 
Total 27,657,148 
43.4 630 
44.1 628 
11.2 365 
1.3 134 
100 1,757 
Elected 
365 
258 
6 
1 
630 
Elected 
304 
317 
9 
0 
630 
Source - F. W. S. Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1832-1987, 
(Hampshire, 1989 edn), pp. 37-40. 
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